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Effective policy depends in substantial part on 
the capacity of policy-makers to predict accu­
rately the consequences of their actions; and 
this ability depends in turn on their having a 
valid theory or "model" of the relationships be­
tween their actions and their effects, between 
means and ends. 
T w o different models, those employed by 
hawks and doves, were inherent in the princi­
pal positions that were taken by policy-makers 
and their critics in the long and acrimonious 
debate on h o w and whether the Vietnam W a r 
was to be fought and what were or should be 
the goals of the United States in fighting or 
getting out. The h a w k and dove models are 
essentially folk theories; that is, they are pre­
sumptive notions about international behavior 
in a limited conflict, and incorporate simplified 
versions of certain theories of h u m a  n behavior. 
They represent quite different perceptions of 
the nature of the war and those waging it, the 
propriety and utility of American involvement, 
the probable outcome of the conflict, and the 
steps that should be taken either to achieve or 
to avoid the end predicted. 
Examination of these models is of critical 
importance to assess their validity and there­
fore their soundness as the basis for making 
policy decisions, as well as to understand w h  y 
so m a n  y of the policies and plans that were de­
signed to end the war instead prolonged and 
expanded it. H o  w valid the folk theories are 
that inform policies and govern actions deter­
mines h o  w well policy-makers are able to pre­
dict and evaluate the consequences of their o w  n 
actions. The accuracy of those predictions has 
important implications for the political process. 
If, for example, principal policy-makers had 
accurately predicted that their Vietnam policies 
would fail to achieve their publicly announced 
objectives, one could infer quite different m o  ­
tives and political principles to the makers of 
policy than are commonly assumed to be those 
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Introduction 
At the beginning of 1965 the Vietnam W a r was primarily a guerrilla 
war between the government of South Vietnam and the National Liber­
ation Front, with the United States and North Vietnam primarily sup­
plying advice and material support.* Within a few years the United 
States was embroiled in one of the largest and costliest wars of its 
history, exceeded in the number of casualties only by World W a r II, 
the American Civil W a r , and World W a r I. United States and North 
Vietnamese combat troops assumed the major burden of the fighting. 
The United States conducted massive bombing of North Vietnam. The 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China supplied the North 
Vietnamese with the most sophisticated weapons of modern war. Both 
sides m a d  e great h u m a  n and material commitments, and suffered tens 
of thousands of casualties. A n  d the country and people of Vietnam— 
both North and South—were devastated. 
Yet despite the increased commitments of m e  n and materiel, the 
military and diplomatic efforts, the violence, and the costs, neither 
side defeated the other militarily nor attained its primary goal: exclu­
sive political control of South Vietnam. 
This book is an analysis of the dynamics of the Vietnam War—what 
the general patterns of military and political interaction were during 
the war. The analysis is both theoretical and empirical, and uses statis­
tical methods to examine monthly quantitative data systematically. The 
quantitative data represent monthly measures of military forces, actions 
and casualties; political support in Vietnam and in the United States; 
and of public statements about the war by leaders on both sides. 
Effective policy depends in part upon the ability of policy-makers 
to predict the consequences of their actions. The ability to predict 
depends in turn upon having a valid theory or "model" of the relation­
ship between actions and consequences—between means and ends. Pol­
icy-makers have asserted different models of the structure of relation­
**Throughout this study the political entities in Vietnam will be referred to by 
their commonly used names rather than by their legal names. "South Vietnam" is 
the Republic of Vietnam: "North Vietnam" is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; 
and the "Viet Cong" is used synonymously with the National Liberation Front and 
the Provisional Revolutionary Government. 
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ships in the Vietnam W a r . T w o such models became prominent: those 
represented in the so-called haw k and dove policy positions. H a w  k 
and dove policy models represent "folk theories" about the conflict, 
i.e., sets of concepts and interrelations among them used by individuals 
to think about a problem. While hawk and dove folk theories predict 
the consequences of military actions in the war, the predictions of 
these two theories in general contradict each other. 
H o  w well the policy-makers were able to predict and evaluate the 
consequences of their o w  n actions, and thus h o  w valid folk theories 
that informed their policies were, has very important implications about 
the political process that underlies their policies and conduct of the 
war. If American policy-makers, for example, had accurately predicted 
that their policies and actions would not have achieved their policy 
objectives in Vietnam, and would have lead instead to the tragic conse­
quences that did occur, one would infer very different motives and 
moral principles underlying their conduct of the war than one would 
if American policy-makers had m a d  e poor predictions about the conse­
quences of their policies and actions. If the former were true, one 
might conclude that cynical calculation of international and domestic 
political advantage guided American policy in Vietnam. If the latter 
were true, one might conclude that American policies and actions in 
Vietnam were the inadvertant consequences of miscalculation. Thus, 
the models of the conflict that guided decision-making are of great 
concern to our understanding of the actions and policies chosen in 
the war. 
In this book the models of the conflict held by the principal policy-
makers are explicated from their public and private statements about 
the relationships that they assumed to exist between particular means 
and ends in the war. These models and the policies based upon them 
are analyzed theoretically and evaluated against factual criteria. Inef­
fective policies are shown to be based on invalid assumptions about 
the empirical relationships between policy means and ends. 
Empirically valid relationships amon  g military actions and political 
consequences in the war are represented as an interrelated set of time-
lagged statistical equations in linear multiple regression form. These 
equations are used as the model for a computer simulation of the 
Vietnam W a r that makes predictions on a monthly basis of all the 
military and political variables in the model. These predictions reveal 
the implications not only of the actual policies that were followed during 
the war but of alternative policies recommended by both hawks and 
doves as well. 
Finally, a basic political dilemma that confronted leaders on both 
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sides of the war is analyzed theoretically and empirically—the trade­
offs they had to m a k e between extending their political power over 
others and retaining the political support that is the basis of their 
o w n power. 
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Theories Underlying 
Hawk and Dove Policy Models 
Policy-makers engage in theorizing and model-building: they prefer 
certain goals and act to achieve them; they perceive relationships be­
tween their behavior and their goals; and they predict the expected 
consequences of alternative actions they consider. Such predictions m a  y 
be of the form: "If I do A because xx, x2, x3, . . . xn are the w a y 
they are, then outcomes Blt B2, B3, . . . Bn will follow." In short, 
policy-makers act on the basis of expectations derived from past expe­
rience, and these expectations are synthesized into models. T h e theories 
and models that can be explicitly analyzed are those that come from 
the policy-makers' o w n private and public statements and those inferred 
from their behavior in different situations. 
Policy models that have been asserted by leaders on the same side 
of the Vietnam W a  r are in some cases as different from each other 
as they are from those of leaders on the other side. Policy-makers 
have been divided in their views of the relationships between means 
and ends in the war. T w  o basic orientations toward the conflict that 
have emerged on each side are popularly referred to as "hawk" and 
"dove." 
H a w  k and dove policy models are folk theories about international 
behavior in a limited conflict that contain simplified versions of certain 
psychological and behavioral theories. In particular, these policy models 
are related to theories of political behavior. "Politics" can be partially de­
fined as the distribution of values over which there is conflict, "power" 
as the process of achieving values by changing or continuing (i.e., 
controlling) the behavior of those with w h o  m one is in conflict. In 
international relations, because legitimate authority is rarely recognized, 
the behavior of another actor is changed either by obtaining his volun­
tary compliance through the use of persuasion or bargaining or his 
involuntary compliance through the use of coercion. Against this theo­
retical background h a w k and dove policy models can be seen as compet­
ing theories of behavior compliance and modification: the h a w k model 
emphasizes controlling the adversary's behavior by threatening or using 
coercive punishments; the dove model emphasizes the use of promises 
and rewards, including self-restraint, to attain voluntary compliance. 
Both theories predict the consequences of escalating or deescalating 
hostile actions against an adversary. Both assume a limited conflict 
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in which it is not military capability but the will to pursue policy 
objectives by coercive means that determines behavior and outcomes. 
Thus, h a w k and dove models deal with questions of commitments 
to strategic goals, not battlefield tactics. In a battlefield situation the 
application of superior military force to destroy an enemy's manpower 
and weaponry m a  y well be the most efficacious means of controlling 
an adversary. In a protracted, limited war, as in Vietnam, however, 
it is not possible to destroy the enemy's total military strength because 
of physical and political reasons. It is not necessary to destroy a country 
in order to defeat it. Even major wars have involved losses of less 
than 11 percent of the total population of the warring nations—not 
enough to render a country ineffective but, demonstrably, enough to 
convince the leaders to stop thefighting.1 Th  e implicit rules of limited 
wars limit destruction of the enemy's military capabilities even more. 
Thus, the most central concerns of the conduct and termination of 
limited wars are issues of will, commitment to political objectives, and 
other psychological factors in decision-making and conflict behavior. 
T h  e major theoretical focus of h a w  k and dove models is similar 
to that of deterrence theory. T h e main difference is that h a w k and 
dove policy models of limited wars are concerned with h o  w to diminish 
and end a war once one is involved in one—the hawks by winning 
it, the doves by stopping it to end the violence—whereas deterrence 
theory is concerned primarily with preventing a war from starting. 
Prior to involvement in a war, the primary concern of dove models 
also is h o w to avoid war, whereas h a w k models are more concerned 
with h o w wars might be used to achieve desired goals. 
Once involved in a limited war, the h a w k theory predicts that escala­
tion will reduce an enemy's hostile behavior. T h e dove theory predicts 
that escalating one's o w  n hostile actions will increase the enemy's. Th  e 
dove theory maintains that to persuade an adversary to reduce his 
hostile actions, one must reduce one's o w n toward him. The h a w k theory 
asserts that such deescalation would only lead the enemy to take advan­
tage of the respite and escalate his hostilities. 
Both theories contain crucial assumptions and hypotheses about h o  w 
people behave in a limited conflict. T  o understand the theoretical bases 
of these policies, let us look briefly at the simplified versions of some 
general theories of h u m a  n behavior that are contained in the h a w  k and 
dove policy models. 
LEARNING, STRESS, AND EXCHANGE THEORIES 
H a w  k and dove policy models draw upon simplified versions of 
three general theories of h u m a  n behavior: learning theory, stress theory, 
and exchange theory. 
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The main assumption drawn horn'stress theory is that a person acts 
to reduce stresses, tensions, and pressures that result w h e  n external 
conditions upset his equilibrium. This theory pays particular attention 
to "irrational" behavior, in which relief from tension, rather than maximi­
zation of values, is sought. Examples of stress theories are H o w a r d 
and Scott's2 theory of the stress resulting from being unable to cope 
with a problem, and frustration-aggression theory, in which frustration 
is conceptualized as tension due to blocked impulses.3 Stress theory 
explains one major motivation of behavior. 
F r o m learning theory (in particular, operant-conditioning) h a w  k and 
dove models take the assumption that people modify their behavior 
on the basis of their past experience. They perform more and more 
frequently behavior associated with subsequent rewards and perform 
less and less frequently behavior associated with subsequent punish­
ments. W h a t constitutes a reward or punishment m a y be inherent in 
the individual4 or group or established by external norms.5 
In some of their hypotheses h a w k and dove models implicitly assume 
rational actors. Exchange theory is a variant of the rational theories 
of h u m a n behavior, which provide still another explanation of what 
motivates behavior. Rational theories assume that people try to get 
at the least cost more of what they value. People are assumed to have 
sets of goals consistently ordered in terms of their relative value to 
the individual. People pursue goals through the exchange of actions 
that each values differently. In trying to obtain these goals, people 
m a k  e comprehensive searches for all possible instrumental actions (sub­
ject to time and information costs), calculate the probabilities of each 
action's success, and then select the action or set of actions that maxi­
mizes the values of the actor. Exchange theory assumes interaction 
between two or more rational actors. Goals sought are instrumental 
or terminal, and include compliance, power, status, wealth, knowledge, 
loyalty, and well-being.6 
These three general theories in their simplified forms are similar and 
complementary in m a n  y respects. All three posit that people act in 
order to obtain something they want (rewards, values, or relief from 
stress) and to avoid or minimize things they do not want (punishments, 
stresses, or costs). Thus, all three theories assume that h u m a n behavior 
is purposive. The motivating mechanisms in the three theories are simi­
lar conceptually. Increasing a stress can be considered punishing; reduc­
ing a stress (or any other punishment), rewarding. 
Th  e h a w  k and dove versions of these theories posit that the acts 
of one side in a conflict that are negatively valued by the other (e.g., 
hostile or violent acts) are stress-producing or punishing. T h  e behavior 
of the punished side would then tend to be extinguished, because 
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people seek to avoid punishment (according to learning theory) and 
minimize costs or negative values (exchange theory). Similarly, positive­
ly valued acts (e.g., those perceived as friendly) can be considered 
stress-reducing or rewarding. Behavior thus rewarded would tend to 
be reinforced and repeated, because people seek rewards, to reduce 
stress, and to maximize values. In general, h a w  k and dove models 
consider rewards and punishments to be political, military, or economic. 
These three basic theories are not altogether compatible. A major 
difference lies in their predictions concerning h u m a  n behavior in a 
conflict. Stress theory hypothesizes that a person under severe stress 
is not likely to m a k  e a rational choice, because high degrees of stress 
impair the ability to learn, to order priorities consistently, to perceive 
accurately, and to seek and consider all relevant information. Thus, 
under conditions of high stress, it is possible that an individual would 
choose an action that increased rather than decreased the punishment 
he experienced. Exchange theory, as a theory of rational action, assumes 
that goals will be consistently ordered, regardless of the amount of 
stress. Learning theory assumes that all relevant information about 
contingent rewards and punishments is present. 
These three general theories explain different aspects of behavior, 
and thus their theoretical assumptions are different. Learning theory 
assumes there are few behavior alternatives, but that rewards can vary 
greatly. Rational theories, on the other hand, assume a great number 
of possible behaviors, but a restricted number of rewards. Ideally, one 
would like to combine these theories into a more general theory con­
taining m a n y behavior alternatives and m a n y reward alternatives. H a w  k 
and dove models draw upon a simplified version of such a combined 
general theory. 
It is not surprising that folk theories have adopted simplified versions 
of general behavioral theories, for educated policy-makers have had 
some exposure to the formal theories. Prescriptive rational decision-
making models, for example, have been explicitly held as a norm by 
some U . S . policy-makers, and systems analysis and operations research 
have been incorporated into some aspects of military policy-making. 
In addition, exponents of rational theories believe they should be ap­
plied in policy-making. Leading learning theorists (e.g., B . F . Skinner) 
have asserted that learning theory can be applied to h u m a  n behavior.7 
Osgood claims that people can learn reinforcement contingencies. A 
first actor can condition the behavior of a second by making his behavior 
contingent upon that of the second. This principle can be applied to 
the deescalation of a conflict.8 
In using parts of learning, stress, and exchange theories, h a w k and 
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dove policy models, assume that the actor is a unit, conceived as a 
policy-making group or individual leader w h  o chooses actions for the 
nation. Moreover, it is assumed that the behavior of one actor is respon­
sive to the behavior of another actor. These assumptions of responsive 
unitary actors do not explicitly take into account other plausible expla­
nations of national decision-making and action, especially those that 
consider complex organizational processes and bureaucratic and do­
mestic politics.9 T h e use of learning, exchange, and stress theories to 
explain and predict the behavior of unitary national actors assumes 
that the stresses, values, rewards, and punishments ascribed to the 
unitary actor are more important in determining national behavior than 
the interests of lower-level bureaucrats and politicians. N  o theoretical 
conceptualization is "true" in a metaphysical sense. T h  e purpose of 
constructing a theory is to derive explanations and predictions the 
validity of which can then be tested against the facts. H a w  k and dove 
models assume unitary responsive national actors. T h  e following analy­
ses m a k e this same assumption in order to test the adequacy of these 
models. 
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF INTERACTION 
H a w  k and dove models not only use simplified versions of learning, 
stress, and exchange theories to explain what motivates and conditions 
a single actor's behavior, but they also use the notion of linking the 
behavior of two or more actors to explain dynamic interaction. T h e 
behavior of each actor is considered a stimulus to the other actor, 
and each is conceptualized as responding to the behavior of the other. 
It will be useful to review briefly the theoretical concepts of interaction 
upon which the simplified h a w k and dove folk theories are based, 
and h o  w the concepts derived from learning, stress, and exchange the­
ories are incorporated into theories of conflict interaction. 
Stimulus-Response Models 
In the simplest models, international conflict is conceptualized as 
a fight. A  n actor is considered to react without thinking to the attack 
of another actor w h  o is trying to control his behavior. H  e responds 
to hostility with increased hostility, and a combative cycle ensues.10 
In a fight both self and mutual control is diminished in a spiraling 
pattern of escalation. This process can be represented as a simple recip­
rocated stimulus-response pattern, i.e., each actor's behavioral response 
is a stimulus to the other actor: Stimulus from Actor A -> Response 
from Actor B (— Stimulus) -> Response from Actor A  , and so on. 
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Since this process is conceived as automatic, with the actions of 
each actor serving as starting points for the opposing actor's counter­
actions, each step in afight should be predictable (increasingly violent 
actions), and only rising costs or destruction of one or both of the 
actors could terminate the fight. 
Mediated Stimulus-Response Models 
T h e second general type of model, the mediated stimulus-response 
model, includes the class of variables included in learning, stress, and 
exchange theories. Explanations of the relationship between the behav­
ior to which an actor is subjected and the behavior that actor subse­
quently exhibits include characteristics of the actor. T h  e simplest rep­
resentation of this model is the S - O - R paradigm, which indicates that 
response (R) is affected by the stimulus (S) as mediated by attributes 
of the actor or organism (O) producing the response.11 
Since the theories most relevant to policy-making conceive of the 
individual decision-maker as the actor or "organism" in the S - O - R para­
digm of international conflict, these theories emphasize psychological 
attributes as mediating factors, including perception, evaluation, inten­
tion, and learning.12 
T w  o synthetic concepts that summarize m a n y of the psychological 
functions attributed to individual decision-makers in the S - O - R model 
have been developed by T h o m a s and Znaniecki13 and refined by March 
and Simon,1 4 Snyder et al.,15 and Brody.16 These are the "definition 
of the situation" and the "definition of policy." 
In defining the situation, an actor observes his environment (includ­
ing the behavior of other actors) and receives information from it 
(including communications from other actors). H  e decodes and inter­
prets this information, and forms an image of the environment and 
the actors in it congruent with his past experience. This process is 
affected by the actor's values, personality traits, past experience, learn­
ing, m e m o r y , and situational factors such as stress, threat, and time 
constraints. 
In defining policy, an actor is motivated to achieve what he perceives 
as desirable and to avoid what he considers undesirable. T h e motiva­
tions are a function of the actors' habits, values, perceptions of possible 
success, and specific incentives.17 A  n actor selects actions on the basis 
of perceived associations between specific behaviors and desired re­
wards1 8 in order to narrow the gap between the situations preferred 
and the ones perceived.19 
In both definition of situation and definition of policy, perception 
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plays a key role in determining an actor's response to a given stimulus. 
Misperception of a stimulus, such as the behavior of the adversary, 
m a y lead an actor to respond inappropriately to the stimulus.20 
O n  e source of misperception is cognitive rigidity.21 For example, 
a dogmatic unchanging image of an enemy leads to inaccurate per­
ceptions of his behavior or his intentions. A  n enemy might attempt 
to deescalate a conflict, but that attempt m a y not be perceived because 
of an unchanging hostile image of that enemy. Thus, policy-makers 
might fail to respond to peaceful overtures and instead increase the 
intensity of their violent behavior. 
In their studies on the outbreak of World W a  r I, Holsti, North, 
and Brody22 and Zinnes23 found that policy-makers on one side per­
ceived the behavior of their adversary to be more hostile or threatening 
than it was intended to be. This misperception led to increased hostile 
intent and more violent behavior. W h e  n this misperception occurred 
on both sides of the conflict, an escalating conflict spiral ensued. This 
process m a  y be diagrammed as in Figure 1, in which misperception 
Actor A 
A 's preferences and A 's 
intentions for own behavior 
behavior 
Actor B 
B's preferences and 
intentions for own 
behavior 
Figure 1. Misperception Leading to Escalation 
is indicated by an arrow broken by an X  . Thus, misperceptions can be 
not only perpetuated but magnified and built upon w h e n they occur 
on both sides of a conflict. 
Other mediating factors include bureaucratic commitments. Policies 
m a d  e within the framework of large bureaucratic organizations tend 
to be relatively resistant to change. Bureaucrats have their o w n interests 
dependent on policies to which they have committed themselves, e.g., 
officers in the U . S  . Air Force are generally committed to the use of 
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air power. Even if a deescalation by North Vietnam were accurately 
perceived by top policy-makers, preferences in the U . S  . Air Force for 
continued use of air power would m a k e a cessation of all bombing less 
likely. 
T h e intervening variables represented by the " O " in the S - O - R model 
clearly m a k e for a more comprehensive and valid representation of 
reality. As will be shown, h a w k and dove models sometimes incorporate 
such mediating factors. T h  e importance attached to these factors, espe­
cially to enemy perceptions and preferences, however, affects the ability 
of h a w k and dove models to explain interactions. 
Linked Mediated Stimulus-Response Models 
Linked mediated stimulus-response models (SA —> O j . —> RA  -> SB —> 
O B -} RB) also take interdependence into account. Rapoport24 theo­
rizes that in a "game" the outcome of a conflict depends not only 
upon the outputs or attributes of either actor but also on their inter­
dependent expectations of what the opponent's behavior in a given 
situation will be. W h e  n both actors in a "prisoner's dilemma" g a m e 
try to maximize their o w n values by exploiting the other's cooperation, 
the empirical result is a long series of exploiting choices by both actors 
in which neither cooperates with the other.25 T h  e effect is analogous 
to escalation that leads to counterescalation, in which neither side is 
willing to risk cooperation because each fears exploitation by the other. 
Another model of interaction26 consists of a pair of simultaneous 
differential equations of the form dx/dt = ky — ax -f- g and dy/dt 
= Ix — by -f- h. Richardson was concerned with the rate of increase 
in arms budgets, but one could substitute armed hostilities. T h e rate 
of increase in hostilities is a function of the sensitivity (k and I) of 
one actor to the other actor's level of hostility, times that level (x 
and y), minus a fatigue or cost factor (a and b), times the current 
level of each actor's o w  n hostile behavior (x and y), plus the amount 
of grievance toward the other actor or commitment to political goals 
(g and h). Richardson's concepts of sensitivity and grievance, which 
in his model determine the course of the interaction, are similar to medi­
ating psychological factors conceptualized by other theorists. 
T h  e parameters k or I in the Richardson equations could theoretically 
represent perception as well as sensitivity or propensity to react to 
enemy behavior. Boulding27 has shown in an analysis of the Richardson 
equations that the rate of increase in hostility depends upon this reac­
tion coefficient. Lagerstrom,28 in an analysis of simultaneous differential 
equation models of the Richardson type, has demonstrated that a spiral­
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ing arms race or escalation of hostilities will occur w h e  n the product of 
the reaction coefficients of the two sides in a conflict is greater than one. 
Thus, an explanation of escalating conflict behavior predicted in the 
Richardson model is misperception of the behavior of the adversary. 
This interpretation of the parameters k and I of the Richardson model is 
more satisfying than one in which there is a parameter with no empirical 
referent, because perception is a concept that can be operationalized 
and measured.29 
A model proposed by North30 represents most of the mediating vari­
ables posited by the foregoing theorists: S (stimulus) -> r (perception 
or definition of the situation) —> s (preference or definition of policy) 
—> R (response). This theoretically comprehensive model of conflict in­
teraction forms the basis for a synthesized mediated stimulus-response 
model of the escalation of the Vietnam W a  r diagrammed in figure 
2. T h  e conceptual components of the "definition of the situation" and 
the "definition of policy" are indicated for only one actor. In this dia­
gram each actor in the conflict is conceptually linked to the other 
through outcomes that are dependent upon the behavior of both, and 
through each actor's perceptions of outcomes and of the behavior of 
the other actor. Reflecting the work of the theorists mentioned above, 
this S - O - R model was constructed as an example of the theoretical 
factors that must be taken into account to explain the dynamics of in­
teraction. 
Given the nature of the data publicly available, including the formerly 
top-secret "Pentagon Papers," it is impossible to operationalize and 
to test systematically all the links in this model, particularly the relation­
ships a m o n g the psychological variables. However , this synthesized 
model of mediating mechanisms operating in dynamic interaction is 
an example of the w a y in which the complexity of conflict interactions 
can be represented, and provides a comparison to the theoretically 
simpler h a w k and dove policy models. Keeping in mind this brief 
discussion of the simplified versions of learning, stress, and exchange 
theories and of general models of dynamic interaction, w e shall n o w 
turn to the specific details of h a w  k and dove models as they relate 
to escalation and deescalation. 
HAWK AND DOVE POLICY MODELS 
T h e h a w k policy prescription for reducing enemy violence in a limited 
war has been to increase one's o w n violent actions. T h e hawks' hypothe­
sis is that, in the face of escalated violence, the enemy's motivation 
to continue the war at an intensified level will be reduced. T h e theoreti­
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cal reason for an enemy to deescalate is that beyond some tolerable 
point the punishment, stress, and costs resulting from the escalated 
violence would, in the enemy's mind, outweigh any possible future 
reward (e.g., future political control over disputed territory and peo­
ple). Thus, following learning theory as well as exchange theory, the 
hawks hypothesize that in the face of overwhelming punishment the 
enemy's violent behavior will be extinguished. T h e hawks assume that 
the enemy will m a k e the same evaluation of punishments and rewards 
regarding the violence to which it is subjected and the worth of its 
political objectives as would the actor applying the punishment in the 
same situation. 
The dove policy model maintains that, to reduce enemy violence, 
one should reduce one's o w n violent actions toward him; for even 
though an enemy's capabilities to engage in violence will remain intact, 
his motivation to use them will be reduced. Theoretically, by deescalat­
ing violence against an enemy, one reduces the punishments, stresses, 
and costs he bears. F r o  m the viewpoint of exchange theory, such a 
reduction induces an enemy to deescalate his o w n hostile efforts because 
he can continue to pursue his long-range political objectives, but at 
less cost to himself, if he reduces his o w  n hostile efforts. T h  e dove's 
hypothesis is that the enemy will act to be cost/effective, and therefore 
continue to reciprocate a deescalation of hostilities. 
F r o  m the viewpoint of learning theory, reciprocal deescalation is 
relatively rewarding to an enemy and to oneself (less punishment is 
inflicted upon both and both can pursue their o w  n objectives using 
relatively less effort and fewer resources). As each side reduces its 
hostilities still further in response to its enemy's decreasing violence, 
these reductions would become mutually reinforcing.31 
The dove policy model has two different sets of basic assumptions: 
one is strictly normative, the other is empirical and pragmatic. Different 
doves consider their importance differently. T h  e basic normative as­
sumption of the dove policy model is: (1) violence is morally wrong. 
Other more pragmatic assumptions of the dove model are: (2) increased 
violence is ineffective in changing the behavior of an enemy because 
potential political power is more rewarding to him than present or 
anticipated increases in hostile actions are punishing to him; (3) actors 
can beflexible about their political objectives and hostile behavior; 
(4) political objectives are not worth unnecessary costs; (5) attempts 
to recoup past losses are not worth additional costs; (6) mutual reduc­
tion of violence is desirable and advantageous to both sides; and (7) 
an enemy will recognize a unilateral attempt to deescalate violence 
as an implicit bargaining bid for him to reciprocate. T h e dove model 
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therefore assumes that it is better and more rational to minimize violence 
and costs to both sides as long as a conflict continues. 
A basic theoretical counter-hypothesis that the h a w k model makes 
is that the doves' proposal to reduce one's o w  n violence in order to 
reduce the enemy's reduces the enemy's stresses, punishments, and 
costs, and thus constitutes a relative reward for his current behavior 
(at the current level of violence, rather than at the reduced level), 
gives him the impression he is succeeding, and reinforces that behavior. 
Thus, the hawks maintain, the enemy would continue the existing level 
of hostilities, taking advantage of a unilateral reduction of violence. 
The dove model counters this argument by maintaining that the 
enemy will not view a reduction in punishment to be a reward for 
his current violent behavior, because he will realize that he can have 
the relatively more valuable reward of being able to continue striving 
for his goal in a most cost/effective w a y if he reduces the level of 
his violent behavior. Continuing to strive for a goal, but at reduced 
costs, the doves argue, would be perceived by the enemy as more 
valuable than some temporary gain derived from exploiting a deescala­
tion, for such exploitation would surely lead to reescalation, and there­
fore lose its value very quickly. 
The doves go on to criticize the h a w k model for its unrealistic assump­
tions about the enemy's motivations and calculations: first, for consider­
ing that strongly held long-term national commitments are of less value 
than the material costs and stresses of war presently endured; and 
second, for assuming that the enemy will value its past commitments 
and costs less than its present punishments w h e  n deciding whether 
to discontinue its behavior because of current punishments. 
The hawks criticize the dove model for assuming that the enemy 
will be subjectively hurt less than oneself if commitments and costs 
are increased, and also for assuming that the enemy will accurately 
perceive the intent of deescalation as an effort to decrease violence 
on both sides, rather than as a trick or as a sign of a basic weakness 
to be exploited. 
T h  e doves counter that this problem can be dealt with through diplo­
matic channels, and that the h a w  k position too m a  y assume inaccurate 
perception on the part of the enemy. For example, the increase in 
stress accompanying escalated violence m a y lead the enemy to misper­
ceive the balance of capabilities, and the increased punishment incite 
him to renew his determination and counterescalate in continued pursuit 
of his long-range objectives. 
The doves have still more theoretical reasons for criticizing the h a w k 
proposal that escalation will cause the enemy to deescalate. It m a y 
be true that w h e n an enemy is punished for a given level of armed 
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hostility, his violent behavior at that level will be extinguished. H o w  ­
ever, in a limited war that has already escalated, it is unlikely that 
the enemy will give up his ultimate political objective. Therefore, in 
the face of escalation that makes the achievement of his goal more 
distant, it is more likely that his violent behavior at the current level 
will be extinguished, and his efforts escalated if he perceives he has 
the capability to do so. Therefore, instead of deescalating, the enemy 
m a y either try harder in the same m o d e of behavior, or try something 
else. ("Something else" m a  y include shifting from conventional to pro­
tracted war, e.g., to terrorism, assassination, and guerrilla attacks; shift­
ing the site of combat, e.g., to Cambodia , Laos, or North Vietnam; 
or shifting the major combatants in the war, e.g., "Vietnamization"). 
Only w h e n all else fails is it likely that the long-range political objective 
will be given up. Thus the question of which side has more "will" 
is dependent upon a comparison of the basic long-term political commit­
ments of both sides. 
A major distinction between the two policy models is what each 
considers to be of paramount importance in a violent conflict. As noted 
above, m a n  y doves assume that the reduction of violence is good in 
itself, and that policy objectives can be pursued through less violent 
means. M a n  y doves further maintain that mutual violence is ineffective, 
and therefore senseless. H a w k  s assume that achieving policy objectives 
is most important, even if violence has to be used to do this. Moreover, 
the h a w k model usually maintains that superior force will be effective 
in achieving policy objectives. T h e hawks perceive conflict as a zero-
sum game: "If you win the objective (political power or territory), I 
lose it" (although in the Vietnam W a  r "winning" was sometimes defined 
as "not losing"). Doves perceive conflict as containing a major non-zero­
sum element: "If w e both reduce our violence, w e will both be better 
off." 
The potential intensity of violence is a major factor in determining 
whether reducing conflict is considered valuable in itself. Most people 
consider the avoidance of a thermonuclear war to be a good in itself 
or a positive-sum benefit. There is less agreement about the value of 
avoiding violence in a limited war, especially w h e n hawks perceive 
not only a positive value (the political objective) to be gained by 
fighting, but the additional value of possibly deterring similar wars 
(e.g., other wars of national liberation) or another war with the same 
adversary. T h e dove model makes an assumption analogous to that 
of deterrence theory, which states that mutual annihilation is less pref­
erable than any other policy objective (save possibly being annihilated 
alone). 
A further distinction between hawks and doves is what they intend 
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their actions to communicate to the enemy. H a w k  s intend their escala­
tion to m e a n that they are reacting to an assumed hawkish enemy 
and will more than match his violence, so that it is futile for the enemy 
to continue fighting. Doves intend their deescalation to communicate 
not a mere reaction to the enemy, but an autonomous initiative that 
is meant to provide the model for a n e w pattern of less violent interac­
tion. 
H a w k s and doves also differ in their assumptions of what aspect of 
one's o w  n past behavior the e n e m  y will respond to in the future-
past cooperation in mutual reduction of violence or past compromises 
that might indicate a softening of one's commitments and will. 
Rather than enter the polemical fray, the aim of this research is 
to test against empirical data major propositions enunciated by policy-
makers of both h a w k and dove persuasions. It is theoretically conceiv­
able that data from some other time period with different conditions 
(no self-imposed limitations on selected military operations, for exam­
ple), might support a model that is not supported by the data used 
here. However , one can empirically test the adequacy of models and 
evaluate the policies upon which they are based only with data repre­
senting actual events. Such empirical tests can provide the only objective 
basis for supporting or rejecting these models. 
Should the hawks' position be correct, one would expect a negative 
correlation between the actions of two parties in a violent conflict: 
as the violent actions of one side escalate, those of the other side 
should deescalate; and as one deescalates, the other should escalate. 
O  n the other hand, one would expect a positive correlation if the 
doves' theory were correct: as the violent actions of one side escalate, 
those of the other should escalate also; and as one deescalates, so 
should the other. B y testing which of these contrary hypotheses is sup­
ported by the facts, empirical analysis will help us evaluate the validity 
of the policy models upon which Vietnam decisions were based. 
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Data 
T h  e first step in the empirical analysis of alternative policy models 
is to construct quantitative indices to measure the concepts in the policy-
makers' models and in the theoretical models of the war with which 
w  e shall deal. S o m  e of these indices are single variables, others are 
weighted sums of two or more variables. The indices were constructed 
to obtain reliable and valid indicators of theoretical concepts, to trans­
form certain information into a form appropriate for quantitative analy­
sis, and to m a k e the models and analysis more parsimonious. 
T h e monthly data used in this study were chosen to represent mili­
tary strength, military efforts, consequences of these efforts, political 
support, and public communications of leading policy-makers that ex­
press their perceptions and preferences regarding the war. T h e data 
are all public and thus allow independent analysis.1 The data are lim­
ited, however. S o m e information of theoretical interest has probably 
never been collected; some necessary data are simply not available; 
and as revealed by the unusual publication of the Pentagon Papers2 
in the s u m m e r of 1971, some of the most relevant information has 
been classified secret by the U . S . government. This classified information 
includes the policy analysis and written thoughts of government officials 
as well as military data combined for geographical units within South 
Vietnam. 
Nonetheless, the available data are rich enough to analyze the most 
significant aspects of the war; the escalation and counterescalation of 
commitments from 1965 through 1967, the political and military conse­
quences of those commitments, and the change in the course of the 
war following the Tet offensive in 1968. 
T h  e recent availability in the Pentagon Papers of documents that 
were once top secret will help to inform the interpretation of public 
statements m a d e by top officials in the U . S . government. 
CONSTRUCTION OF MILITARY, PUBLIC OPINION,

AND SEASONAL INDICES

Valid indicators of theoretical concepts are important to policy-
makers as well as to social scientists. For example, the U . S  . Department 
of Defense reportedly constructed an "index of victory" consisting of 
the numbers of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong killed, hamlets paci­
fied, Communist troops infiltrated and recruited, and miles of roads 
18 
Data 19 
cleared in South Vietnam (Wall Street Journal, 27 Oct. 1967, p. 1). 
A  n index of two or more variables is more reliable than a single-variable 
index because it is less subject to fluctuations due to random error 
and to the same biases producing tionrandom error. Indices can thus 
reflect more accurately than individual variables the abstract concept 
implied in a theory. 
Differences and proportional differences between the values of one 
month and the next, as well as absolute values, are used for all vari­
ables except public statements. Differences reflect the incremental na­
ture of decision-making, e.g., the additional number of troops committed 
in a given month. Increments in hostile behaviors are the components 
of the general upward trend in hostilities that is termed escalation. 
The determinants of the size of these increments can be useful in 
explaining the escalation of the war. The use of proportional differences, 
a form of logarithmitic transformation of the data, is based on the 
concept that larger changes in a particular variable—bombing of North 
Vietnam, for example—are possible once a high-enough level of activity 
has been reached with the same effort required by smaller changes 
at lower levels of activity. T h e addition of 100 bombing sorties over 
North Vietnam was a major decision in 1964, but a bureaucratic one 
in 1967. It is more relevant to speak of a 10 percent increase in bombing 
missions than of the absolute increase. 
Variables and Indices of Military Efforts 
1. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military strength is represented 
by troop levels. Recruitment and infiltration are indicated by the change 
from one month to the next in the reported number of Viet Cong and 
North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam, including main force di­
visions, regiments, and battalions, Viet Con  g guerrilla platoons, Viet 
Cong administrative and logistical personnel, but not political cadres 
or irregular self-defense militia. 
2. United States military effort is indicated by the changes in U . S . 
commitments, a weighted sum equal to .025 times the number of U . S . 
troops in South Vietnam, plus 50 times the number of U . S . ground 
operations of battalion-size or larger, plus .67 times the number of U . S . 
bombing sorties over South Vietnam, plus the number of hundreds of 
short tons of cargo sealifted to South Vietnam by the U . S . Military Sea 
Transport Service.3 
3. United States military action is also indicated by the number of 
U.S. bombing sorties over North Vietnam. For 1965 the number of 
bombing sorties is used. After 1965 the U . S . government reported mis­
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sions rather than sorties. Accounts from thefield suggest that each 
mission had an average of three sorties; therefore, for 1966 and 1967, 
three times the reported number of bombing missions is used. 
Like all data used in this study, data on the bombing of North 
Vietnam come from public sources; these officially releasedfigures,h o w ­
ever, m a y require some qualification. After the bombing was halted 
in November 1968, it would be expected that more bombing missions 
would be flown over the South because of the additional planes avail­
able. However, the number of bombing sorties over South Vietnam 
before and after November 1968 is fairly constant, the number remain­
ing about the same as for the previous year. The seasonal pattern 
in the number of sorties is also consistent with previous years. Since 
it is n o w acknowledged that the United States bombed the Laotian 
part of the H  o Chi Minh trail, one might infer that all or most of 
the planes that once were used over North Vietnam were shifted to 
bombing the North Vietnamese in Laos. Otherwise, most of those air­
planes would be idle, an unlikely event during a war. Thus, the b o m b ­
ing "halt" of November 1968 appears to have been a geographic shift, 
rather than a halt. Information is not available as to whether bombing 
missions over Laos were included in the public statistics on bombing 
of North Vietnam. 
The number of bombing missions at any time depends on the n u m ­
bers of planes, bombs, and pilots available. Public data on these latter 
variables, however, are not available. Thus, other variables on which 
public data are available will be used in the analysis to predict the n u m  ­
ber of U . S . bombing missions. 
Indices of the Consequences of Military Action 
4. U.S. casualties are measured by ten times the number of U . S . 
troops killed in action, plus the number of wounded requiring hospital­
ization, plus half the number wounded not requiring hospitalization. 
5. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attrition is measured by 2.5 
times the reported number of Communist troops killed, plus 3 times 
the total number of weapons captured, plus the number of Communists 
captured. 
6. South Vietnamese casualties are indicated by four times the total 
number of South Vietnamese troops reported killed in action (including 
regular troops of the A r m  y of the Republic of Vietnam [hereafter 
abbreviated as A R V N ]  , Regional Forces, and Popular Forces) plus 
the number reported seriously wounded. 
7. The kill ratio, the number of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 
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troops killed in action divided by the number of U . S . plus South Viet­
namese troops killed, is an index that the U . S  . Department of Defense 
reportedly used as an indicator of relative progress in the war. T h e 
number of "third nation" (e.g., South Korean) troop casualties is not 
included in this index because these data were not reported for the entire 
period under study. 
Variables and Indices of Political Support 
8. U.S. domestic support for the Johnson administration is indicated 
by the difference between the percent w h  o approve and w h  o disapprove 
of the w a y Johnson handled his job as president. These data come 
from the American Institute of Public Opinion and were measured 
in their "Gallup Poll" each month during the period studied. Gallup 
Poll data on the w a y Johnson handled the situation in Vietnam were 
not available on a monthly basis until July 1965. However, the correla­
tion between disapproval of Johnson's handling of his job as president 
and of the situation in Vietnam from July 1965 to December 1967 
is very high, .89. Similarly, approval of President Johnson on these 
two items correlated .80. 
9. Data on the number of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese defectors 
(called hoi chanh or "ralliers") were collected by the U . S . Department 
of Defense and used as an indicator of Communist morale. It is assumed 
here that the greater the number of defectors, the lower the Communist 
troop morale. 
10. Confidence in the government of South Vietnam by the people 
of that country is one of the key measures of the war's progress. In a 
"war of national liberation" the achievement of political objectives is 
primary, and military actions are only a means to winning the confidence 
of, and control over, the people. 
It is very difficult to measure directly the confidence the South Viet­
namese people have in their government. In the politically treacherous 
situation in South Vietnam, people are most reluctant to reveal their 
true opinions about the government to strangers w h  o might ask direct 
questions about them, for a stranger might be suspected of being an 
agent of one side or the other. Thus, w  e need to develop an unobtru­
sive measure of popular confidence in the South Vietnamese government 
( W e b  b et al., 1966). 
The measure used in this study is the value that people in the urban 
money economy placed on the South Vietnamese government's piastre 
currency in terms of the U . S . dollars it could buy as compared with 
its value in terms of the goods and services it could buy. 
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T o construct this index, w  efirst take the mid-month selling price 
(in dollars) of the piastre by hand-payment in the Saigon black market, 
i.e., dollars/piastre. This represents the value of the piastre in terms 
of the more stable liquid asset of U . S . dollars. W  e then adjust this 
value of the piastre in terms of dollars by the economic factors of 
m o n e y supply (M.S.) and consumer prices (C.P.), i.e., the value of 
the piastre in terms of goods and services. 
T h e purchasing power or value of one piastre in terms of goods 
and services is I /Consumer Prices. Thus, according to the quantity 
theory of m o n e  y (Friedman, 1968), in an underdeveloped country like 
South Vietnam, the total value in goods and services of all piastres 
circulating in the domestic economy is M o n e y Supply/Consumer Prices, 
i.e., M . S . / C . P . 
As American personnel and dollars in South Vietnam increased, the 
m o n e y supply in South Vietnam increased, driving up consumer prices 
because of increased deman  d for South Vietnamese goods and services, 
and thus also tending to decrease the value of the piastre in terms 
of goods and services. The American influx also had the effect of increas­
ing d e m a n d for the piastre, since purchases of goods and services were 
m a d  e in piastres. 
W h e  n w  e take the ratio of the black market dollar value of the 
piastre, i.e., (Dollars/Piastre), to the total value of the piastre money 
supply in the economy, i.e., (Money Supply/Consumer Prices), w  e 
have the relative preference of the South Vietnamese people for the 
liquid asset of U . S . dollars as compared with their preference for goods 
and services. Since people can more easily flee with their wealth in 
the form of dollars than as goods and services, the assumption of this 
measure is that the less confidence the South Vietnamese people have 
in their government^ the greater the proportion of their wealth they 
will tend to hold in U . S . dollars and the smaller the proportion of 
their wealth they will prefer to hold as goods and services. Therefore, 
the measure used in this study is: 
n j si ri (Dollars\ / (Money Supply \ 
Popular Confidence =b^—7—1 / I 7^
 D • I 
\Piastre// \Consumer Prices/ 
or the equivalent, 
(Dollars\
 x /( Consumer Prices] 
\Piastre) \JMoney Supply 
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This index is correlated .92 with the black market value of the piastre 
over the sixty-nine-month period from January 1965 through September 
1970. 
Data on the black market value of the piastre are quoted at least 
twice monthly byfinancialfirms in H o n g Kong w h o have agents in 
Saigon. These data are publicly available and were collected from 
a money dealer in San Francisco. Data on South Vietnamese consumer 
prices and money supply are publicly available in various issues of 
the International Financial Statistics published by the International 
Monetary Fund. 
Indices of Seasonal Changes 
The Vietnam W a  r was affected by seasonal variations. Monsoon or 
dry weather affected the number of U . S . bombing missions, the number 
of ground operations either side could initiate, and the movement of 
troops and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Ideally, 
one would like to test with local rainfall and cloud data the degree 
to which season affected military activities in various parts of Vietnam. 
However, public local weather data for North Vietnam are not available. 
Although regional weather data are available for the South, they are 
not useful for correlation with activities in North Vietnam, since the 
monsoon seasons in North and South Vietnam do not coincide. More­
over, regional weather variations cannot be correlated with the data 
on military activities combined at the national levels, the only military 
activity data publicly available. 
11-12. In lieu of actual weather data throughout the war, four " d u m ­
m y  " variables are used to represent seasonal variations. Th  efirst two 
d u m m  y variables are called winter-summer and spring-fall, and are 
represented by sine curves given the monthly values shown in table 
1. 
13. The third d u m m  y variable, a seasonal variable corresponding 
to the best flying weather over North Vietnam, is represented by the 
following values: July = 1, August = 3, September = 1, remaining 
months = 0. 
14. The fourth is a d u m m  y variable reflecting the holiday activities 
of Christmas and Tet: December = 1, January = 2, remaining months 
= 0. 
CONSTRUCTION OF INDICES OF PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENTS 
Public statements m a d e by major policy-makers in the United States, 
South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front 
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TABLE 1 
WINTER-SUMMER AND SPRING-FALL VARIABLES 
USED TO REPRESENT SEASONAL CHANGES 
Jan. Feb. Mar . Apr. May June 
Winter-
Summer 10.0 8.65 5.0 0.0 -5.0 -8.65 
Spring-

Fall 0.0 5.0 8.65 10.0 8.65 5.0

July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
Winter-
Summer -10.0 -8.65 -5.0 0.0 5.0 8.65 
Spring-

Fall 0.0 -5.0 -8.65 -10.0 -8.65 -5.0

comprise the communications data. All statements m a d  e during the 
years 1965, 1966, and 1967 that appeared in the New York Times 
Index were content-analyzed according to a coding scheme in which 
speakers' preferences and perceptions concerning forty-one separate 
items were separately recorded. The coding scheme (presented in A p ­
pendix A ) measures on an ordinal scale the speakers' public preferences 
for increasing, continuing unchanged, or decreasing the particular be­
haviors or events referred to in the statements. Speakers' perceptions 
of these same behaviors or events were also measured on an ordinal 
scale as certainly decreasing, possible decreasing, remaining unchanged, 
possibly increasing, or certainly increasing. These data were collected 
on a daily basis and combined into monthly totals. For the three years 
(1965 through 1967) 1,857 separate statements, including 3,941 specific 
perceptions and preferences, were coded. 
The forty-one topics were combined into the following eight com­
munication indices: (1) North Vietnamese and Viet Con  g leaders' pref­
erences regarding their o w  n military and political activities; (2) their 
perceptions of U . S  . and South Vietnamese military and political activ­
ities; (3) their preferences for negotiation; (4) their preferences for 
particular outcomes and goals; (5) U . S  . and South Vietnamese leaders' 
perceptions of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military and political 
activities; (6) their preferences regarding their o w  n military and polit­
ical activities; (7) their preferences for negotiation; and (8) their pref­
Data 25 
erences for particular outcomes and goals. T h  e components of these 
communications indices are fully described in Appendix B  . 
These indices are sums of measures on those of the forty-one specific 
items relevant to each of the eight general topics. Depending upon 
the nature of the statement, either the frequency of statement, the 
frequency times the typical comment, or the frequency times the differ­
ence between preference and perception is used as the measure. For 
example, the United States never expressed a preference for increasing 
North Vietnamese troop strength in South Vietnam. However, the fre­
quency of statements preferring decreased North Vietnamese troop 
strength is indicative of the salience of North Vietnamese troops to 
the U . S . decision-makers. M a n y topics were discussed too infrequently 
to permit adequate measures of perceptions or preferences. 
The coding of preferences and perceptions as ordinal values raises 
the problem of combining them with the interval data derived from 
counting the frequency of each topic. T h e problem was minimized, 
however, in several ways. First, the coder of the public statements 
was instructed to evaluate the strength of preference or perception 
as a linear continuum. Second, because only three orfive ordinal classi­
fications were used, the ordinal-to-interval transition is reasonable. 
Third, several measures were combined into a single index; thus, errors 
were not systematic and could be expected to cancel each other. Treating 
the perception and preference indices as if they were interval data al­
lows the use of the product-moment correlation and regression analysis 
w h e  n relating these communications indices with other interval data, 
such as military casualties. 
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE DATA 
As in any empirical research, there is some "slippage" between the 
theoretical concepts and their operationalization. T h e main question 
is whether the variables are valid measures of the theoretical concepts. 
Confidence in the validity of the "hard" data (i.e., military actions 
and Gallup Poll data) is greatest; however, even these are not above 
question. T h e military data, since they come from unclassified sources, 
m a y cover up what was "really" happening; as in the previously cited 
example, data on U . S . bombing of North Vietnam m a y have included 
bombing of the H  o Chi Minh Trail in Laos as well. However, to the 
extent that policy-makers themselves relied on the data used in this 
study, the pragmatic validity of the data is enhanced. For example, 
even if the number of Communist troops in South Vietnam was inac­
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curate (and there is evidence that these figures were rough estimates), 
if the Johnson administration responded to those figures by deciding 
to increase U . S  . military strength, then even those inaccurate data should 
help explain U . S  . behavior. A  n additional problem is that the public 
military data on Vietnam are aggregated for the whole country, an 
aggregation that m a y cover up differences in the type of warfare in 
specific locales: guerrilla war in some areas, conventional war in others, 
and some combination of the two in still other areas. 
There is also the problem of deliberately falsified information. O n  e 
particular variable should be mentioned in this regard, since it occurs 
so often in general discussion of the subject: the number of Viet Cong 
and North Vietnamese troops reported killed m a y be exaggerated, as 
have been estimates of enemy casualties in most wars. There m a y be 
a tendency by U . S . forces to count all Vietnamese killed w h o were 
not part of the South Vietnamese armed forces as "enemy." "Body 
counts" were not often literally that, according to independent observ­
ers. Double counting frequently occurred, and sheer guesses were often 
m a d e by artillery crews and bomber pilots. O n the other hand, there 
were no doubt Viet Cong and North Vietnamese killed by bombs or 
artillery shells w h o were never counted. General Giap, the North Viet­
namese defense minister, reportedly remarked to a correspondent for 
the Milanese magazine L'Europeo that 500,000 North Vietnamese had 
been killed in the entire war through the spring of 1969, a figure that 
was very close to the U . S . government tally of 500,509 North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong killed from 1 January 1961 to 30 M a  y 1969 (Ayres, 
New York Times, 1 June 1969). 
These data need not be absolutely accurate to be useful, however. 
In this research trends over time are of interest and importance. Thus, 
relative changes from month to month are probably more significant 
than absolute numbers. In addition Communists reported killed and 
American casualties (a more reliable figure) correlate .92 within the 
same month. Both variables indicate the intensity of thefighting, and 
deaths resulting fromfirefights probably are proportional over the long 
term. If one wishes, then, to ignore Communist casualty figures, the 
intensity of the war during this period can still be measured by counting 
U . S  . and South Vietnamese casualties. 
Despite the difficulties mentioned above, the validity problems posed 
by the hard data are relatively minor. For the military variables the 
operational definition is very close to the conceptual definition, e.g., 
military effort. Gaps between operational measures and concepts are 
larger in the political support variables. That the number of Viet Cong 
defectors indicates Communist morale has face validity; but it is, ad­
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mittedly, based on intuition. The use of the Saigon black market value 
of the piastre, adjusted for consumer prices and money supply, as an 
indicator of the popular confidence in the government of South Vietnam 
is a more indirect measure. The reasoning behind the use of the adjusted 
piastre value is that an indirect measure of people's confidence in a gov­
ernment is h o w m u c h they value its paper currency as compared to some 
more universal standard of wealth. Both of these indicators do, h o w ­
ever, provide "unobtrusive measures," which W e b  b and his associates 
(1966) have convincingly demonstrated to be superior to more direct 
measures, such as survey questions, especially w h e  n a normative re­
sponse bias can be anticipated. In the treacherous political situation in 
South Vietnam, the most invalid measure of popular support for either 
side is probably the direct survey question, which has been used by 
C B S N e w s ( C B S N e w s , 1967) and the U . S . Information Agency. 
The communications data pose even more serious problems. The 
reliability of the content analysis is open to question because the tabu­
lation of statements is based to some extent on the subjective judgment 
of the coder. Initially, two coders independently coded a subsample 
of the communications. O  n this small subsample 100 percent agreement 
was achieved. Thereafter, a single coder coded the statements from 
the New York Times Index. The great volume of the work (1,857 sepa­
rate statements) m a d  e it impractical for a second coder to code all the 
statements. 
The publication of the "Pentagon Papers" has brought into serious 
question the validity of the public statements of preferences and percep­
tions of U . S  . leaders. O n  e might speculate that the public statements 
of the leaders of North and South Vietnam are equally misleading. 
O n  e of the most significant revelations of the "Pentagon Papers" is 
that U . S  . leaders consciously attempted to keep the truth about their 
deepening involvement in the Vietnam W a  r from the American people, 
press, Congress, and foreign allies, as well as from the foe in Vietnam. 
The "Pentagon Papers" are themselves an incomplete set of secret gov­
ernment documents during the Vietnam W a r , for the papers came prin­
cipally from sources in, or in contact with, the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense. Later memoirs, diaries, secret documents, and transcripts 
of private meetings and telephone conversations from other parts of 
the U . S  . government, especially the Office of the President, will no 
doubt reveal m u c h more about the thinking that formed Vietnam policy. 
However, the public statements of policy-makers on both sides of 
the war are not without value. These are the statements to which the 
public responded, on which world opinion focused, and to which the 
opposing side paid at least some attention. It is thus of interest to see 
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what relationship these public statements of perceptions and prefer­
ences had to actual behaviors and outcomes of the war. 
1. The source of the military data is table 6, Unclassified Statistics on South­
east Asia, U . S  . Department of Defense, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller), Directorate for Information Operations. These data are the only 
public complete time series on military activities in the war. They are selective 
in the choice of activities measured and reported, and m a y be biased. They do rep­
resent the Defense Department's view of what was happening in the war. The use of 
these data for research and policy evaluation is in no w a y an endorsement of the ac­
tivities reported in the data. 
Computer-readable copies of any data used in this study will be mad  e available 
by the author to readers or researchers requesting them. Requests should be ad­
dressed to International Relations Archive, Inter-University Consortium for Po­
litical Research, P . O . Box 1248, A n n Arbor, Michigan 48106. 
2 . The Pentagon Papers as published in the New York Times (New York: Ban­
tam Books, Inc., 1971). Subsequent citations will appear in the text, abbreviated to 
" N Y T , PP" with page references. 
3. Since the impact of each component of an index is proportional to the variance 
due to that component and not due to the mean, weightings are chosen so that the 
product of weighting and standard deviation are of the relative magnitude desired 
for each component in the index. This procedure accounts for some of the unusual 
coefficients. Th e weightings are the subjective judgments of the researcher. 
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Methods 
Four techniques of data analysis are used in this study. 
GRAPHS 
All variables were graphed through time and against each other. 
These graphs facilitate the visual recognition of patterns in the data. 
The h u m a n eye and brain are superior to computers for recognizing 
patterns, discrete and continuous, linear and nonlinear. For example, 
visual inspection of the time plots reveals that there were three phases 
of the Vietnam W a  r from 1965 through 1967: January-November 1965, 
December 1965-January 1967, and February-December 1967. During 
each phase the min imum monthly casualtyfigures are higher than the 
m a x i m u  m casualties of the previous period. In January 1968 a n e  w 
phase began with the Tet offensive. 
CORRELATIONS AND SERIAL CORRELATIONS 
The second analytic technique is the calculation of correlations among 
the variables, including reciprocal time lags and leads. Variations in 
one variable m a  y be systematically related to variations in another 
variable, with no delay or with a delay of some given amount of time. 
For example, not only is the relationship between U . S . bombing and 
Communist troop commitments in the same month examined, but also 
the relationship of bombing to the commitment rate in a subsequent 
month. If bombing affected North Vietnamese troop commitments, the 
effect would not be observed until later months because of the time 
required—as long asfive months—for troops to go from North to South 
Vietnam. 
In this same example the relationship of Communist troop commit­
ments to bombing in subsequent months is also examined. In analyz­
ing a dynamic process like the Vietnam W a r  , empirical data can help 
one infer which of two variables changes in response to prior changes 
in the other. For example, did increases in U . S . bombing in North 
Vietnam precede increases in Communist troop commitments in South 
Vietnam or vice versa? 
If one considers the Vietnam W a  r as a time series experiment (Camp­
bell and Stanley, 1963), variations in a dependent variable m a  y be 
considered due to previous or simultaneous variations in a logically 
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related independent variable. T h e statistical method of reciprocal serial 
(lagged) correlation can help determine the sequence of changes in 
pairs of variables that are both observed over time (Campbell and 
Clayton, 1961). W h e  n changes in one variable occur earlier than changes 
in a second variable, one m a  y infer that thefirst is responding to 
the second. Of course, there m a y be alternative explanations. Previous 
changes in a third variable m a  y be affecting both the second and first 
variables. A time series experiment differs from a true experiment in 
that such alternative explanations cannot be ruled out. 
In the method of serial correlation, if two variables are observed 
to change continuously over time, and if past values of one (x) are 
more highly correlated with present values of a second (y) than past 
values of the second (y) with present values of thefirst (x), i.e., w h e  n 
rxt-nyt^> Tvt-txi'  ^ e n c n a n g e s m t n efirst variable (x) can be considered 
to have occurred prior to changes in the second (y). T h e time lag be­
tween changes in two variables is determined by choosing the time lag 
(n) giving the highest correlation between the two variables, i.e., w h e n 
rx. « is at its m a x i m u m  . In this study, w h e  n the highest correlation 
between two variables is fn the same month, time precedence is as­
sumed on theoretical grounds. 
Partial correlation techniques are not used to determine time or "caus­
al" sequence (Blalock, 1964) because measurements of all variables 
over time are available, thus providing more information on the time 
sequences of variations than "causal" modeling techniques assume one 
has. 
T h e concept of "cause" commonly includes three components: time 
precedence of the cause before the effect, concomitant variation of 
the two, and an assumed logical or metaphysical relationship between 
the cause and the effect. Serial correlation can be used to analyze time 
precedence and concomitant variation. However, since no statistical 
method can specify logical or metaphysical relationships, one should 
be aware that alternative explanations involving some third variable 
are not ruled out by serial correlations. Serial correlation allows one 
to observe reciprocal relationships between two variables and to m e a ­
sure the strength of such relationships. It is an appropriate technique 
for inferring time precedence since expected time lags in variations 
between military and political variables used in this study are c o m m e n ­
surate with the monthly intervals between observations. 
Outlying values cause a problem in interpreting the general relation­
ship between variables. If outlying values are included in calculating 
correlation coefficients, they m a  y lead one to infer a relationship that 
is in fact true only because of the outlying values. If outlying values 
are omitted from the calculation, the relationship is not all-encompass­
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ing. Mathematical transformations could be used for each variable in 
an attempt to construct a more normal distribution before correlating 
variables, but this raises serious problems of substantive interpretation. 
Visual inspection was used to check bivariate relationships for outly­
ing values, shape of the curve, and scatter. In this w a  y the h u m a  n 
eye and brain are used in conjunction with correlation and regression 
coefficients to recognize patterns and identify significant relationships. 
The researcher decides whether the inclusion or exclusion of outlying 
values makes a difference in general relationships. If outlying values 
are excluded, general propositions are qualified accordingly (Conn and 
von Holdt, 1965; Hall et al., 1968). 
Given the nature of the data in this study, the use of statistical 
tests of significance is problematical. S o m e would argue that such tests 
are appropriate only with a randomly drawn probability sample (Mor­
rison and Henkel, 1969). T h e data in this study are not a random 
sample. However, they are a sample of all observations possible with 
different operational measures. They are also a sample of months taken 
from the entire Vietnam W a r  . Because the data are a sample in this 
sense, and because inferences are drawn from them about conceptual 
relationships, statistical significance tests m a  y be appropriate. 
T h  e level of statistical significance varies with the sample size (Fried­
heim and Kadane, 1970). T h e data here represent a relatively small 
number of observations for each variable (thirty-six for the pre-Tet 
offensive period). If more monthly data were gathered, the level of 
statistical significance would increase. 
T h  e historical context of each data point in these time series can 
be independently assessed. For example, the small number of U . S . 
bombing missions over North Vietnam in January 1966 was associated 
with the Johnson administration's "peace offensive." Thus, the substan­
tive as well as statistical significance of general relationships and of 
exceptions to them can be independently evaluated, increasing the 
chances for making valid statements about what happened in the war. 
Thus, the statistical significance of a correlation coefficient or t-ratio 
is left an open question. T h  e reader m a  y judge for himself the impor­
tance of a reported correlation by its size, which is an estimate of 
the strength of association between variables. As a working rule of 
thumb, the estimated strength of association considered "significant" 
enough to support a hypothesis and be reported in the text is equal 
to, or greater than, an absolute value of .30 for a correlation coefficient 
and 2.1 for a t-ratio. Thus, as a m i n i m u m standard, 9 percent of the 
variance in one variable must be accounted for by the variance in 
the second variable. 
W h e r  e outlying values distort the bivariate correlation (thereby over­
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estimating the strength of association), the values are not reported. 
W h e r  e outlying values lead to an underestimate of the strength of 
association, the outlying values are excluded and the recomputed corre­
lation coefficient is reported. 
T h  e strength of association selected as a m i n i m u  m (r > .30; t-ratio 
of regression coefficient/standard error > 2.1) is comparable to a sta­
tistically significant correlation at the .05 level if the data were a proba­
bility sample of 33 observations randomly drawn from some hypotheti­
cal universe (N = 33 w h e n time lags of 3 months are used with 36 
observations). T h  e values of r shown in table 2 are reported by Hays 
(1963, p. 531) as necessary for rejection of the null hypothesis that 
r = 0 with 33 randomly selected observations: 
T A B L E 2 
SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS OF CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
Significance Level Two-tailed One-tailed 
0^5 M 29 
.01 .44 .40 
.001 .54 .51 
Correlation analysis is used to test the hypotheses of the decision-
makers, to suggest variables to be used in the construction of indices, 
and to estimate the strength of theoretical and empirical relationships. 
It is supplemented b y the third analytic technique, regression analysis. 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Regression analysis is a statistical technique for estimating the coef­
ficients of the specific independent variables used to explain and predict 
a specific dependent variable. T h  e coefficients are calculated using 
a "least-squares" criterion in order to get a best fit to the data. In 
a typical linear multiple regression equation of the form Y* = a* -f 
&i*i + b2x2 + . . . + bnxn -f- Ei, the regression coefficient bi for each 
independent variable Xi indicates h o  w m u c  h the dependent variable Yi 
will change with a unit change in Xi under the assumption that other 
independent variables in the equation are held constant. The error term, 
Eh represents all other factors affecting the variation in the dependent 
variable besides those specified in the equation. The predicted monthly 
value of the dependent variable Y* in a regression equation is calcu­
lated by multiplying the value (in the previous month indicated by the 
lag) of each independent variable (xi) and its respective regression 
coefficient (bi), and then adding these products for all the independent 
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variables (through xn) to the constant term ait Predictive models con­
sist of several regression equations, in which each "endogenous" inde­
pendent variable (the values of which are determined by the other 
variables in the model) is treated as a dependent variable in a separate 
equation. 
In the predictive multiple regression models in this study, past values 
of independent variables predict present values of dependent variables. 
Time-lagged relationships are of from one to five months. Reciprocal 
predictive loops within the same month are avoided in specifying the 
models. Four "exogenous" seasonal variables also appear in the models 
as independent variables to represent the effect of weather changes 
and the Christmas-Tet holiday period. Other variables in the system 
are not used to explain these exogenous variables, for their values 
are independent of the other variables in the model. 
T h e problem of multicollinearity must be considered in selecting 
independent variables for the regression equations. If independent vari­
ables are themselves highly associated, it is difficult to measure their 
separate effects on the dependent variable because of measurement 
and sampling error. Multiple regression measures the change in the 
dependent variable caused by a change in one of the independent 
variables while simultaneously controlling-for the values of the other 
independent variables. However, it is impossible to keep the values 
of one independent variable constant while varying the values of another 
independent variable with which it is highly correlated. 
For this reason independent variables that logically might be included 
in regression equations were excluded if their correlation with another 
substantively relevant independent variable was greater than .70 . Be­
low this degree of intercorrelation, the problem of multicollinearity 
is not severe. In a few cases two highly correlated independent variables 
are included in a regression equation because substantive knowledge 
of the particular process requires it. In these cases the size of the 
regression coefficients measuring their "independent" effects on the de­
pendent variable m a y not be correct. T h e substantive validity of the 
model is enhanced, however, as is its predictive validity (measured 
by the square of the multiple correlation coefficient,  R 2 )  . 
T h e square of the multiple correlation coefficient,  R 2 , indicates the 
amount of variance accounted for in the dependent variable by the 
independent variables in a multiple regression equation. It is a measure 
of the ability of the equation to predict the dependent variable in 
that it measures the "goodness of fit" of the monthly values of the 
dependent variable predicted by the equation with the actual historical 
monthly values of the dependent variable. 
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T h  e  R 2 is thus a measure of the proportional reduction in the error 
in predicting the monthly values of the dependent variable as compared 
to the prediction that the value of the dependent variable in each 
month is the m e a n value of that variable over all the months. 
COMPUTER SIMULATION 
T h  e fourth analytic technique is computer simulation. This technique 
is used to predict future values of military and political variables under 
existing and alternative policies. 
Regression analysis is a form of prediction in which each dependent 
variable is predicted from k n o w  n values of independent variables. Re  ­
gression analysis, however, does not allow one to m a k e repeated predic­
tions farther and farther into the future because future values of the 
independent variables are unknown. However, an interrelated set of 
regression equations in which present values of dependent variables 
are sufficiently and consistently dependent on past values of indepen­
dent variables can m a k  e repeated predictions to extrapolate the entire 
system of variables into the future in a step-by-step (or month-by­
month) w a y . 1 
This repeated prediction is done by simulating the future values 
of the endogenous independent variables in the following w a y . The 
Vietnam W a  r model consists of an interrelated set of regression equa­
tions, including the specification of time-lagged relationships. Using 
actual data from the Vietnam W a  r (e.g., the values of each variable 
during the thirty-six months of 1965 through 1967), the regression coef­
ficients and constants are estimated (as described in the above section 
on multiple regression analysis). Using only the initial real values of 
each variable from thefirst month of each of these time series (i.e., 
only one real data point for each variable) and these estimated regres­
sion coefficients and constants, the set of regression equations is solved. 
T h  e solutions are the predictions of the values of the dependent vari­
ables for the second month. These predicted values of the variables 
—rather than their actual values for that second month—are then used 
with the same regression coefficients and constants to predict the value 
of each variable for the third month. This "bootstrapping" technique 
is repeated again and again to m a k e month-by-month predictions. These 
predictions can be continued beyond the period from which the regres­
sion coefficients were estimated from the k n o w n data. 
In this w a  y predictions are m a d  e as the implications of the relation­
ships specified in the model continue to unfold. As past values of inde­
pendent variables predict present values of dependent variables, present 
values of these dependent variables—used as independent variables 
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in other equations—are used to predict future values of other dependent 
variables. Thus, the implications of the complicated interdependent 
relationships among the variables can be foreseen, provided that these 
relationships continue to hold in the future as they have in the past. 
This bootstrapping procedure is illustrated infigure 3. In this example 
b3x3f+ Ei (1) 
if+1 b4x4f+b5x5t+ b6x6t+ E2 (2) 
0) 
Figure 3. Bootstrapping Predictions of Variables 
in Equation 1, the second month's value of Y1 (at time t-\-l) has been 
predicted (indicated by the symbol  A ) using thefirst month's actual 
value of Xx (at time t). However, the predicted value of Xi for the 
second (f+1) month (derived from Equation 2) is used to predict 
the value of  Y x for the third (t+2) month, as shown in Equation 3. 
In the same w a y , after the second month, all endogenous variables 
are predicted from previous predictions, month after month. 
This method of simulation is a stringent test of the predictive validity 
of a model, for though the simulation method uses the regression coeffi­
cients that represent the relationships a m o n  g variables for a whole 
time period (e.g., 1965-67), one begins by making predictions by this 
bootstrapping method, using only thefirst months' real data for each 
of the endogenous variables in the system. All the data beyond the 
first month are predicted by the equations in the model. Moreover, 
by the third month in the simulation, all data points being predicted 
are based on previously predicted values of the variables in the system. 
This simulation method is straightforward w h e n variables are depen­
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dent only on past values of independent variables. A problem arises 
w h e n one variable is dependent on another variable in the same time 
period, i.e., with no lag. Regression analysis would use a set of simul­
taneous equations if two variables were hypothesized to affect each 
other reciprocally within the same time period. However, a large system 
of simultaneous equations might present problems of stability (e.g., 
error terms cannot be assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent 
variables in each equation [Blalock, 1964]). Systems of simultaneous 
equations would also require a difficult parameter calculation to pre­
vent a biased estimation of parameters. O n  e possible solution is the 
development of a nonreciprocal (i.e., hierarchical or recursive) system 
of variables. A recursive system allows a relatively simple estimate 
of parameters, and hence calculation of predictions, but requires a 
hierarchy of variables to be theoretically specified for nonlagged rela­
tionships between variables. For example, in a recursive model, if one 
month's U . S . troop commitments are used to predict the same month's 
Communist troop commitments, then the latter cannot be used to predict 
the former. However, previous values of Communist commitments could 
be used to predict current U . S  . commitments. Although the specifica­
tion of a hierarchy of hypothesized causation within the same time 
period m a y seem artificial, it can be justified on the basis of other 
information available about policy-making in the Vietnam W a  r (e.g., 
the "Pentagon Papers"), as well as for theoretical reasons. 
The hierarchy used here is designed to be substantively and theo­
retically plausible, to account for the greatest amount of explained 
variance in the regressions, and to provide the best simulation. In this 
model, troop commitments are at the top of the concurrent hierarchy, 
followed by combat activities, then military outcomes (such as casual­
ties), then changes in popular support and confidence, andfinallycom­
munication variables indicating leaders' publicly stated perceptions and 
preferences. Within a single month, for example, an increase in C o m  ­
munist commitments can be related to a later increase in U . S  . commit­
ments (airborne troops could go into action in South Vietnam one 
week after the decision was m a d e to commit them from the United 
States). These developments can be related to subsequent increased 
bombing, increased casualties, and to changes in the number of C o m  ­
munist defectors, South Vietnamese popular confidence, and U . S . pop­
ular approval of the president. Finally, at the bottom of the hierarchy 
of variables that might relate to each other in the same month are 
the decision-makers' public statements of perception or preference. 
These public statements were placed last because policy-makers prob­
ably can react more quickly with verbal statements than they can with 
military actions. 
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Computer simulation offers several advantages over regression analy­
sis. First, simulation allows predictions to be m a d e farther and farther 
into the future beyond the time point for which actual data are avail­
able. Second, it allows complex interaction effects to become apparent 
over time even though only linear additive regression models are consid­
ered. Simulation is a more realistic w a y to study interaction in interna­
tional relations than multiplicative regression models because the as­
sumptions m a d  e in the use of multiplicative terms are difficult to 
support (e.g., that the rate of increase in. a dependent variable is propor­
tional to the product of two independent variables). 
Third, ascribing significance to £ Vietnam W a  r model consisting of 
a set of regression equations demands a stringent test of the model. 
This more Stringent test is provided by the simulation. If the simula­
tion does not accurately predict the values of the variables, then the 
model has not uncovered the underlying relationships. If the simulation 
makes accurate predictions despite the possibly increasing error terms 
in the equations, as the bootstrapping process proceeds, it has passed 
a stringent test indeed. Accurate prediction from a simulation is a 
better indicator of the predictive validity of a model than is an exami­
nation of the variance explained by the regression equations of the 
model because of the complex interactions a m o n g the variables in a 
simulation. Thus, simulations m a  y allow one to draw inferences about 
the phenomena that could not otherwise be drawn. 
Once an accurate predictive model has been developed, it can be 
used to explore the probable consequences of experimental changes 
in selected variables. Policy-makers, for example, might wish to deter­
mine probable outcomes of alternative strategies before actually imple­
menting any one of them. Computer simulation can m a k e such forecasts 
as long as the relationships a m o n  g the variables in the system remain 
constant. W h a t would have happened, for example, if President Johnson 
had continued the peace overtures of December 1965-January 1966, 
the period of the thirty-eight-day bombing halt and of major diplomatic 
activity? A  n answer can be found in a computer simulation exercise 
of the model. T h e simulation is exercised by making the experimental 
variable exogenous in the system, i.e., allowing it only the specified 
experimental values rather than the values it would otherwise take 
on as a dependent variable in the system. 
T h e results of the computer simulation exercises of h a w k and dove 
policy alternatives is reported in chapter 7. This research was under­
taken in an exploratory spirit. That computer simulations of alternative 
futures in the Vietnam W a  r have evinced any validity at all is 
startling and provocative, both for its practical and for its intellectual 
implications. 
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1. This technique is similar to methods used in numerical analysis for the solu­
tion of differential equations, and was developed for use in this research by m y c o m ­
puter scientist colleague William Charles Mitchell. 
4

Tests of Crucial Hypotheses and 
Assumptions of U.S . Pol icy-makers 
about the Vietnam War 
In chapter one w  e discussed the theoretical structure of assumptions 
and propositions that generally underlie h a w  k and dove policy models. 
In this chapter w  e shall investigate the empirical validity of selected 
crucial policy assumptions and predictions by principal U . S . policy-
makers upon which U . S . policy and conduct of the war were based. 
There are two important reasons for studying the crucial assumptions 
and predictive hypotheses of policy-makers' o w  n "folk models." First, 
if principal policy-makers believe them to be true, this in itself influ­
ences the formulation of policy and the conduct of the war. Second, 
by determining whether or not important assumptions and hypotheses 
are empirically valid, w  e can understand w h  y certain outcomes in the 
war followed certain policy decisions whereas others did not. 
The reason w e focus on U . S . policy-makers' models of the war is 
that the public disclosure of the once top-secret "Pentagon Papers" 
allows us to examine in some detail the beliefs of U . S . leaders about 
the war. Ideally, one would like to acquire a similar set of policy 
papers of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to determine their 
beliefs about the war, and to test their assumptions against empirical 
data. This remains a task for future research. 
UNITED STATES POLICY ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The primary assumption of U . S . policy-makers that motivated U . S . 
involvement in the Vietnam W a  r was a folk model called the domino 
theory. This theory assumed that the Communist government of the 
People's Republic of China, through its support of wars of national 
liberation, was set upon a course of expanding its power and influence 
throughout Asia and the Pacific. These "people's wars" were those 
fought by guerrilla insurgents against existing non-Communist regimes. 
The crucial assumption of the domino theory was that if South Viet­
n a m should "go Communist," other Southeast Asian countries would 
inevitably follow. The reasoning behind this assumption was that if 
the United States should fail to meet its commitments in South Vietnam, 
Communists throughout the world, but particularly in Southeast Asia, 
would conclude that it would not meet its anti-Communist commitments 
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elsewhere, and the Communists would consequently challenge pro-
U . S . non-Communist regimes in other countries. If South Vietnam went 
Communist, a whole set of strategic international linkages would be 
challenged,first in Southeast Asia, then Japan and South Asia, then 
the Middle East, andfinally Europe. Based on the analogy of Nazi 
Germany's behavior prior to World W a  r II, the domino theory argued 
that to stop this series of challenges to its vital interest, the United 
States would eventually be pushed into a third world war. The folk 
theory implied that to prevent this chain of events, the United States 
must thwart the Communist take-over of South Vietnam ( N Y T , ??, 
p. 27). 
Whether or not the People's Republic of China was bent on expansion 
during the early 1960s is a question that can be answered only by 
historical evidence, m u c  h of which (e.g., policy papers) is not available 
to U . S . scholars at this time. A n y Communist Chinese plans for expan­
sion have no doubt been modified by the thwarted Communist coup 
in Indonesia in 1965, by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
that began in 1966, by Chinese fears of Soviet military attack since 
1969, and by the beginnings of a Chinese-American detente in 1972. 
The assumptions that countries in Southeast Asia and the rest of 
the world would fall like dominoes if the United States did not prevent 
a Communist take-over of South Vietnam and that the United States 
would be pushed into a third world war are not subject to scientific 
empirical test, since the events referred to in the assumptions have 
never occurred. History has provided no data on what would have 
happened had the United States not intervened in Vietnam. Thus, 
w  e cannot k n o  w in any scientific sense whether this crucial assumption 
upon which U . S . Vietnam policy was based was actually true. W h a t 
is of significance is that U . S  . policy-makers believed it to be true, and 
thus this folk theory directly motivated the formulation of U . S  . policy 
in Vietnam. 
Using empirical data, w  e shall n o  w test crucial assumptions and 
hypotheses that guided U . S  . policy in Vietnam. These are clustered 
into four main categories: (1) the effectiveness of U . S . air power against 
North Vietnam; (2) the effectiveness of U . S  . ground forces in South 
Vietnam; (3) the effects of U . S  . military commitments on South Viet­
namese political stability and popular confidence; and (4) the effects 
of U . S  . commitments and actions in Vietnam on public opinion and 
popular support in the United States. 
W  e shall n o  w look at these testable assumptions and hypotheses 
in more detail, examine the w a y in which they were articulated by prin­
cipal U . S  . policy-makers, and determine their validity by testing them 
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against empirical data from the period during which the major escala­
tion of the Vietnam W a  r occurred, January 1965 to December 1967. 
United States Bombing of North Vietnam 
United States leaders at first assumed that the threatened use of 
massive U . S . military power, including large-scale bombing, would per­
suade North Vietnam to relinquish its support and direction of the 
Viet Cong's insurgency in the South, since the North Vietnamese pre­
sumably could not win against superior American military power. 
Historically, the use of military coercion against North Vietnam began 
with the covert operations undertaken as "Operation Plan 34A" from 
February to August 1964. The operation's implied message to North 
Vietnam was that they should cease their support of the Viet Cong 
insurgency in the South or bear the consequences of massive (and 
presumably devastating) U . S  . military force in North Vietnam. ( N Y T  , 
PP, chap. 5) The operations included sabotage and psychological opera­
tions against North Vietnam. (McNamara M e m o r a n d u m to Johnson, 
"Vietnam Situation," 21 December 1963, N Y T  , PP, p. 273. T h  e covert 
operations are described on pp. 301-6.) 
Since these covert operations against North Vietnam failed to per­
suade its leaders to halt their support of Viet Cong guerrilla insurgency 
in the South, U . S . policy-makers initiated a policy of bombing North 
Vietnam. As originally conceived, these air attacks were designed to 
increase the costs to North Vietnam of its aid to the Viet Cong. T h e 
assumption of U . S . leaders was that these added costs would be suffi­
ciently great to break the will of the North Vietnamese to continue 
supporting the Viet Cong. The bombing attacks against North Vietnam 
were not atfirst designed to affect significantly North Vietnam's capa­
bility of continuing its support for the Viet Cong guerrilla war in South 
Vietnam. 
As early as 22 January 1964, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Maxwell D  . Taylor, recommended to Secretary of Defense 
M c N a m a r a that the United States "must therefore be prepared fully 
to undertake a m u c  h higher level of activity, not only for its beneficial 
tactical effect, but to m a k  e plain our resolution, both to our friends 
and to our enemies." The activities included "conduct[ing] aerial b o m b ­
ing of key North Vietnam targets, using U . S  . resources under Vietna­
mese cover, and with the Vietnamese openly assuming responsibility 
for the actions" ( N Y T , PP, pp. 276-77). United States policy-makers 
thus defined the stakes in the Vietnam W a  r as a test of wills, designed 
partially to prove the credibility of U . S  . commitments, 
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President Johnson and his closest advisers (the "principal" makers 
of U . S  . Vietnam policy, according to the "Pentagon Papers"—McGeorge 
B u n d y , William P. B u n d y , Henry C  . Lodge , Robert M c N a m a r a , John 
M c N a u g h t o n , Walt  W . Rostow, D e a n Rusk, and Maxwell Taylor1)— 
assumed that an escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam would, 
in the words of Maxwel l Taylor, "persuade or force the D . R . V  . [North 
Vietnam] to stop its aid to the Vietcong and to use its directive powers 
to m a k  e the Vietcong desist from their efforts to overthrow the govern­
ment of South Vietnam" (briefing paper, 27 N o v e m b e r 1964, N Y T  , PP, 
p. 326) In the concrete terms stated by Assistant Secretary of Defense 
M c N a u g h t o n on 6 N o v e m b e r 1964, North Vietnam must: 
(1) Stop training and sending personnel to w a g e war in S V N 
and Laos. 
(2) Stop sending arms and supplies to S V  N	 and Laos. 
(3) Stop directing and controlling military actions in S V N and 
Laos. 
(4) Order the V  C and P  L [Pathet Lao] to stop their insurgencies 
and military actions. 
(5) R e m o v e V  M [Viet M i n h ] forces and cadres from S V N and 
Laos. 
(6)	 Stop propaganda broadcasts to South Vietnam. . . . (NYT, PP, p. 367) 
The type of bombing effort planned, as outlined by William P. Bundy 
in afinal draft position paper on 29 November 1964, was a program 
"of graduated military pressures directed systematically against the 
D R V  . Such a program would consist principally of progressively more 
serious air strikes, of a weight and tempo adjusted to the situation 
as it develops. . . .  " ( N Y T , PP, p. 375) 
The assumption of the principal U . S . policy-makers was that the 
North Vietnamese would break under the pressure of American air pow­
er. Yet the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agen­
cy, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
felt that the chances for this were small. North Vietnam is composed 
primarily of decentralized, self-sufficient agricultural villages, and is 
therefore not as vulnerable to devastation by bombing as would be a 
highly centralized industrial economy ( N Y T , PP, p. 331). From another 
point of view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that only quick massive 
bombing—rather than calculated limited bombing—would convince the 
North Vietnamese leaders that "the U . S  . intends to use military force 
to the full limits of what military force can contribute to achieving 
U . S  . objectives in Southeast Asia" ( N Y T  , PP, p. 330). Undersecretary 
of State George Ball also expressed doubt that bombing North Vietnam 
would accomplish U . S . policy objectives ( N Y T , PP, p. 325). 
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Even within President Johnson's closest circle of advisers, there were 
some doubts about h o w effective the bombing of North Vietnam would 
be. The historical evidence suggests that bombing was pursued despite 
these doubts because of the perceived lack of alternatives on h o  w to 
strengthen the South Vietnamese government and avoid its defeat by 
the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese ( N Y T , PP, p. 344). 
The U . S . air war against North Vietnam was launchedfirst on 4 
August 1964. The bombing was initiated in response to a North Viet­
namese P  T boat attack on 2 August against the U . S  . destroyer Maddox, 
which was operating in the Gulf of Tonkin on an intelligence patrol 
related to South Vietnamese commando raids on North Vietnam. 
The Maddox, joined by the destroyer C  . Turner Joy, was attacked 
again by torpedo boats on 4 August, and within twelve hours of the 
time word of the attack reached Washington, reprisal bombing raids 
were launched from U . S . carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. The U . S . 
destroyers m a  y have been mistaken for South Vietnamese vessels escort­
ing South Vietnamese c o m m a n d  o raids on North Vietnamese instal­
lations. The attacks on the destroyers were, in any case, quickly taken 
by United States decision-makers as justification for launching the retal­
iatory raids against North Vietnam that had long been planned ( N Y T  , 
PP, chap. 5). 
The continual bombing of North Vietnam, although planned by U . S . 
policy-makers in the latter part of 1964 (an original bombing scenario 
was outlined on 23 M a y 1964 [ N Y T , PP, p. 343]), was not begun 
until February 1965. In reprisal for a Viet Cong attack on the U . S . 
military advisers' compound at Pleiku, South Vietnam, on 6 February 
1965, U . S . Navy jets, in an operation named "Flaming Dart I," bombed 
and rocketed North Vietnamese barracks and staging areas at Donghoi 
(NYT, PP, p. 343). 
A second and heavier U . S . bombing attack against North Vietnam, 
"Flaming Dart II," occurred on 11 February 1965, in reprisal for a 
guerrilla attack on an American barracks at Quinhon, South Vietnam. 
O  n 13 February 1965 President Johnson ordered the beginning of 
"Operation Rolling Thunder," which began on 2 March 1965. This oper­
ation was to become the gradually escalating air war against North Viet­
n a m ( N Y T , PP, p. 343). 
Within a month and a half the primary objective of Operation Rolling 
Thunder had changed. Atfirst at attempt to break the will of the 
North Vietnamese in their support of the war in South Vietnam, the 
operation's objective became the destruction of North Vietnam's capa­
bility of supporting such a war. This shift occurred in March 1965 
as the North Vietnamese showed no diminution in their determination 
to continue supporting the Viet Cong ( N Y T , PP, p. 398). Thus, the 
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bombing was aimed at strategic targets such as petroleum storage facil­
ities, at military targets, and at the North Vietnamese transportation 
system that carried m e  n and supplies through North Vietnam and Laos. 
B y the summer of 1965 the objective of the bombing had become 
to reduce the flow of m e  n and supplies from North to South Vietnam 
( N Y T , P P , p . 4 6 8 ) . 
Operationally, then, the success or failure of the bombing in fulfilling 
U . S . policy objectives can be measured by the number of North Vietna­
mese troops, arms, and supplies sent from North to South Vietnam, 
and the number of Viet Cong guerrillas trained by the North Vietna­
mese. The assumption by U . S . policy-makers that bombing North Viet­
n a m would persuade its leaders to cease their support of the Viet 
Cong can thus be tested by correlating the monthly number of U . S . 
bombing missions over North Vietnam with the number of North Viet­
namese and Viet Cong troops reported to be in South Vietnam. 
The empirical data from January 1965 to December 1967 show that, 
contrary to the hawkish assumptions of the principal American policy-
makers, the number of Communist troops in South Vietnam increased 
with the number of U . S . bombing sorties over North Vietnam (the 
correlation is .82 with a one-month lag). Even the rates of Communist 
troop commitments in South Vietnam increased proportionally with 
the rate of U . S . bombing missions over North Vietnam (the correlation 
is .44 with a two-month lag). Thus, although the U . S . m a d e more 
costly to the North Vietnamese their support of the war in the South, 
their capability of continuing such support was not destroyed. The 
psychological effect of the escalation in the bombing was to strengthen 
the will of the North Vietnamese and increase their determination to 
continue the war. The net effect of the bombing was thus the intensi­
fication of North Vietnamese efforts in the war, including their escalation 
of troop commitments. This finding thus supports the prediction of 
the dove folk theory that escalation would lead to counterescalation, 
and refutes the contrary h a w  k theory. 
There is evidence of a nonstatistical nature that shows this process 
of reciprocal escalation and counterescalation. The U . S . State Depart­
ment had evidence of a major increase in infiltration from North to 
South Vietnam during 1964. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, A m b a s  ­
sador Taylor reported the appearance of North Vietnamese regulars 
in October 1964 ( N Y T , PP, p. 338). A Central Intelligence Agency 
and Defense Intelligence Agency m e m o r a n d u m reported the presence 
in February 1965 of a regular North Vietnamese regiment of the 325th 
People's A r m y of Vietnam division. This regiment was accepted into 
the Communist order of battle in Kontum province in April 1965 after 
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the sustained bombing of North Vietnam had begun ( N Y T , PP, p. 
409). 
There is additional evidence that the bombing strengthened North 
Vietnamese determination in the war. The director of the Central Intel­
ligence Agency, John A . M c C o n e , in a 2 April 1965 m e m o r a n d u m to 
Secretaries Rusk and M c N a m a r a , McGeorge Bundy, and Ambassador 
Taylor, wrote "I have reported that the strikes to date have not caused 
a change in the North Vietnamese policy of directing Viet Cong insur­
gency, infiltrating cadres and supplying material. If anything, the strikes 
to date have hardened their attitude" ( N Y T  , PP, p. 440). 
A  n intensive study sponsored by the Defense Department in the 
summer of 1966 arrived at the same conclusion: the bombing of North 
Vietnam had "no measurable effect" either on North Vietnamese will 
or capability to support and direct Communist insurgencies in South 
Vietnam and Laos2 ( N Y T , PP, p. 505). Forty-seven top scientists partici­
pated in this study through the Institute for Defense Analysis. Entitled 
"The Effects of U . S . Bombing on North Vietnam's Ability to Support 
Military Operations in South Vietnam: Retrospect and Prospect," the 
study identified two implicitly assumed sets of causal relationships 
in then current official thinking about the bombing: 
1. That by increasing the damage and destruction of resources 
in N V N  , the U . S . is exerting pressure to cause the D R  V to stop 
their support of the military operations in S V  N and Laos; and 
2. That the combined effect of the total military effort against 
NVN—including the U . S  . air strikes in N V  N and Laos, and the land, 
sea, and air operations in SVN—will ultimately cause the D R  V to 
perceive that its probable losses accruing from the war have become 
greater than its possible gains and, on the basis of this net evaluation, 
the regime will stop its support of the war in the South. ( N Y T , PP, 
p. 506) 
The study goes on to state: 
These two sets of interrelationships are assumed in military plan­
ning, but it is not clear that they are systematically addressed in 
current intelligence estimates and assessments. Instead, the tendency 
is to encapsulate the bombing of N V  N as one set of operations 
and the war in the South as another set of operations, and to evaluate 
each separately; and to tabulate and describe data on the physical, 
economic, and military effects of the bombing, but not to address 
specifically the relationship between such effects and the data relat­
ing to the ability and will of the D R  V to continue its support of the 
war in the South. ( N Y T , PP, p. 506) 
This study points out that although it was assumed that military 
punishment would break the will of the North Vietnamese to continue 
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their support of the war in the South, there existed no adequate meth­
odology to determine h o w m u c h b o m b damage would do so. B o m b 
damage can be systematically quantified; there were no systematic indi­
cators of North Vietnamese determination. Thus, according to this 
study, "there is no firm basis for determining if there is any feasible 
level of effort that would achieve these [U.S.] objectives" ( N Y T , PP, 
506-7). 
The Institute for Defense Analysis study also offered some explanation 
of w h y U . S . bombing of North Vietnam had not been effective: 
Although the political constraints seem clearly to have reduced 
the effectiveness of the bombing program, its limited effect on Hanoi's 
ability to provide such support cannot be explained solely on that 
basis. The countermeasures introduced by Hanoi effectively reduced 
the impact of U . S . bombing. More fundamentally, however, North 
Vietnam has basically a subsistence agricultural economy that pre­
sents a difficult and unrewarding target system for air attack. 
The economy supports operations in the South mainly by function­
ing as a logistic funnel and by providing a source of manpower. 
The industrial sector produces little of military value. Most of the 
essential military supplies that the V C / N V  N forces in the South 
require from external sources are provided by the U S S  R and C o m m u  ­
nist China. Furthermore, the volume of such supplies is so low that 
only a small fraction of the capacity of North Vietnam's rather flex­
ible transportation network is required to maintain theflow. ( N Y T  , 
PP, pp. 502-3) 
Thus, North Vietnam was an inappropriate target for strategic or 
interdiction bombing because, according to the "Pentagon Papers," such 
bombing "assumed highly industrial nations producing large quantities 
of military goods to sustain mass armies engaged in intensive warfare" 
( N Y T , PP, p. 469). 
The Institute for Defense Analysis study went on to explain w h y 
U . S . bombing had not weakened the will of the North Vietnamese: 
. . . Initial plans and assessments for the R O L L I N G T H U N D E R 
program clearly tended to overestimate the persuasive and disruptive 
effects of the U . S  . air strikes and, correspondingly, to under-estimate 
the tenacity and recuperative capabilities of the North Vietnamese. 
This tendency, in turn, appears to reflect a general failure to appreci­
ate the fact, well-documented in the historical and social scientific 
literature, that a direct, frontal attack on a society tends to strengthen 
the social fabric of the nation, to increase popular support of the 
existing government, to improve the determination of both the leader­
ship and populace to fight back, to induce a variety of protective 
measures that reduce the society's vulnerability to future attack, 
and to develop an increased capacity for quick repair and restoration 
of essential functions. ( N Y T  , PP, pp. 505-6) 
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A n even earlier study by the Defense Intelligence Agency in N o v e m ­
ber 1965 had informed Secretary M c N a m a r a that although bombing 
had reduced industrial performance in North Vietnam, "the primarily 
rural nature of the area permits continued functioning of the subsis­
tence economy," and that "the air strikes do not appear to have altered 
Hanoi's determination to continue supporting the war in South Vietnam" 
( N Y T , PP, p. 469). 
The ineffectiveness of the bombing of North Vietnam was explained 
in a very different w a y by the generally more hawkish Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. In a m e m o r a n d u m to Secretary M c N a m a r a on 10 November 
1965, the Joint Chiefs stated: " W  e shall continue to achieve only limited 
success in air operation in D . R . V . / L a o  s if required to operate within 
the constraints presently imposed. The establishment and observance 
of de facto sanctuaries within the D . R . V .  , coupled with a denial of 
operations against the most important and war supporting targets, pre­
cludes attainment of the objectives of the air campaign." They added, 
" N o  w required is an immediate and sharply accelerated program which 
will leave no doubt that the U . S  . intends to win and achieve a level 
of destruction which they will not be able to overcome" ( N Y T  , PP, 
pp. 475-76). 
A m o n  g the conflicting opinions and policy recommendations pre­
sented by different agencies and advisers, President Johnson selected 
a general pattern of gradual escalation in the bombing. Although neither 
hawks nor doves believed that gradual escalation would be effective 
in achieving U . S . objectives, the policy represented an essentially po­
litical compromise reached by a very politically conscious Lyndon John­
son. Not until the Tet offensive of January-February 1968 demonstrated 
h o  w ineffective the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy had been 
was there a reversal of bombing policy. A cutback of bombing to the 
twentieth parallel in North Vietnam on 31 March 1968 was part of 
the effort to commence negotiations to end the war. The bombing 
of North Vietnam was halted by the Johnson administration in October 
1968, when the deescalation of bombing proved successful in persuading 
the North Vietnamese to agree to begin formal negotiations. Thus, the 
assumptions of the dove folk theory concerning the effects of bombing 
North Vietnam proved more nearly correct than did the hawkish as­
sumptions that were implemented during most of the Johnson era. 
Effects of U.S. Ground Forces in South Vietnam 
President Johnson's decision in April 1965 to commit U . S . ground 
troops to offensive action in South Vietnam was a reversal of an Ameri­
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can policy held since the Korean W a r  : that the U . S  . should avoid 
another land war in Asia. His decision was formalized in the National 
Security Action M e m o r a n d u m 328, on 6 April 1965. The m e m o r a n d u m 
included presidential approval of an 18,000- to 20,000-man increase 
in U . S  . military support forces, the deployment of two additional Marine 
Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron, and "a change of mission 
for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam [two were deployed 
in March 1965] to permit their more active use under conditions to 
be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consulta­
tion with the Secretary of State" ( N Y T  , PP, pp. 382-83). 
The reason for this major decision to commit U . S . ground combat 
forces in Vietnam was the failure of the bombing to make the North 
Vietnamese cease their support of the war in the South. As spelled 
out in the "Pentagon Papers": 
Official hopes were high that the Rolling Thunder program would 
rapidly convince Hanoi that it should agree to negotiate a settlement 
to the war in the South. After a month of bombing with no response 
from the North Vietnamese, optimism began to wane. 
The U . S . was presented essentially with two options: (1) to with­
draw unilaterally from Vietnam leaving the South Vietnamese to 
fend for themselves, or (2) to commit ground forces in pursuit of 
its objectives. A third option, that of drastically increasing the scope 
and scale of the bombing, was rejected because of the concomitant 
high risk of inviting Chinese intervention. ( N Y T  , PP, p. 383) 
Thus, the Johnson administration committed U . S . forces to a ground 
war in Asia believing that those forces could achieve its objectives 
in Vietnam. The purposes of this troop commitment were to convince 
the North Vietnamese that their winning over the combined forces 
of the U . S . and South Vietnam was impossible and therefore to persuade 
them to cease their support of the Viet Cong. Ambassador Taylor wrote 
on 17 April 1965: 
However, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in all probability, 
the primary objective of the G V  N [Government of South Vietnam] 
and the U S  G [United States Government] of changing the will 
of the D R  V to support the V  C insurgency cannot be attained in 
an acceptable time-frame by the methods presently employed. The 
air campaign in the North must be supplemented by signal successes 
against the V  C on the South before w  e can hope to create that 
frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions w  e seek. 
( N Y T , PP, p. 445) 
Thus, U . S . aims in March 1965, according to Assistant Secretary 
of Defense McNaughton, included: '70%—To avoid a humiliating U . S . 
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defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor). 20%—To keep S V  N (and 
the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands. 1Q%—To permit the people 
of S V N to enjoy a better, freer way of life" ( N Y T , PP, p. 432). If the 
North Vietnamese could not be persuaded to cease their efforts, the pur­
poses of the large U . S . ground effort in South Vietnam included: "To 
defeat the V  C on the ground" ( N Y T , PP, p. 436). 
Initially, the strategy adopted to prevent a Viet Cong victory was 
an enclave strategy. However, after Viet Cong victories in M a  y and 
June 1965, the United States adopted a strategy of "search and destroy," 
the objective of which was "to take the war to the enemy, denying 
him freedom of movement anywhere in the country . . . and deal him 
the heaviest possible blows" ( N Y T  , PP, p. 403). As described by Secre­
tary M c N a m a r a in a m e m o r a n d u m to President Johnson on 20 July 
1965, U . S  . combat forces were "by aggressive exploitation of superior 
military forces . .  . to gain and hold the initiative . . . pressing the 
fight against V C - D R  V main force units in South Vietnam to run them 
to ground and destroy them" ( N Y T  , PP, p. 457). Thus, the strategy 
chosen to defeat the Communists was one of attrition, or the so-called 
"meat-grinder" strategy ( N Y T  , PP, pp. 501-2). 
The basic assumption of the principal policy-makers in the Johnson 
administration was that in the face of supposedly superior American 
combat forces in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese would realize 
that they could not win and would thus cease their efforts in South 
Vietnam. Walt  W . Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy 
Planning Council, wrote to Secretary M c N a m a r a on 16 November 1964: 
" W  e must make clear that counter escalation by the Communists will 
run directly into U . S  . strength on the ground; and therefore the possibil­
ity of radically extending their position on the ground at the cost of 
air and naval damage alone, is ruled out" ( N Y T , PP, p. 418). 
The empirical data from January 1965 through December 1967 show 
that the above assumption of the Johnson administration was incorrect. 
Rather than deterring additional Communist troop commitments in 
South Vietnam or reducing their number through attrition, the escala­
tion of U . S  . troops, supplies, and combat operations in South Vietnam 
was followed by a concomitant North Vietnamese and Viet Cong coun­
terescalation of troop commitments (the correlation coefficient is .94). 
Counterescalations of Communist troop commitments and C o m m u  ­
nist counteroffensives necessitated round after round of additional U . S  . 
combat troop commitments. President Johnson willingly granted Gen­
eral Westmoreland an 18,000-20,000 m a  n increase in April 1965; in 
July 1965, 44 battalions were granted for a total of 193,887 troops 
( N Y T , PP, pp. 384-85). In November 1965 General Westmoreland re­
quested a total of 375,000; in December 1965, 443,000; in January 
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1966, 459,000; in August 1966, 542,588. In March 1967 General West­
moreland asked for 200,000 more troops, but this request was scaled 
d o w n to 30,000 n e w m e n ( N Y T , PP, pp. 460-61). 
It was not until March 1968, w h e n General Westmoreland requested 
an additional 206,756 m e n in the wake of the devastating Communist 
Tet offensive of January and February, that the continued build-up 
of American ground forces in Vietnam was halted by President Johnson 
in a major policy reversal. The president sent just 30,000 more m e n 
to Vietnam, recalled General Westmoreland, and announced that he 
would neither seek nor accept the nomination of his party for reelec­
tion. 
Thus, the hawkish U . S . policy of escalation was met by Communist 
counterescalation. In the end it was not the North Vietnamese and 
Viet Cong but the Americans w h o were forced for military and politi­
cal reasons to halt the escalation spiral. 
U.S. Bombing of North Vietnam and 
Popular Confidence in the South Vietnamese Government 
Throughout the Vietnam W a r  , a major objective of U . S  . policy-makers 
was the establishment and maintenance of a stable anti-Communist 
government in South Vietnam that could and would actively prosecute 
the war against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. This proved 
to be a difficult goal after the fatal coup against N g o Dinh Diem 
in November 1963. A great deal of political instability followed Diem's 
assassination, taking the form of coups, plots, cabinet shake-ups, mass 
demonstrations, and general turmoil. United States policy-makers were 
greatly displeased by this political instability, fearing that the Viet 
Cong would take advantage of the situation to strengthen their o w n 
political position. The political conflict among different factions of non-
Communists in South Vietnam weakened the cooperation necessary 
for successful conduct of the war against the Communists. 
A  n excellent example of the desire of principal U . S  . policy-makers 
for political stability in South Vietnam is found in Ambassador Maxwell 
Taylor's remarks to the "young Turk" leaders of a coup against the 
High National Council and the civilian government of Tran V a n Huong 
in December 1964. A m o n  g those present were two later presidents 
of South Vietnam, Nguyen Cao K y and Nguyen Van Thieu. Ambassador 
Taylor is quoted in an airgram to the State Department, on 24 December 
1964, as saying: 
. .  . I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner w  e 
Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted m  y words. 
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M a y b e this is because something is wrong with m y French because 
you evidently didn't understand. I m a d  e it clear that all the military 
plans which I k n o w you would like to carry out are dependent 
on governmental stability. N o  w you have m a d  e a real mess. W  e 
cannot carry you forever if you do things like this. . . . ( N Y T  , PP, 
p. 379) 
Late 1964 and early 1965 saw continued political turmoil in South 
Vietnam and m a n  y military defeats of the South Vietnamese govern­
ment's forces. In response to this situation, U . S  . policy-makers sought 
to decrease political divisiveness and increase the military and political 
effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government, including its popular 
appeal and support. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor presented an ap­
proved U . S  . government statement and program to the South Vietna­
mese government at the end of November 1964. It stated: 
It was the clear conclusion of the recent review in Washington 
of the situation in South Vietnam that the unsatisfactory progress 
being m a d e in the Pacification Program was the result of two primary 
causes from which secondary causes stem. The primary cause has 
been the governmental instability in Saigon, and the second the 
continued reinforcement and direction of the Viet Cong by the Gov­
ernment of North Vietnam. It was recognized that to change the 
downward trend of events, it will be necessary to deal adequately 
with both of these factors. 
In the view of the United States, there is a certain m i n i m u  m 
condition to be brought about in South Vietnam before n e  w measures 
against North Vietnam would be either justified or practicable. At 
the min imum, the Government in Saigon should be able to speak 
for and to its people w h  o will need special guidance and leadership 
throughout the coming critical period. The Government should be 
capable of maintaining law and order in the principal centers of 
population, assuring their effective execution by military and police 
forces completely responsive to its authority. . . . (Gravel ed., PP, 
p. 343) 
The program went on to say: 
Better performance in the prosecution of the war against the Viet 
Cong needs to be accompanied by actions to convince the people 
of the interest of their government in their wellbeing. Better perform­
ance in itself is perhaps the most convincing evidence but can be 
supplemented by such actions as frequent visits by officials and 
ranking military officers to the provinces for personal orientation 
and "trouble shooting." The available information media offer a chan­
nel of communication with the people which could be strengthened 
and more efficiently employed. The physical appearance of the cities, 
particularly Saigon, shows a let-down in civic pride which, if cor­
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rected, would convey a message of governmental effectiveness to 
their inhabitants. Similarly, in the country an expanded rural develop­
ment program could carry the government's presence into every 
reasonably secure village and hamlet. 
If governmental performance and popular appeal are significantly 
improved, there will be little difficulty in establishing confidence 
in the government. . . . (Gravel ed., PP, p. 345) 
In return for greater propaganda efforts by the South Vietnamese 
government, the U . S . government offered to begin bombing the Laotian 
corridor and North Vietnam, actions the South Vietnamese generals 
had sought since July 1964, (Gravel ed., PP, p. 328). 
. . . While the Government of Vietnam is making progress toward 
achieving the goals set forth above, the United States Government 
would be willing to strike harder at infiltration routes in Laos and 
at sea. . . . 
. .  . If the Government of Vietnam is able to demonstrate its 
effectiveness and capability of achieving the m i n i m u  m conditions 
set forth above, the United States Government is prepared to consider 
a program of direct military pressure on North Vietnam as Phase 
. .  . As contemplated by the United States Government, Phase 
II would, in general terms, consititute a series of air attacks on 
North Vietnam progressively mounting in scope and intensity for 
the purpose of convincing the leaders of North Vietnam that it is 
to their interest to cease aid to the Viet Cong and respect the inde­
pendence and security of South Vietnam. . . . (Gravel ed., PP, p. 
344) 
Thus, aside from its military objectives in North Vietnam, the U . S . 
bombing that commenced on 6 February 1965 had as one of its primary 
objectives the improvement of political stability and popular confidence 
in South Vietnam. Secretary M c N a m a r  a stated this objective clearly 
and publicly: "It was also anticipated that these air operations would 
raise the morale of the South Vietnamese people w h o  , at the time 
the bombing started, were under severe military pressure" (McNamara, 
New York Times, 26 August 1970). 
The assumed relationship between U . S . bombing in North Vietnam 
and popular confidence in the South Vietnamese government was thus 
a crucial hypothesis in the folk theory held by principal U . S . policy-
makers. W  e can test this assumption empirically using monthly data 
between January 1965 and December 1967 on the number of U . S . 
bombing missions over North Vietnam and the index of popular confi­
dence described in chapter 2 (i.e., the dollar value of the South Vietna­
mese piastre on the black market times the index of consumer prices 
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divided by the money supply). Using multiple regression analysis and 
controlling for autocorrelation in the popular confidence index by using 
the previous month's value of the index, the empirical test shows that 
there is no systematic relationship between the number of bombing 
missions over North Vietnam in one month and popular confidence 
in the South Vietnamese government the following month. Thus, the 
empirical evidence refutes the policy assumption that the bombing 
of North Vietnam would systematically contribute to the achievement 
of U . S  . political objectives in South Vietnam. 
U.S. Ground Forces and Popular Confidence 
in the South Vietnamese Government 
Since the bombing of North Vietnam did not have the sustained 
effect of bolstering the morale of, and public confidence in, the govern­
ment of South Vietnam, one might also question the effectiveness of 
the build-up of U . S . ground forces in accomplishing the same purpose. 
The original commitment of U . S . Marine combat forces in February 
1965 had as one of its main objectives bolstering the morale of the 
South Vietnamese government and increasing its willingness to continue 
the fight against the Communists (Gravel ed., PP, p. 432). W a s this 
policy successful? 
A multiple regression analysis of empirical data from January 1965 
through December 1967 shows that, w h e n controlling for auto-correla­
tion in the popular confidence index, there is no systematic relationship 
between the monthly commitment of U . S . troops, supplies, and combat 
operations, and popular confidence in the South Vietnamese government 
the following month. Thus, the empirical evidence again refutes the 
folk theory that U . S . military forces would systematically contribute 
to the strengthening of popular confidence in the South Vietnamese 
government. 
U.S. Commitments in Vietnam and 
Public Opinion in the United States 
The principal U . S . policy-makers were incorrect in their predictions 
concerning the military and political effectiveness of bombing North 
Vietnam and committing U . S  . ground forces to combat in South Viet­
nam . Yet they continued these policies despite the contrary warnings 
of their o w  n intelligence agencies and other respected analysts. W h  y 
they continued to do so m a y be explained by a fourth major assumption 
of the Johnson administration: based on the historical precedent of 
the political events in the United States following the Communist take­
over of mainland China, an administration perceived by the American 
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public as being "soft on C o m m u n i s m " would be punished politically 
(Ellsberg, 1971). Conversely, the Johnson administration believed in 
the U . S  . public's willingness—even its insistence—that its government 
take the necessary measures to prevent a Communist take-over in South 
Vietnam. 
It is doubtful that President Johnson believed that the American 
public wholeheartedly endorsed a policy of perpetually escalating U . S  . 
military commitments in South Vietnam. In early 1965 President John­
son launched the air war before committing U . S . ground combat forces 
because, according to the "Pentagon Papers," the American public 
"would find an air war less repugnant than a ground war" ( N Y T , 
PP, p. 329). The public consensus since the Korean W a  r was that 
the United States should not again become entangled in a land war 
in Asia. Thus, w h e n the president ordered on 6 April 1965 an increase 
in U . S  . ground forces and approved their use in offensive operations, 
it was noted in National Security Action M e m o r a n d u m 328: 
The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 
5 through 7 [military support force increase, deployment of addi­
tional U . S  . Marines, and permission granted to the Marines to be 
more aggressive in their missions], premature publicity be avoided 
by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken 
as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any 
appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on 
these troop movements will be m a d e only with the direct approval 
of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes 
should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with 
existing policy. ( N Y T  , PP, p. 443) 
This example of m i n i m u  m public disclosure is representative of a 
pattern of official secrecy concerning the extent of U . S  . military, eco­
nomic, and political involvement in Vietnam. Such official secrecy sug­
gests that the Johnson administration had at least some awareness of the 
American public's distaste for a policy of gradually escalating U . S  . 
military commitments in Vietnam. O n  e m a  y infer, however, that Presi­
dent Johnson believed that the U . S . public was, on balance, favorable 
to a firm policy of resistance toward Communists, since he frequently 
cited public opinion polls that showed public support for his Vietnam 
policy. 
A statistical analysis of monthly data from January 1965 through 
December 1967 comparing the percentages of the American public 
approving and disapproving President Johnson's handling of his job 
(as measured in the American Institute of Public Opinion's "Gallup 
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Poll") with the index of U . S  . military commitments in Vietnam shows 
a very strong negative relationship: the more U . S . troops and supplies 
sent to Vietnam in one month and the more combat in which the 
troops engaged, the less support the president received from the Ameri­
can people in the following month (the correlation coefficient is —.93). 
This loss of political support for President Johnson was accompanied 
by a loss of support for his Vietnam policy. F r o m July 1965 to December 
1967 the American Institute of Public Opinion regularly assessed do­
mestic public reaction to the w a y President Johnson was handling his 
job as president and to his handling of the Vietnam W a r  . During 
this period public evaluation of the president's general performance 
and of his Vietnam policy were highly correlated: the percentages 
of those w h  o disapproved of the president and his Vietnam policy 
correlated .89; the percentages of those w h  o approved of the president 
and his Vietnam policy correlated .80. 
Thus, the Johnson administration was incorrect in its crucial assump­
tion that the American public would approve a policy of gradual escala­
tion in Vietnam. In its evaluation of the war the American public's 
greatest consideration was its monetary and h u m a n costs, rather than 
its value in defeating C o m m u n i s m . The most significant costs to the 
American people were the number of American "boys" killed and 
wounded in Vietnam. The correlation between American casualties 
in Vietnam and the margin of approval for President Johnson and 
his Vietnam policy is very strongly negative (r = —.77). T h e more 
casualties incurred, the more the public disapproved of the president 
and his Vietnam policy. W h  y the costs of waging war in Vietnam 
led to a decline in domestic political support will be further analyzed 
in chapter nine. 
In concluding this chapter, w  e should note that the principal policy-
makers of the Johnson administration held and acted upon hawkish 
assumptions or "folk models" of the interrelationship between interna­
tional politics and domestic politics that were in m a n y respects as 
incorrect as their assumptions about the dynamics of international poli­
tics. President Johnson's failure to foresee that escalation of the Vietnam 
W a  r would lead to a loss of political support for his presidency was 
as significant as his failure to foresee that bombing North Vietnam 
would not lead to greater popular confidence in the South Vietnamese 
government or that the Communists would be able to equal his escala­
tion rather than surrender to it. Although President Johnson m a  y gradu­
ally have been m a d e aware by dissenting advisers and agencies that 
his hawkish folk models were invalid, he nonetheless continued to be 
guided by them in his direction of American policy in Vietnam. 
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1. Although not one of President Johnson's closest advisers, General William 
Westmoreland was one of the people w h o most influenced U . S . policy in Vietnam. 
General Earl G  . Wheeler as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and John A  . M c  ­
Cone, director of the CIA, also played significant roles in influencing U . S  . policy 
in Vietnam during the Johnson administration. 
2 . This study, conducted at the Jason Division of the Institute for Defense 
Analysis in Wellesley, Massachusetts, from June through August 1966, was under 
the leadership of Dr. Jerrold R . Zacharias of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech­
nology. The idea for a summer seminar of scientists and academic specialists to study 
technical aspects of the war had been suggested by Dr. George B  . Kistiakowsky 
and Dr . Carl Kaysen of Harvard and Dr . Jerome B . Wiesner and Dr. Zacharias of 
M . I . T  . These m e  n were given briefings by high officials from the Pentagon, the 
C.I.A., the State Department, and the White House, and were provided with secret 
materials. Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton was the overseer of the 
project ( N Y T , PP, pp. 483-84). 
5

Empirical Patterns of Interaction 
in the Escalation of the Vietnam W a  r 
Held up to the light of empirical data, the models of the war held 
by U . S . policy-makers were clearly inadequate. Convinced that their 
o w n decisions and actions would alone determine the outcome of the 
war, they generally failed to consider adequately not only the reactions 
of their opponents but the fact that the outcomes of war are dependent 
upon the actions of both sides. Thus, this tragic war was conducted, 
at least partially, on the basis of invalid assumptions and models. 
To predict accurately the consequences of policy decisions and ac­
tions, a valid model of the conflict is needed. It is essential, for example, 
to find out what factors were or were not systematically related to 
each other, i.e., the general empirical patterns of actions, reactions, 
and consequences during the conflict. Using the statistical methods 
of correlation and regression analysis, this chapter will demonstrate 
such major patterns of interaction during the Vietnam War's escalatory 
period from 1965 through 1967.1 
MUTUAL ESCALATION 
The main discernible pattern of behavior in this war was mutual 
escalation. In 1964 U . S . military commitments to South Vietnam were 
substantial, but limited to providing equipment, funds, and advisers. 
At the end of 1964 there were 23,000 U . S . military personnel in South 
Vietnam. Except for the Tonkin Gulf incident, U . S . airpower had not 
been used against the North. 
North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong in the south was also 
limited in 1964 to supplies and to m e n w h o for the most part had 
been South Vietnamese members of the Viet Minh and w h o had moved 
to the North after the 1954 cease-fire. Only in late 1964 did regular 
North Vietnamese soldiers begin infiltrating into the South. Their n u m  ­
ber is estimated to have been 12,000, at the least, by the end of 1964 
(less than 10 percent of the total Communist troop strength in South 
Vietnam at the time) (Sharp and Westmoreland, 1969, p. 3). Large 
numbers of regular troops of the North Vietnamese A r m  y apparently 
were sent into the South only after the United States went beyond 
previous tacit limits and b o m b e  d North Vietnam in the Tonkin Gulf 
incident of August 1964. Indeed, the role of the North Vietnamese 
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prior to 1965 m a  y have been similar to that of tht U . S  . "advisers" to the 
South Vietnamese army. 
The Tonkin Gulf incident itself was used by the Johnson administra­
tion as an occasion for U . S  . escalation that had, in fact, been in the 
planning stages for months ( N Y T  , PP, chap. 5, especially pp. 286­
88). In other words, the deteriorating situation that U . S  . and South 
Vietnamese policy-makers perceived at the end of 1964 and the begin­
ning of 1965 led them to escalate the war to avoid a Communist victory. 
This situation was vividly described by Admiral U  . S. G  . Sharp, the 
U . S . commander in chief in the Pacific: 
During January and February 1965 the general situation in South 
Vietnam continued to worsen, the military threat increased, political 
tensions in Saigon deepened, and morale plummeted. It became 
increasingly apparent that the existing levels of United States aid 
could not prevent the collapse of South Vietnam. Even as delibera­
tions on h o w best to deal with the situation were in progress within 
our government, the Viet Cong launched a series of attacks on Ameri­
can installations in South Vietnam. These attacks indicated that North 
Vietnam was moving in for the kill. It appeared that they would 
succeed, perhaps in a matter of months, as things were developing. 
Acting on the request of the South Vietnamese government, the 
decision was m a d e to commit as soon as possible 125,000 United 
States troops to prevent the Communist takeover. 
At the same time President Johnson indicated that additional forces 
would be sent as requested by the Republic of Vietnam and the 
C o m m a n d e  r of the United States Military Assistance C o m m a n d  , Viet­
n a m (Sharp and Westmoreland, 1969, pp. 4-5). 
This pattern of escalation at the beginning of 1965 was repeated 
throughout the period from 1965 through 1967. Thus, in response to 
these Communist troop increases and to thwart a Communist military 
victory and political take-over in South Vietnam, the Johnson adminis­
tration committed U . S . troops and supplies and ordered bombing sorties 
in South Vietnam and battalion-size or larger ground operations.2 
U.S.	 Commitments = - 23,000+ .164 N.V. + V.C. troops

R 2 = .9O (2,400) (.01) l-1

(1) 
Furthermore, the U . S . bombing of North Vietnam was intensified 
as well, in response to the increasing numbers of North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong troops sent to the South. This, of course, was meant 
to prevent the defeat of South Vietnamese forces by compelling the 
North Vietnamese to stop sending their troops and supplies into the 
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South. A n d that positive relationship between Communist troop com­
mitments and U . S . bombing missions over North Vietnam still holds 
even w h e  n taking into account the winter-summer seasonal variation 
that affectsflying weather, as well as the m o m e n t u m of the U . S . bombing 
policy. 
U.S. bombing sorties = - 2,900 + .64 U.S. bombing N.V.
 t^ 
ouerN.V.
R2 = .91
 (1,400) (.10) 
 + .021 N.V. + V.C. troops
 t_i 
(.007) 
- 110 Winter-Summer 
(34) (2) 
As already discussed in detail in chapter 4, the main objective of 
the U . S . bombing of North Vietnam was to decrease infiltration of North 
Vietnamese troops and supplies into the South. But that objective was 
not achieved. Indeed, the results were quite the contrary: the North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong counterescalated by committing more of 
their troops to South Vietnam in response to increased U . S . bombing 
of the North. 
N.V.	 + V.C. troops = 194,000 + .0099 U.S. bombing 
R2 = .67 (8,000) (.0012) sorties over N.V. t-1 
(3) 
O n e might conclude, in fact, that the U . S . bombing of North Vietnam 
provoked the North Vietnamese to increase their commitments in the 
South. According to the theory of cognitive congruence, one might 
speculate that North Vietnamese leaders came to value success in their 
struggle in the South in proportion to the costs of the punishments 
they suffered in the North as a result of their participation in the 
South. In other words, the continual bombing of North Vietnam that 
occurred from February 1965 through October 1968 (and intermittently 
until it was continual again starting in the spring of 1972)—escalating 
the war geographically and in destructive power—was a key factor 
in the spiraling escalation of North Vietnamese troop support to the 
Viet Cong in South Vietnam. 
That the North Vietnamese considered the bombing of the North 
a provocative escalatory action is further indicated by their insistence 
that the bombing be the only issue on the agenda at the start of the 
Paris negotiations in M a  y 1968. 
Another reason for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong's escalating 
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their o w  n troop commitments in the South was to offset the American 
escalation of troop, supply, and battle commitments there. Because 
American troop commitments and the American bombing of North 
Vietnam were so highly inter-correlated (r = .92 within the same 
month) , w  e cannot simultaneously measure their relative impact on 
Communis t troop escalations using the statistical methods of multiple 
regression. However , since at the beginning of 1965 the Communists 
were on the verge of winning a military victory and causing the collapse 
of the South Vietnamese government, w  e m a  y infer that they increased 
their troop commitments in the South because the American escalation 
of troop and combat commitments threatened the victory they expected. 
Thus, w e can specify equation 4 and measure the impact of U . S . com­
mitments on Communis t troop increases. 
N.V. + V.C. Troops = 183,000 + 4.5 U.S. Commitments

R 2 = .87 (6,000) (.3) l-2
 ( 4 )

T h e military consequence of troop escalations on both sides was 
the intensification of fighting and hence an escalation of both U . S . 
casualties and Communis t attrition.3 
U.S. Casualties = -890 + .44 U.S. Commitments

R2 = .8S (650) (.03)

+ 150. Spring-Fall 
(47.) (5) 
N.V.	 + V.C. Attrition = 5,700 + .84 U.S. Commitments 
R 2 = .75 (1,600) (.08) (6) 
Increases in U . S . commitments, including battalion-size operations 
and tactical bombing within South Vietnam, did achieve the objective 
of General Westmoreland's "meatgrinder" strategy—that of inflicting 
heavy casualties on the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong . However , 
the hawkish assumptions of that strategy proved invalid; indeed, rather 
than wear d o w  n the Communis t forces, it led the Communists to replace 
their forces instead. For although North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g 
m a n p o w e r was not limitless, it was not exhausted either; and apparently, 
they were willing to continue to accept high casualties. 
T h e very high correlation between U . S . casualties and North Vietna­
mese and Viet C o n g attrition (r = .92) indicates not only that the 
escalating combat resulted in proportionally escalating combat losses 
on both sides, but also that during this 1965-67 period the intensity 
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of the fighting on both sides could be measured using U . S . casualties 
alone. 
South Vietnamese casualties were not as highly correlated with U . S . 
casualties (r = .22) or with Communist attrition (r = .29) as these 
latter two variables were with each other. Sincefirefights between op­
posing military forces usually result in casualties on both sides, these 
findings indicate that U . S . troops took on most of the direct combat 
with the Communist forces during the 1965-67 period, leaving the South 
Vietnamese troops mainly responsible for maintaining the security of 
pacified areas. 
As U . S . casualties increased, the U . S . bombing of North Vietnam 
increased proportionately (r = .86 with a three-month lag). O n  e major 
objective of the intensified bombing was, in the words of General West­
moreland, "the destruction of war-supporting activities which would 
assist us directly in the prosecution of the ground battle in the South" 
(Sharp and Westmoreland, 1969, p. 98). However, in attempting to 
reduce Communist military effectiveness and hence U . S . casualties, 
the escalation cycle was repeated: increased bombing of North Vietnam, 
Communist troop increases, U . S . troop increases, and increased casual­
ties. Thus the vicious cycle went on and on. 
U.S. Commitments 
N.V. + V .C. Troops Casualties 
U.S. Bombing N.V. 
Figure 4. The Escalation Cycle 
U.S. PUBLIC OPINION 
Although relating to domestic politics in the United States, public 
support for President Johnson and his administration's Vietnam policy 
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was another crucial element in the dynamics of the Vietnam W a r ; 
and the leaders on both sides realized that fact. T o the North Vietnamese 
and Viet C o n g leaders, American public opinion was of strategic impor­
tance to the achievement of their objectives in Vietnam. They expected 
that in this protracted war that was costly to the United States, they 
could outlast the American determination to go on because they were 
fighting in their o w n country, whereas the Americans were fighting 
in a country that was of peripheral interest to the national security 
of the United States. Moreover, they believed that American popular 
support for the war would eventually fall to the point that the U . S . 
government would be forced to withdraw from Vietnam as the French 
had from Indochina in 1954.4 
It is n o w clear that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were correct 
in their expectation that as the U . S . commitments of troops, supplies, 
and combat in South Vietnam continued to escalate, U . S . public opinion 
support for President Johnson and his Vietnam policy would fall. 
Percentage of U.S. Public 
Supporting President Johnson = 53.6 - .0019 U.S. Commit­
(2.4) (.0001) ments
 t_i 
R 2 = .88 
(7) 
Since the escalating troop and battle commitments resulted in more 
Americans killed, as well as greater amounts of tax dollars spent on 
the war, higher taxes tofinance the war, and increased inflation, which 
was fed by the government's initial deficit war spending and its resultant 
excessive demands on the U . S . economy, the American people steadily 
withdrew their support from, and voiced their opposition to, the Johnson 
administration and its Vietnam W a  r policy. Indeed, public opinion 
support for President Johnson fell so low by March of 1968 (36 percent) 
that had he then sought a second full term, he would have faced 
less chance of reelection than any incumbent American president since 
1948 and possibly since 1932. 
In sum, President Johnson tried but failed to lead American public 
opinion to support his Vietnam policy. The less public support he 
had, judging from the polls, the more he and his administration publicly 
stated their preferences for increasing American military commitments 
in Vietnam (r = — .30 with a one-month lag). Yet as he m a d e more 
and more military commitments, he lost more and more support. 
T h e Johnson administration thus found itself in a dilemma partly 
of its o w n making. T o save the South Vietnamese government from 
military defeat and political collapse at the hands of the North Vietna­
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mese and the Viet Cong, President Johnson felt he had to commit 
an increasingly large number of U . S . troops to combat in South Vietnam. 
A n  d to help the American and South Vietnamese troops defeat the 
Communists, he and his administration felt they had to intensify the 
bombing of North Vietnam. The Communists met these escalations 
with counterescalations of their o w n . Thus, the war was stalemated 
at increasingly greater levels of violence and casualties, and American 
public support for the war continued to decline. 
POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE VIET CONG 
Yet another essential factor with regard to the dynamics of the war 
was the decline in popular support for the Viet Cong. In a "war of 
national liberation," the insurgents depend upon the local populace 
for military recruits, food supplies, information, and compliant behavior 
that m a y be based on threat, coercion, exchange for services, or ideolog­
ical zeal. Such "cooperative" behavior is their political power, and insur­
gents depend upon it for their o w n protection from the political author­
ities they oppose, as well as for their continued operation. 
Local people m a  y cooperate with insurgents for a variety of reasons: 
the fear of being harmed by the insurgents if they do not; a possible 
gain in social or economic advantages if they do; or perhaps a true 
belief in the insurgents' cause. During a war, however, there is one 
determining factor for the behavior of local people: they will cooperate 
with whoever they think can most reliably offer them protection from 
harm, whether they be insurgents or the political authorities they are 
fighting. Survival—for oneself, one's family, and one's w a  y of life—is 
the primary motivation in such situations. People will give their services, 
their goods, their money, their loyalty, and even a sense of legitimacy 
to those w h o they think can reliably protect them, and will even fight 
along with them for what they see as self-protection, whatever the 
demands. 
W h e  n such demands are no longer seen as legitimate, local people 
will withdraw their compliance, if they get the chance, and will cease 
to cooperate. In other words, w h e n insurgents cannot be relied upon 
to protect a population, the population will defect.5 
Thus, w e can measure the loss of popular support for the Viet Cong 
by counting the number of military and political defectors ("hoi chanh" 
or "ralliers") from it each month, because most of these "ralliers" to 
the South Vietnamese were Viet Cong, rather than North Vietnamese. 
Of course, their number was partly determined by the size of the 
Viet Cong forces; for as the war escalated and the Viet Cong forces 
increased, the number of Viet Cong defectors inevitably rose as well— 
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and sometimes for quite simple, personal reasons. Merely wanting to 
return to their homes and families to help plant or harvest the crops 
is one example, for the season of the year is also a determining factor. 
N.V. + V.C. Defectors = -1,100 + .011 N.V. + V.C. Troops 
R 2 = .47 (500) (.002) 
+ 48 Spring-Fall 
(16) (8) 
Still, season and n u m b e r of Viet C o n g troops are only a partial 
explanation for the n u m b e r of Viet C o n g defectors. As the war escalated, 
it took an increasingly heavy toll in North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g 
attrition. A n  d as attrition increased, m a n  y of those w h  o had joined 
the Viet C o n g came to realize that the Viet C o n g was not protecting 
them and therefore defected in ever larger numbers. 
B y looking at the determinants of the monthly proportion of North 
Vietnamese and Viet C o n g w h o defected—i.e., the ratio of defectors 
to total North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g troops—we can show that 
attrition a m o n g the Viet C o n g was a significant factor in its o w n right, 
and not just a result of increased Viet C o n g forces. In the following 
regression equation, attrition and season are significant factors, but 
U . S . commitments are not. 
v r f '  H -0037 + .00013 Spring-FallV.C. Troops )
 ( ^ (mm.P 
R 2 = .29 + .00000017 N.V. + V.C. Attrition 
(.00000009) 
- .000000033 U.S. Commitmentst_i 
(.000000095) 
(9) 
Thus, although w  e cannot simultaneously measure the independent 
effects of both troops and attrition on North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g 
defections because of their being so highly intercorrelated, w  e can 
measure the effect of attrition alone w h e n controlling for season. 
N.V. + V.C. Defectors = 430 + .061 N.V. + V.C. Attrition 
(270) (.013)

R 2 = .44

+ 32 Spring-Fall 
(17) (10) 
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W  e m a  y therefore conclude that the escalation of thefighting and 
the number of casualties had a negative effect on the political support 
for the Viet Cong that paralleled the negative effect it had on political 
support for the Johnson administration in the United States.6 
POPULAR CONFIDENCE OF THE

SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN THEIR GOVERNMENT

W  e n o w come to the question of the South Vietnamese popular 
confidence in their government, which in this study is measured by 
an index of the ratio of the black-market value of the South Vietnamese 
piastre in terms of dollars to the value of the piastre in goods and 
services, i.e. [(Dollars/Piastre) / (Money Supply/Consumer Prices)].7 
Using this index as a measure, w  e can see that South Vietnamese 
popular confidence varied during the 1965-67 escalatory period of the 
war. Except for an abrupt rise in July 1965, w h e n American troops 
first began offensive combat operations against the Communists, popular 
confidence generally dropped until it reached a low point in M a  y 1966. 
It rose, in general, from then until it reached a high point in August 
1967, whereupon it began to fall once more, never again reaching that 
height. 
Since it is based on economic components, this indicator is highly 
autocorrelated and thus demonstrates a high degree of inertia. W h e  n 
controlling for such autocorrelation in regression equations, U . S . com­
mitments in South Vietnam, U . S . bombing in North Vietnam, and North 
Vietnamese and Viet Con  g troops, taken individually, have no signifi­
cant effect on the index in question. Thus, its variation appears to 
be independent of the steady escalation of the war. 
SUMMARY OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL INTERACTION 
The main pattern of military and political interaction during the 
1965-67 escalatory period of the Vietnam W a  r is illustrated in figure 
5. Reciprocal escalation between U . S . troop and combat commitments 
in South Vietnam arid the U . S . bombing of North Vietnam, on the 
one hand, and that of North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g troops, on 
the other, led to increasingly heavy American and North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong casualties. The U . S . commitments reduced political sup­
port in the United States for the Johnson administration and its Vietnam 
policy; the attrition suffered by the North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g 
reduced the Viet Cong's popular support. Thus, in seeking to gain 
military and political control of South Vietnam, both sides lost militarily 
as well as politically. 
U.S. Public Support 
for President Johnson 
U.S. Commitments N.V. + V . C . Defectors 
/
N.V. + V . C . Attrition
N.V. + V . C . Troops U.S. Casualties 
U. S. Bombing of N.V. 
Figure 5. Pattern of Military and Political Interaction 
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This pattern of interaction was unrelieved until the Communist Tet 
offensive, which began in January 1968, forced the Johnson administra­
tion to review its entire Vietnam policy, reduce and then halt the 
bombing of North Vietnam, and m o v e to start negotiating with the 
North Vietnamese and Viet C o n  g in Paris.8 
PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF POLICY-MAKERS 
The subsidiary patterns of interaction between public rhetoric and 
military actions during this 1965-67 period remain to be analyzed. T o 
begin with, the public statements of policy-makers on both sides were 
elements in the domestic and international politics of the war. Public 
statements directed toward domestic audiences and foreign allies were 
used to justify policies and gain support for them. Those directed 
at adversaries were used to threaten or promise, and sometimes to 
bargain tacitly. 
Since such public statements were heeded by leaders on both sides, 
as well as by those leaders' o w n people and allies, they constituted 
political acts during the war, even though they were often misleading 
and sometimes outright lies, as m a y be seen, for example, by compar­
ing m a n y public statements of American policy-makers with their pri­
vate secret m e m o r a n d a published in the Pentagon Papers. 
In analyzing the patterns of relationships between the public state­
ments of policy-makers and their actual behavior during the war, one 
finds a basis for such domestically important political phenomena as 
the "credibility gap" during the Johnson administration and the failure 
of the two sides to negotiate a deescalation of the war during the 
1965-67 period. 
As was explained in chapter 2, eight communications indices were 
constructed from a systematic content analysis of the public statements 
m a d e by the policy-makers on both sides (U.S. and South Vietnamese; 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong) . These statements were coded from 
the New York Times Index for the entire period of 1965-67. Th  e indices 
were constructed to measure each side's publicly stated preferences 
for its o w  n military and political activities; perceptions of the opposing 
side's military and political activities; preferences for negotiations; and 
preferences for advantageous outcomes in the war.9 
"PEACE OFFENSIVES" 
Th e major pattern of relationships of the public rhetoric on both 
sides to their military actions, and to the political consequences of 
such actions, m a y be described as the so-called peace offensive—a term 
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first used by President Johnson in describing the intensified diplomatic 
efforts that accompanied the thirty-eight-day halt in the bombing of 
North Vietnam during December 1965 and January 1966. It was charac­
terized by what appeared to be public attempts to persuade the adver­
sary to enter into negotiations that would deescalate or end the war 
in order to stop the terrible destruction and loss of life. The peace 
offensive pattern of public rhetoric, however, occurred throughout the 
1965-67 period. 
A main characteristic of the various peace offensives was that, in 
general, they were designed as attempts to assuage the negative inter­
national and domestic political reactions to the escalation and conduct 
of the war as m u c h as they were attempts to seriously negotiate a 
compromise to end the war. Each side, through its military efforts, 
demonstrated that it sought to win militarily and politically, or at least 
to avoid being defeated. M o r  e than a call for serious negotiation of 
a compromise settlement, the public rhetoric of the leaders on both 
sides consisted generally in thinly disguised exhortations for the adver­
sary to renounce its o w n objectives and military efforts. Knowing that 
such exhortations would probably go unheeded, the policy-makers re­
sponsible for them were more likely playing a cynical domestic political 
g a m e with their o w n constituents and an international political game 
with nonbelligerents in deference to "world opinion" than seriously 
seeking a compromise that would end the war. 
United States rhetoric with regard to negotiating was intended as 
m u c  h for dovish political opponents of the Johnson administration, 
U . S . allies, neutrals, and nonbelligerent Communist states as for the 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Indeed, as to the former, such public 
statements were most likely meant to have the effect of assuaging opposi­
tion, showing determination, explaining policy, and bringing them over 
to the Johnson administration's point of view. 
Documentary evidence for this interpretation of U . S . peace offensives 
includes the following quotation from a m e m o r a n d u  m in the "Pentagon 
Papers," written by Secretary M c N a m a r a on 20 July 1965: 
Together with the above military moves, w e should take political 
initiatives in order to lay a groundwork for a favorable political 
settlement by clarifying our objectives and establishing channels 
of communications. At the same time as w  e are taking steps to 
turn the tide in South Vietnam, w e would m a k e quiet moves through 
diplomatic channels (a) to open a dialogue with M o s c o  w and Hanoi, 
and perhaps the V C  , lookingfirst toward disabusing them of any 
misconceptions as to our goals and second toward laying the ground­
work for a settlement w h e n the time is ripe; (b) to keep the Soviet 
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Union from deepening its military [sic] in the world until the time 
w h e n settlement can be achieved; and (c) to cement support for 
U . S . policy by the U . S . public, allies and friends, and to keep inter­
national opposition at a manageable level. Our efforts m a y be unpro­
ductive until the tide begins to turn, but nevertheless they should 
be m a d e . ( N Y T , PP, p. 458) 
The series of bivariate correlations illustrated in figure 6 demon­
strates the general "peace offensive" pattern during the 1965-67 period, 
as well as the linkages of this pattern to the military escalation and its 
political consequences during this same period. 
U . S  . + S.V. 
preferences for 
ow n military & U.S. Commitments 
U . S  . public - 3 5  . political activities _ 2 to S.V. 
support for U . S  . + S.V. 
Pres. Johnson — 1  , preferences 
for negotiation 
U.S. Bombing of N.V. 
Christmas U . S  . + S.V. perceptions 
Tet of N.V . + V . C  . military 
& political activity N.V. + V.C . Troops 
o, .4 o 
\ N .V  . + V . C  . preferences 
for ow  n military & 
%. political activity 
*	 N.V. + V . C . preferences -1 2 , - 5 0 
for negotiation 
1, .50 — Previous month's values of x correlated .50 with present 
>y month's values of y (i.e., with one month lag). 
Figure 6. Bivariate Correlations in the "Peace Offensive" Pattern, 
1 9 6 5 - 6 7 
Following decreases in American public support for President John­
son and his Vietnam policy (r = —.37 with a one-month lag), in­
creases in U . S  . troop and combat commitments in South Vietnam (r 
= .32 with a three-month lag), and in U . S . bombing of North Vietnam 
(r = .32 with a one-month lag), U . S . and South Vietnamese leaders 
tended to increase the frequency of their public statements expressing 
preference for a negotiated settlement of the war. Moreover, these 
statements tended to occur during the Christmas-Tet holiday season 
(r = .39). Such findings suggest that, motivated in part to counter 
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dovish criticism of its Vietnam policy, the Johnson administration took 
the occasion of the Christmas-Tet holiday season to demonstrate its 
peaceful spirit by increasing the number of its public statements regard­
ing its desire to end the war by negotiations. 
Thefirst peace offensive after the sustained bombing of North Viet­
n a m had begun occurred in M a y 1965. President Johnson's personal 
message of 10 M a  y 1965 to General Maxwell Taylor, the U . S  . ambassa­
dor to South Vietnam, clearly illustrates the pattern of the peace offen­
sive approach that the Johnson administration followed throughout 
the escalatory phase of the war. The holiday period on this occasion 
was Buddha's birthday rather than Christmas or Tet. 
I have learned from Bob M c N a m a r a that nearly all Rolling Thun­
der operations for this week can be completed by Wednesday noon, 
Washington time. This fact and the days of Buddha's birthday seem 
to m  e to provide an excellent opportunity for a pause in air attacks 
which might go into next week and which I could use to good 
effect with world opinion. 
M  y plan is not to announce this brief pause but simply to call 
it privately to the attention of M o s c o  w and Hanoi as soon as possible 
and tell them that w  e shall be watching closely to see whether 
they respond in any way . M  y current plan is to report publicly 
after the pause ends on what w  e have done. . . . 
You should understand that m  y purpose in this plan is to begin 
to clear a path either toward restoration of peace or toward increased 
military action, depending upon the reaction of the Communists. 
W  e have amply demonstrated our determination and our commit­
ment in the last two months, and I n o w wish to gain some flexibility. 
. . . (New York Times, 28 June 1972, p. 18) 
That the Johnson administration was also heeding its hawkish consti­
tuents is shown by its attempt to "soften up" the Communists by esca­
lating combat in the South and bombing in the North prior to these 
public statements. For the hawks had argued that the U . S . could offer 
to cease its bombing in the North in exchange for a Communist capitu­
lation and a halt in their military efforts in the South. 
O  n the other hand, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong leaders 
also tended to use the Christmas and Tet holiday season as an occasion 
to increase the frequency of their publicly stated preferences for nego­
tiation (r = .34). Moreover, the Communists generally m a d e similar 
statements following periods in which they had inflicted relatively heavy 
casualties on the South Vietnamese forces that were engaged in efforts 
to "pacify" and secure the countryside. Thus, the Communists also 
sought to negotiate w h e  n they were in a position of strength, as well 
as to reduce their public statements regarding their preferences for 
outcomes in the war of advantage to themselves. 
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N.V.	 + V.C. Public = - 25 + .018 S .V. Casualtiest3 
Preferences for (7) (.006) 
Negotiation 
+ 7.2 Christmas-Tet 
R 2 = .41 (2.3) 
- .55 N . V + V.C. Public Statements 
(.25) about Favorable Outcomes 
(11) 
However, the North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g leaders, like their 
U . S . and South Vietnamese counterparts, appeared to follow a mixed 
declaratory policy; for on both sides increased publicly stated prefer­
ences for negotiations were uncorrelated with statements preferring 
their o w n military and political activities. In other words, both sides 
were as likely as not to be publicly stating their preferences for increas­
ing their o w n military and political activities in South Vietnam during 
the same month that they were publicly stating their desire for negotiat­
ing. 
Furthermore, both sides were likely to increase their troop commit­
ments in South Vietnam, and the United States to increase its bombing 
of North Vietnam, during the same month that their respective leaders 
stated their growing desire for negotiations. In addition, the United 
States tended to increase its commitments in South Vietnam (r = 
—.35 with a two-month lag) and its bombing in North Vietnam (r 
= —.37 with a two-month lag) following the U . S . and South Vietnamese 
leaders' publicly stating their preferences for decreasing their military 
and political activities in South Vietnam. Thus, by not matching their 
actions to their words, each side would reinforce the other's distrust 
and fear of being exploited. 
T h e sincerity of all statements preferring negotiation were therefore 
continually suspect. Each side believed that the other was taking advan­
tage of holiday cease-fires to resupply and reinforce their o w n troops. 
For example, within the same months that the U . S . and South Vietna­
mese leaders increased their publicly stated preferences for negotiation, 
they also publicly expressed their belief that the North Vietnamese 
and Viet C o n g were increasing their military and political activity 
in South Vietnam (r = .40), and this most particularly during the 
Christmas-Tet holiday periods (r = .43). 
N o w  , in point of fact, the public statements of U . S  . and South Vietna­
mese leaders asserting that North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g military 
and political activity in South Vietnam was increasing were actually 
uncorrelated with Communist troop increases. Rather, they were appar­
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ently responses to public statements of North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong leaders conveying their preferences for increased military and 
political activities (r = .40). A n d although Communist troop increases 
were uncorrelated with such statements, the statements also tended 
to increase during the Christmas-Tet holiday periods (r = .38).10 
North Vietnamese President H  o Chi Minh's 1966 poetic N e  w Years' 
message printed in Nhan Dan is an example of the bellicose rhetoric 
of the holiday periods: 
M a  y the South shine with n e  w victories, 
With m a n y more Dautieng, Baubang, Pleime, Danang. . . . 
M a  y the Northfight heroically, 
The higher the American aggressors escalate, 
The heavier their defeats. 
Let all our compatriots unite and be of one mind, 
Whether at the front line or in the rear 
Let our people redouble their efforts, 
Emulating in production and rushing forward to the fight 
Against the U . S  . aggressors, for national salvation, our 
Victory is certain. 
This poe  m (reprinted in the New York Times, 2 Jan. 1966, p. 22), 
directed to a domestic North Vietnamese audience, appeared little more 
than a month after H  o and Premier P h a m V a n D o n g had expressed 
their desire for negotiation in a personal interview with Amintore Fan­
fani, then Italy's foreign minister, and Giogio L  a Pira, professor of 
R o m a n law and former mayor of Florence. The meeting took place 
on 11 November 1965, and was reported in the New York Times on 
18 December 1965. The following are excerpts from their statements: 
. .  . In order for the peace negotiations to come about, there 
will be necessary (a) a cease-fire (by air, by sea, by land) in the 
entire territory of Vietnam (North and South); the cessation, that 
is, of all belligerent operations (including therefore also the cessation 
of debarkation of further American troops); (b) a declaration accord­
ing to which the Geneva agreements of 1954 will be taken as the 
basis for the negotiations—a declaration m a d e up of the four points 
formulated by Hanoi, points that are in reality the explanation of 
the Geneva text and which therefore can be reduced to a single 
point: application in other words of the Geneva accords. 
. . . The government in Hanoi is prepared to initiate negotiations 
without first requiring actual withdrawal of American troops. 
H o Chi Minh also added: "I a m prepared to go anywhere; to meet 
anyone" (Fanfani, p. 3 ) . 
During the holiday period a year later, in a personal interview with 
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Harrison Salisbury, reporter and associate editor of the New York Times, 
Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam again stated simultaneously 
both his desire for deescalating and ending the war and his determina­
tion to continue thefighting if necessary: 
"The moment the United States puts an end to the war, w  e will 
respect each other and settle every question. W h  y don't you [the 
U.S.] think that way?" 
At another point he said that with a cessation of hostilities, " w  e 
can speak about other things." H  e added: "After this there will 
be no lack of generosity on our part—you m a y be sure of that." 
At the same time the Premier stressed again and again that North 
Vietnam was prepared to fight 10 years, 20 years, or any number 
of years in support of its sovereignty and independence in its "sacred 
war." 
" W  e are determined to fight on until our sacred rights are rec­
ognized. 
"The big question is to reach a settlement which can be enforced. 
"The party which has to makefirst steps is Washington. W  e have 
no doubt on this point. If this does not come about today, it will 
come tomorrow. It's no use to make haste, the questions will be 
put wrongly and w  e will have to wait again. So let the situation 
ripen. 
" W  e are prepared for a long war because a people's war must 
be a long war, a war against aggression has to be a long war. Nobody 
knows h o w long it will be. It lasts until there is no more aggression. 
" H o w many years? W h a t I used to tell our friends was that the 
younger generation will fight better than we—even kids so high. 
They are preparing themselves. That's the situation. 
" H o w many years the war goes on depends on you and not on 
us." (Salisbury, 4 January 1967, pp. 1-2) 
Such belligerent rhetoric on the part of the North Vietnamese and 
Viet Cong leaders during peace offensives was probably meant as a 
bargaining counter to U . S  . attempts to apply military pressure to the 
Communists prior to U . S . peace offensives—itself a move designed to 
coerce the Communists to negotiate a settlement on U . S  . terms. Accord­
ing to the "Pentagon Papers," U . S  . conditions for a negotiated settle­
ment, at least in the spring of 1965, "were not 'compromise' terms, 
but more akin to a 'cease and desist' order that, from the D . R . V . / V  C 
point of view, was tantamount to a demand for their surrender," albeit 
"discreet and relatively face-saving" ( N Y T  , PP, pp. 388, 458). Indeed, 
Secretary M c N a m a r  a outlined the desired outcomes of any negotiated 
settlement that the Johnson administration considered fundamental and 
acceptable in a memorandum dated 20 July 1965. The terms would 
have amounted, in effect, to a Communist capitulation: 
74 Dynamics of the Vietnam War 
(a) V  C stop attacks and drastically reduce incidents of terror 
and sabotage. 
(b) D R  V reduces infiltration to a trickle, with some reasonably re­
liable method of our obtaining confirmation of this fact. 
(c) U . S . / G V  N stop bombing of North Vietnam. 
(d) G V  N stays independent (hopefully pro-U.S. , but possibly gen­
uinely neutral). 
(e) G V  N exercises governmental functions over substantially all 
of South Vietnam. 
(f) C o m m u n i s t s remain quiescent in L a o s	 a n d Thailand. 
(g) D R  V withdraws P A V  N forces and other North Vietnamese 
infiltrators (not regroupees) from South Vietnam. 
(h) V C / N L  F transform from a military to a purely political orga­
nization. 
(i)	 U . S . combat forces (not advisors or A I D ) withdraw. 
( N Y T , PP, p. 458) 
Th e North Vietnamese and Viet Con  g leaders thus matched American 
toughness in starting negotiations with their o w  n toughness with state­
ments expressing their determination to continue their part in the war 
and not capitulate. 
Each side interpreted the other side's toughness at the time of peace 
offensives as a sign of insincere negotiating tactics. United States and 
South Vietnamese leaders, expecting that their attempts to initiate ne­
gotiations would be unsuccessful, and fearing that the Communists 
would take advantage of them during holiday lulls in the fighting, 
tended to focus their attention on the belligerent public statements 
of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong leaders rather than the more 
conciliatory statements supporting negotiations to end the war. More­
over, since Communist troop commitments were uncorrelated with 
North Vietnamese and Viet Con  g leaders' publicly expressed prefer­
ences for negotiation, Communist troop increases would as likely as 
not have occurred within the same month that Communist preferences 
for negotiations were being publicly announced. Under pressure from 
its hawkish critics not to trust the Communists nor to risk American 
lives by letting up the military pressure on them, the Johnson adminis­
tration tended to pay heed to the belligerent rhetoric of the Communist 
leaders and plan for the worst. B y citing Communist intransigence, 
and thus temporarily relieving the dovish political pressure to negoti­
ate instead offighting, the Johnson administration used the peace offen­
sives to "clear the decks" for intensified reescalation of the war ( N Y T , 
PP, p. 388). 
That President Johnson viewed Communist offers of negotiation as 
requests for surrender is illustrated by his statement in a public speech 
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at Johns Hopkins University on 7 April 1965, to the effect that the 
United States was bombing North Vietnam "to convince the leaders 
of North Vietnam—and all w h  o seek to share their conquest—of a simple 
fact: W  e will not be defeated. W  e will not grow tired. W  e will not 
withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement" 
(Johnson, 7 April 1965). 
During peace offensives the Communists also were presented with 
double messages by the U . S . and South Vietnamese leaders, w h o were 
often making their belligerent statements about increasing their o w  n 
military and political activity at the same time as they were publicly 
stating their preferences for negotiating an end to the war, since such 
public statements were uncorrelated. Moreover, given the fact that 
U . S . troop commitments to South Vietnam and the bombing of North 
Vietnam were uncorrelated with U . S . and South Vietnamese leaders' 
public statements expressing a preference for negotiations, American 
intentions were even more ambiguous, since American troop commit­
ments and the bombing of the North were as likely to increase as 
decrease during the same month that U . S . and South Vietnamese leaders 
increased their publicly expressed desires to negotiate. T h  e contradic­
tion between American words and deeds was probably designed to 
show U . S . determination to continue its military efforts until the C o m ­
munists capitulated.11 Thus, wishing to give an image of strength and 
determination but suspicious of American intentions, North Vietna­
mese and Viet Cong leaders accused not only U . S . leaders of being 
insincere but the "peace offensives" as being trickery designed to take 
advantage of them. As a result, both sides were more polarized and 
intent on continuing thefighting; for, in fact, U . S  . and South Vietnamese 
public statements expressing a preference for negotiations decreased 
subsequent to increased numbers of similar public statements by the 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (r = —.50 with a two-month lag). 
In other words, with each side distrusting the enemy, afraid of being 
taken advantage of, desiring that the other side capitulate under the 
cover of a negotiated settlement of the war, the peace offensives failed 
to achieve a negotiated end to the fighting. 
The main reason for the "peace offensive" rhetoric's failure to end 
the war was that, although each side had an incentive to reduce the 
intensity of the conflict and hence its o w  n military and economic losses, 
the respective leaders desired the initial objective (i.e, political control 
of South Vietnam) even more. Although a cessation of hostilities was 
attractive to both sides, both wanted it on their o w n terms. Distrustful 
of the enemy, neither side wanted peace at the cost, or even apparent 
cost, of capitulation. Indeed, both felt the need to justify the heavy 
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costs they had already brought upon themselves, and the respective 
leaders were willing to bear ever greater losses in order to inflict 
ever greater punishment on the enemy, believing at each escalatory 
step that they could force the other side to capitulate. Refusing to 
concede victory or apparent victory to the enemy, each side felt impelled 
to press ahead and failed to recognize that its o w n escalation would 
provoke counterescalation, not capitulation, on the part of the enemy. 
Thus, both sides were confounded in their attempts to halt the spiral 
of increasingly intense warfare in Vietnam.12 
1. The regression coefficients (b) state (within some stated standard error (SE)) 
the magnitude of the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable. 
The sign of the regression coefficient indicates the direction of the effect (plus 
or minus). These equations can be used to predict the value of a dependent 
variable given the value of the independent variable, assuming that the value 
of the independent variable stays within the range of the values it has had 
in the past and from which these regression equations were derived. 
The proportional reduction in the error of the prediction of a dependent "vari­
able, as compared with the error associated with using the m e a  n value as the 
predicted value, is measured by the square of the multiple correlation coefficient, 
or R 2 . 
Values for all variables in the regression equations are monthly. Values are 
within the same month except those marked "t~l" which are of the previous 
month, and "t-2," which are the values from two months before. 
The first-order autocorrelation term (i.e., the dependent variable with a one-
month lag) is included in the specification of the regression equations for those 
dependent variables which for theoretical or substantive reasons w  e would expect 
to display a great deal of "inertia." For example, the number of troops one 
month is dependent upon the previous month's number, because this variable 
is necessarily additive. The number of bombing missions flown one month is 
not dependent in the same w a y on the number flown the previous month; they 
need not be additive. The number of bombing missions, however, does display 
a great deal of autocorrelation because of bureaucratic inertia and the m o m e n t u  m 
of the bombing policy: once the bombers and pilots were in Southeast Asia, 
there was a great deal of incentive to use them if possible unless limited by 
political decisions. 
The specification of the regression equations is informed by theoretical and 
substantive considerations, however, and autocorrelation terms will not always 
appear in the regression equations w h e  n substantive or theoretical terms take 
precedence in the specification. Additional U . S  . troop commitments, for example, 
were m a d  e not primarily because U . S  . troops were already in Vietnam but in 
response to additional North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops. 
2. Even though U . S  . commitments are highly autocorrelated, w  e know that 
their increase was due more to Communist troop increases than to mere m o m e n ­
tum. Hence, the specification of equation 1. 
3. United States commitments are more highly correlated with U . S  . casualties 
and N . V . + V . C . attrition than are N . V . + V . C . troops. Because U . S . commitments 
and N . V  . + V . C  . troops are so highly correlated, w  e cannot include them both 
in a multiple regression to determine their separate but simultaneous effect on 
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U . S  . casualties and N . V  . + V . C  . attrition. Hence, U . S  . commitments are specified 
in regression equations 5 and 6. 
4 . President Johnson was also aware that American public support for his 
Vietnam policy was of crucial importance to his international and domestic polit­
ical plans. In fact, he frequently quoted the results of public opinion polls, which 
he sometimes carried in his coat pocket w h e n they were favorable to him and 
to his Vietnam policy. As noted in chapter 4 , he did his utmost to lead the 
American people to support his policy; and he controlled the flow of information 
to the Congress and public with regard to the full extent of the actual commit­
ments m a d  e to South Vietnam as a result of his policy, as well as the costs 
of those commitments. For example, in order to avoid congressional and public 
debate about his policy and commitments, he chose to finance the war initially 
through huge budget deficits rather than ask the Congress for a necessary tax 
increase. This deficit financing of the war eventually lead to very serious domestic 
and international economic problems for the United States, including rapid inflation 
and a deficit in its international balance of payments. 
5. Defection is literally "voting with one's feet." Defections from the Viet 
Cong often occurred w h e n South Vietnamese government forces demonstrated 
local military superiority and overran Viet Cong areas. 
6. This ironic effect of both sides' escalation of the war will be further analyzed 
in chapter 9. 
7. The development of this indirect index is described in chapter 2 . 
8. The patterns of interaction after the Tet offensive, including the withdrawal 
of U . S  . ground troops from Vietnam during the Nixon administration, are analyzed 
in chapter 8. 
9. See Appendix A  , "Content Analysis of Public Communications." 
10. During the same holiday periods, however, Communist leaders might also

make statements indicating their willingness to negotiate, so that by contrast to

their stated determination to fight on in the war, their proposals for peace on

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong terms would appear more acceptable to U . S . and

South Vietnamese leaders and not a sign of Communist weakness.

11. This pattern of relationships between public statements of the policy-
makers of the United States and U . S  . troop commitments in South Vietnam, as 
well as the bombing of North Vietnam, suggests an explanation of the "credibility 
gap" that developed during the Johnson administration. The American public 
heard the Johnson administration publicly saying one thing (that it preferred 
to reduce American military efforts in Vietnam) and saw it doing another: making 
larger American troop and combat commitments in South Vietnam and intensifying 
the bombing of the North (r = —.35 and —.37 respectively with two-month lags). 
Moreover, the public realized that no correspondence existed between the adminis­
tration's publicly stated preferences for negotiating an end to the war and its 
preferences for increasing American military efforts in Vietnam. It is little wonder, 
then, that the American people came to question the truthfulness of the Johnson 
administration's public statements. 
12. Even later high-level negotiations between the United States and North 
Vietnam such as those occurring from October to December 1972 reflect this 
pattern of each side's wanting to end the war on its o w n terms, being frustrated 
by the other side, and reescalating the war. 
6

Computer Simulation Predictions 
of the Escalation of the W a  r 
Discovering and analyzing the general empirical patterns of political 
and military interactions help us not only to understand the dynamics 
of the war but also to construct predictive models based upon those 
patterns. Predictive models have practical significance and at the same 
time fulfill one of the major purposes of scientific inquiry: 
The purpose of science is to describe the world in an orderly 
scheme or language which will help us to look ahead. W  e want to 
forecast what w  e can of the future behavior of the world; particu­
larly w e want to forecast h o w it would behave under several alterna­
tive actions of our o w  n between which w  e are usually trying to 
choose. (Bronowski, p. 70). 
In this chapter a model, using the computer simulation method de­
scribed in chapter 3 and constructed from relationships empirically 
validated in chapter 5, will be used to predict (as if w e were in March 
1965) the course of the war during the 1965-67 escalatory period and 
beyond. In the next chapter w  e will use this model and computer 
simulation method to m a k e predictions of what the course of the conflict 
might have been under hypothetical alternative h a w  k and dove policies. 
REGRESSION EQUATION MODEL 
The model used in the computer simulation consists of the eight 
interrelated regression equations shown in table 3. The dependent vari­
ables in these equations are the components of the primary pattern 
of mutual escalation analyzed in chapter 5. They include: North Vietna­
mese and Viet Cong troops, U . S . troop and combat commitments in 
South Vietnam, U . S . bombing sorties over North Vietnam, U . S . casual­
ties, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attrition, U . S . public support 
for President Johnson, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong defectors, 
and the popular confidence of the South Vietnamese people in their 
government. The empirical relationships represented in this model are 
diagrammed infigure 7. 
As discussed in chapter 3, a model constructed of interrelated regres­
sion equations can be used to make predictions by means of computer 
simulation w h e n the model meets certain criteria. These include time­
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TABLE 3 
REGRESSION EQUATION MODEL FOR SIMULATION PREDICTIONS 
N.V.	 + V.C. Troops = 194,000 + 4.1 U.S. Commitments.
 3 
(5,000) (0.3) " (1) 
U.S.	 Commitments = - 3,100 + .027 N.V. + V.C. Troops11 
(1,900) (.011) 
+	 .82 U.S. Commitments, -. 
(.06) " (2) 
U.S. Bombing N.V. = - 2,900 + .64 U.S. Bombing N.V 
(1,400) (.10) 
- 112 Winter-Summer 
(34) 
+	 .021 N.V. + V.C. Troopst, 
(.007) ' (3) 
U.S. Casualties = - 890 + 150 Spring-Fall 
(650) (47) 
+ .44 U.S. Commitments 
(.03) (4) 
N . V .	 + V.C. Attrition = 5,700 + .84 U.S. Commitments 
(1,600) (.08) (5) 
Percentage of U.S. Public 
Supporting President Johnson = 53.6 - .0019 U.S. Commitments^ 
(2.4) (.0001)	 (6) 
N . V . + V.C. Defectors = 430 + 0.061 N . V + V.C. Attrition 
(270) (0.013) 
+ 32 Spring-Fall 
(17)	 (7) 
Popular Confidence of 
the South Vietnamese	 = 410 + .87 S.V. Popular Confidence^ ^ 
(320) (.07) 
+	 .0065 U.S. Commitments . , 
(.0054) " (8) 
lagged relationships, nonreciprocal specification of relationships within 
the same time period, and feedback relationships. In addition, the 
greater the amount of statistical variance explained (i.e., the greater 
the  R 2 ) in all of the variables, the more accurate will be the predictions 
for all the variables in the model. 
In order to m a k e predictions using this computer simulation method, 
each independent variable used to predict some dependent variable 
(except the exogenous seasonal independent variables) must itself be 
predicted as a variable dependent upon some other independent vari­
ables. In this w a y  , a n e  w value for each variable is predicted each 
month, and these n e w values are used to predict the following month's 
values of all the variables. 
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1 ]
Winter-Summer • U.S. Bombing N.V.«­
•N.V. + V.C. Troops^. 
1S.V. Popular Confidence - 1 
U . S  . Public Support for President Johnson 
— U.S. Commitments1 
U . S  . Casualties 
Spring-Fall
 x 
• N.V. + V . C . 
-*- N.V. + V . C . Defectors 
Attrition 
Figure 7. Patterns of Interaction in Simulation Model 
In order to achieve a high multiple correlation coefficient for each 
variable (since the success of the simulation predictions for all variables 
depends upon the accuracy of the predictions for each variable), some 
of the equations specified in this model include autocorrelation terms, 
i.e., the past value of the dependent variable itself. In each such equa­
tion, (U.S. commitments, U . S  . bombing, South Vietnamese popular 
confidence) the inclusion of thefirst order autocorrelation term is the­
oretically justified, because of the "inertia" or " m o m e n t u m  " of these 
variables. 
In the equations for U . S . commitments and U . S . bombing of North 
Vietnam, intercorrelated independent variables are specified. Their in­
clusion is justified on theoretical grounds, since U . S . commitments and 
bombing were determined by policies and actions of both sides. More­
over, inclusion of collinear independent variables in these cases contrib­
utes to a greater amount of statistical variance explained in the depen­
dent variables. 
O n e will note in equations 1 and 2 in table 3 that U . S . commitments 
and North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g troops determine each other 
with a time lag for both. T h  e purpose for this specification is to provide 
feedback in the model. In regression analysis, predictions of the depen­
dent variable are based on given updated values of the independent 
variables. In computer simulation, however, after the initial values are 
given, all predicted values in following months are themselves based 
upon prior predictions of the independent variables. Thus, for simula­
tion purposes, a model without feedback in which, for example, variable 
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A determines variable B, and variable B in turn determines variable 
C  , i.e., A -* B -> C  , will not work, for w  e will not be able to predict 
the next month's value of A . W h a t w e must do instead is construct 
models in which feedback relationships are specified, e.g., in which 
variable B or variable C determines variable A  , i.e., A O B -> C or 
A -> B -> C -> A . W h e n B -> A or C -> A relationship is lagged in 
time, w e can predict the next month's value of A , and thus do another 
round of predictions of B and C as well. This is the "bootstrapping" pro­
cess described in more detail in chapter 3. T h e chief advantage of con­
structing models that include feedback relationships is that using the 
computer simulation technique, one can continue to m a k  e predictions 
indefinitely into the future of each variable in the model. W  e shall n o w 
turn to the predictive results of the simulation of this model. 
RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION OF THE 1965-67 ESCALATION 
Using just the initial values of January, February, and March, 1965, 
the simulation of the model m a d e predictions for each month from 
April 1965 on. In general, the simulation predicted the major trends 
of the escalation of the war from April 1965 through December 1967. 
The predicted values of the variables show a realistic stability, i.e., 
they do not diverge rapidly from the actual values or oscillate widely 
from one month to the next.1 
A comparison of the graphs of the values predicted by the simulation 
(noted by "O's" on the graphs) and of the actual values of the variables 
(noted by "X's") (see figures 8-15) shows a good duplication of the 
actual escalatory trends in U . S  . commitments and casualties, U . S  . b o m b  ­
ing of North Vietnam and North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops 
and attrition. Moreover, the steep drop in U . S  . public support for Presi­
dent Johnson is clearly seen in the computer simulation. T h  e predictions 
also represent the "peaks" and "valleys" in the variations of U . S . bombing 
of North Vietnam, U . S . casualties, and defections from the Communists, 
even though the predictions m a  y not go as high or as low as the 
actual values of these variables. The "peaks" and "valleys" in the pre­
dicted values of these variables reflect seasonal changes and show a 
regular yearly phase component that matches that in the actual values 
of the variables. T o test whether this model and simulation represent 
nothing more than a linear time trend and a yearly phase, a separate 
regression analysis and simulation were done in which each dependent 
variable was predicted only by the two independent variables of a 
linear time trend and the month. T h e average explained variance (R2) 
was only 35 percent in the regression equations> suggesting that the 
82 Dynamics of the Vietnam War 
phase component in the simulations is not a regular curve such as 
a sine wave. Thus, the other variables in the simulation model are 
necessary to explain the escalation of the Vietnam W a r . The predictions 
of South Vietnamese popular confidence do show a decline and rise, 
but do not reflect the steepness of the actual decline, the sharp rise 
starting in June 1966, and the abrupt fall starting in September 1967. 
This lack of correspondence between the simulation predictions and 
actual values of this variable is further evidence that, as reported in 
chapter 5, U . S  . commitments did not have a significant systematic effect 
on South Vietnamese popular confidence, even though for lack of an 
alternative determinant, the computer simulation model was specified 
in this w a y . 
W  e can evaluate the accuracy of the simulation predictions by com­
paring them with the actual monthly values for each variable and 
to the values estimated by the ordinary regression technique. In ordinary 
regression the actual monthly values of the independent variables are 
used to m a k  e the estimate of the dependent variables. B  y contrast, 
in the simulation, only the predicted monthly values of the independent 
variables from April 1965 on are used to m a k  e additional predictions 
of the dependent variables. 
Table 4 provides six different measures of the goodness offit of 
the values predicted by the simulation to the actual values and to 
the values estimated by the ordinary regression technique. 
In table 4 w e see in column 2 that, w h e n compared with the actual 
values, the m e a  n error of the simulation predictions ranged from a 
remarkably low 4 percent for the number of N . V . + V . C . troops to 
a very large 843 percent for U . S . bombing sorties over North Vietnam.2 
Th  e m e a  n error of the estimates m a d  e using ordinary regression 
analysis (shown in column 3) range from a low of 5 percent for the 
number of N . V  . -f- V . C  . troops and South Vietnamese popular confi­
dence to a high of 455 percent for U . S . bombing sorties over North 
Vietnam. 
Thus, w h e n comparing the errors in the simulation prediction with 
the errors in the ordinary regressions in column 4, w  e see that the 
predictions m a d e by the computer simulation using only the initial 
data from January through March 1965 average only 35 percent more 
error than do the estimates m a d e by ordinary regression, which continu­
ally uses the previous month's actual values for the estimates it makes. 
W h e  n comparing the variance explained by the simulation predictions 
(in column 6) with the variance explained by regression analysis (col­
\imn 5), w  e see that for seven of the eight variables, the simulation 
predictions are nearly as accurate as the estimates m a d e by regression 
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analysis. Indeed, the simulation predictions of the number of North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops are better than the regression esti­
mates. The average explained variance for the simulation predictions 
is 72 percent, compared with 79 percent for the regression estimates. 
Thus, on the average, the simulation predictions explain only 7 percent 
less variance than do the regression equations. This is remarkable w h e n 
w e consider that the simulation predictions were m a d e up to thirty-
three months beyond the initial actual values. 
T h e predictive capability and stability of the simulation predictions 
is evidence that the regression equation model and the empirical pat­
terns upon which the simulation is based have incorporated a substan­
tial part of the systematic dynamics of the Vietnam W a r . The stringent 
test that the simulation technique gives the model lends strong support 
to the validity of the relationships incorporated in that model. 
T h e two exceptions to the good predictive results of the computer 
simulation are the predictions of South Vietnamese popular confidence 
and North Vietnamese and Viet Cong defectors. The relatively poor 
predictive results for these two variables suggests that there are other 
important factors determining these two variables that were not in­
cluded in the model. For the majority of the variables in this model, 
however, the ability of the computer simulation to predict values ac­
curately during the 1965-67 period is striking. 
O n e will recall from the discussion of the computer simulation method 
that the predictions for the 1965-67 period are based on the regression 
coefficients derived from the data from the entire period, but using 
only the actual data from thefirst three months of this 36-month period 
to start the generation of the predictions. The "bootstrapping" method 
of computer simulation, however, can continue to generate predictions 
for each variable beyond the last month of the period from which 
the regression coefficients were derived. W e will n o w turn our attention 
to the predictions beyond 1967—through September 1970—to determine 
the accuracy of the predictions of the computer simulation w h e  n based 
upon the initial actual values from thefirst three months of 1965. 
Because data were not available after December 1967 for North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops, w e shall confine the evaluation of 
the predictions m a d e by the computer simulation in the period follow­
ing 1967 to the seven variables for which comparable data are available. 
Table 5 shows the m e a  n percentage error of the predictions m a d  e 
by the computer simulation for the periods of April 1965-December 
1967, April 1965-September 1970, and January 1968-September 1970.3 
Th  e predictions m a d  e for this last period are based solely on the regres­
sion coefficients derived from the 1965-67 period, and the data from 
January-March 1965. 
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TABLE 5 
MEAN PERCENTAGE ERROR OF SIMULATION PREDICTIONS 
EACTUAL-PREDICTION ACTUAL 
N 
April 1965­ April 1965­ January 1968­
Variable December 1967 September 1970 September 1970 
(N 33) (N = 66) (N = 33) 
N . V  . + V . C  . attrition .21 .31 .40 
S.V . popular confidence .10 .44 .77 
U . S  . commitments .15 .23 .31 
U . S  . casualties .41 .57 .73 
U . S  . bombing N . V  . 8.43 6.49§ .10* 
U . S  . public support for 
President Johnson .73 .97" 1.63t 
N . V  . + V . C  . defectors .34 .44 .55 
N . V  . + V . C  . troops .04 • • • t 
* January 1968 — October 1968 only 
tJanuary 1968 — December 1968 only 
JData not available for comparison after January 1968 
§April 1965 — October 1968 only 
"April 1965— December 1968 only 
Table 5 shows that the average error of the predictions m a d e by 
the computer simulation increase as one extends the predictions farther 
from the initial starting point, i.e., thefirst three months of 1965. T h e 
average error is increased from the m i n i m u  m of 16 percent for U . S  . 
commitments to a m a x i m u  m of 90 percent for U . S  . public support 
for President Johnson. However, the error in the predictions for 1968 
up to the time of the bombing halt were actually m u c h less than they 
were during the 1965-67 period (733 percent better)! 
Table 6 shows another measure of the goodness offit for the simula­
tion predictions for the 1965-67 and 1968-70 periods—the ratio of the 
error variance of the predictions to the total variance of the variables. 
Error variance is a measure that is less sensitive to the magnitude of the 
actual values than is the m e a  n percentage error. T h  e error variances 
for the period from 1968 on are m u c  h greater than those for the 1965­
67 period. 
W h a t these measures show is that computer simulation that is based 
on the structure of relationships in the war for the 1965-67 period 
is not, in general, able to m a k  e very accurate predictions for the period 
of 1968 on, particularly w h e  n the simulation is based on the actual 
values of only thefirst three months of 1965, w h e n U . S . military com­
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TABLE 6 
ERROR VARIANCE OF SIMULATION PREDICTIONS/TOTAL VARIANCE 
£ (ACTUAL-PREDICTION)2 
£ ( A C T U A L - A C T U A L ) 2 
N 
April 1965- April 1965- January 1968­
Variable December 1967 September 1970 September 1970 
(N 33) (N - 66) (N - 33) 
N . V . + V . C . attrition .32 .98 1.99 
S.V. popular confidence .63 2.56 9.36 
U . S  . commitments	 .05 .59 3.04 
U . S  . casualties	 .20 .69 1.05 
U . S . bombing N . V .	 .20 • 19§ .67* 
U . S  .	 public support for 
President Johnson .16 .16" .87t 
N . V . + V . C . defectors .64 .76 1.07 
N . V . + V . C . troops	 .08 
...t 
•January 1968 — October 1968 only 
fJanuary 1968 — December 1968 only 
JData not available for comparison after January 1968 
§April 1965 — October 1968 only 
"April 1965— December 1968 only 
mitments in South Vietnam and bombing of North Vietnam were very 
small and just beginning to build up. 
In figures 16 through 23 w  e can see the results of the computer 
simulation predictions for the entire 66-month period graphed. The 
graphs show shape and sources of errors calculated in tables 5 and 
6. Th  e computer simulation failed to predict, for example, the decline 
in South Vietnamese popular confidence after the Communist Tet offen­
sive in January 1968. The computer simulation shows a continuing 
rise in U . S  . commitments to South Vietnam, although in reality those 
commitments started to decline after they reached their peak in M a  y 
1968 during the Communist spring offensive that was beaten back. 
The computer simulation predicted a continuation of the seasonal varia­
tion in the pattern of U . S . bombing of North Vietnam, although with 
diminishing numbers of bombing sorties. These predictions were fairly 
accurate for thefirst ten months of 1968, but the simulation failed 
to predict the halt in the bombing of North Vietnam starting at the 
end of October 1968. The computer simulation did predict the continued 
decline in popular support for President Johnson, although it missed 
the big upsurge of support for him in April 1968 after he announced 
that he was limiting the bombing of North Vietnam, asking the C o m m u ­
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nists to negotiate in Paris, and not running for reelection to the presi­
dency. Subject to seasonal variations, the computer simulation predicted 
a gradual increase in the number of North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g 
defectors, but failed to predict the great reduction in Communist de­
fectors in preparation for, and during, the Communist Tet and spring 
offensives of 1968, and the huge upsurge of defections from the C o m  ­
munists in the wake of the failure of that peak Communist military 
effort. A n  dfinally, the computer simulation predicted a gradual increase 
in both U . S . casualties and North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g attrition 
subject to seasonal variations, but missed the huge upsurge in these 
casualties that occurred at the time of the Communist Tet and spring 
offensives in 1968. 
In this review of w h e  n the computer simulation predictions begin 
to be less accurate, w  e can identify a c o m m o  n element: the change 
in the overall system of military and political interaction that was ini­
tiated and associated with the Communist Tet offensive of 1968. T h e 
inability of the computer simulation to m a k  e accurate predictions in 
the post-Tet period, w h e n the regression model is based upon data 
and the interrelationships a m o n  g variables in the pre-Tet period, is 
strong evidence that the military and political interactions in the Viet­
n a m W a r did change in significant ways starting at the time of the 
Tet offensive. Thus, if its formerly accurate predictions diverge from 
reality, the computer simulation can be used as a diagnostic tool to 
discover whether, w h e n , and h o w a system of interaction has changed. 
W  e will analyze the n e  w system of interaction in the post-Tet period 
in chapter 8. W  e shall n o  w turn briefly to consider the problem of 
modeling unstable systems that the Tet offensive has presented to us. 
MODELING UNSTABLE SYSTEMS 
System instability—the change in relationships a m o n g the same vari­
ables over time—poses a difficult problem for the analyst or policy-
maker w h o wishes to use computer simulations to m a k e forecasts. Partic­
ularly for forecasts upon which policy decisions are to be based, one 
must have a model that remains valid over time. This poses a particular 
dilemma for policy-makers: their o w n decisions that attempt to establish 
a n e  w policy and break with an old pattern of action m a  y themselves 
break the overall pattern of relationships in the system of interaction, 
and m a k e the prediction of reactions and consequences less accurate 
than otlit:i . ise would be the case. 
To c  m struct a model with good predictive ability even w h e n the 
processes under study change, one can include only those relationships 
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that do remain stable over time, if there are any. O n e can also attempt 
to construct a more comprehensive model including n e w variables that 
account for changes in the relationships among other variables. For 
example, if analysts for policy-makers in both Washington and Hanoi 
k n e w what the relationships were between their o w n behavior and 
that of their adversary, they might advise their respective policy-makers 
to take advantage of those relationships by changing the pattern of 
their o w n behavior. If this advice were followed, the system of inter­
action would change. If one k n e w which contingency plans (such as 
those included in the "Pentagon Papers") were proposed and which 
accepted as guiding future policy and actions, one would include that 
information in a more comprehensive model to increase the accuracy 
of that model's predictions even under altered circumstances. O n  e 
would expect more rapid and greater changes in the structure of a 
conflict system if both sides were analyzing behavioral interrelationships 
and modifying their behavior accordingly, m u c  h like two hunter-killer 
submarines chasing each other in the darkness of the ocean depths. 
If it is not possible to build a more comprehensive model, one might 
construct a discontinuous one, i.e., one submodel for one time period, 
another for a different time period. T  o predict with a discontinuous 
model, however, one has to k n o w somehow which subsystem one is 
in to use the appropriate submodel. One's only guide is to m a k  e alter­
native predictions with the different submodels, and then to revaluate 
their accuracy once actual data become available. This requires careful 
judgment and information that is independent of the model itself. 
Thus, empirical patterns that are incorporated into systematic models 
can help us look ahead and guide our decisons and actions. T h  e methods 
used in this research—correlation and regression analysis and computer 
simulation—can be an enormous aid in analyzing patterns of interaction 
and foreseeing the implications of those patterns. It must be realized, 
however, that the utility of these methods is limited by the stability 
of those patterns over time. 
1. In the following graphs, the actual values of each variable for each month 
are represented by X ; the values predicted by the simulation of the composite 
empirical model are represented by 0. 
The predictions are m a d e using only three initial data points (January through 
March 1965) and the set of regression coefficients for each dependent variable 
listed in chapter 6. These regression coefficients were derived only from 1965-67 
data. Thus the predicted values for 1968 and onward are pure prediction. The 
predicted values for 1965-67 are predictions from the empirical relationships and 
three initial values of each variable. For this reason, thefirst three values are not 
predicted or shown on the graphs. 
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A  n X and not a 0 is printed on these graphs whe  n the predicted and actual values 
for that month are nearly the same. The actual values are not printed w h e n no 
actual data were collected, as in 1968 for some variables. Because these values have 
been scaled for analytic purposes, the values printed on the vertical axis are not 
absolute values but relative values for that index. 
2. The large percentage error in the number of U . S . bombing sorties over 
North Vietnam is partly artifactual. The bombing halt in January 1966 makes 
the ratio of the difference between actual and predicted to actual number very 
large for that month. 
3. Because the new Nixon administration started in January 1969, U . S  . public 
opinion support for the president is calculated only through December 1968. 
Because U . S  . bombing of North Vietnam was halted for some time after October 
1968, the calculations for this variable are m a d  e only through October 1968. 
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Simulation Exercises of 
Alternative H a w  k and Dove Policies 
Once a computer simulation of a model of the dynamics of the Vietnam 
conflict has been successful in making stable and reasonably accurate 
predictions, one can use it to explore changes that occur in the predicted 
values of dependent variables as one changes a single independent 
variable in a k n o w  n way  . Such an exercise is analogous to the experi­
mental manipulation of a single variable. 
EXERCISING THE SIMULATION

TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE POLICIES

W h e  n the experimental variable in the simulation exercise represents 
an action that policy-makers themselves can directly control, then the 
simulation exercise is a w a  y to forecast and explore possible outcomes 
of alternative policies. During the period in which the relationships 
amon g the variables remain stable, w  e can use such simulation exercises 
to explore what effect hypothetical policies and actions would have 
had on the course of the conflict. 
Forecasting the different consequences of various possible actions 
is one of the principal purposes and uses of scientific inquiry. Informed 
by such forecasts, decisions could be m a d e and actions taken that 
impose m i n i m u m costs on all concerned. The analysis necessary to 
m a k  e appropriate forecasts is surely less costly than the actual military 
and political commitments m a d e on an experimental basis. The reversal 
of actual commitments has been extremely difficult even w h e n their 
consequences have been unsatisfactory. 
HAWK AND DOVE EXERCISES OF THE SIMULATION 
As an exercise of the computer simulation, w  e will here explore 
what might have been the consequences of both relatively more hawkish 
and dovish U . S . policies in Vietnam. Focusing on U . S . commitments 
to South Vietnam, which include U . S  . troops, supplies, battalion-size 
or larger combat operations, and bombing sorties within South Vietnam, 
w e will see what the consequences for all other variables in the system 
would have been had U . S . policy been to m a k e U . S . commitments 
to South Vietnam the following multiples of what they actually were: 
0.25, 0.5. 1.5, 2.0, and 2.5. W  e can perform these t xercises by making 
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U . S . commitments an exogenous variable, i.e., by controlling the month­
ly values of U . S . commitments, rather than allowing them to be depen­
dent upon other variables in the system, as is done in the regular 
simulation. 
The results of each simulation exercise are valid only under the 
assumption that the structure of relationships a m o n  g the variables in 
the simulation model would be the same under the altered policy as 
it was under the actual policy carried out during the war. W  e can 
show that this assumption of unchanged structure during the simulation 
exercises is theoretically valid. 
Let us represent the Vietnam W a  r during the 1965-67 period as 
a two-person zero-sum Prisoner's Di l emma g a m e in which policy choices 
become obvious over time, as shown infigure 24. 
F I G U R E 24 
THE VIETNAM W A R AS A PRISONER'S DILEMMA G A M E 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
Escalate Deescalate 
U.S. and Escalate 3rd, 3rd 1st, 4th 
South 
Vietnamese Deescalate 4th, 1st 2nd, 2nd 
The preference orderings of the four outcomes that would result 
from the different joint actions of the two sides are indicated first 
for the United States and South Vietnamese, and then for the North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong. 
According to this model, each side wants most to win by escalating 
its o w n military efforts while its enemy deescalates theirs and wants 
least to be taken advantage of in this w a y . Each side's second choice 
is to reduce its costs in the war by deescalating, but only if the other 
side also deescalates. A n  d each side's third choice is to escalate its 
military efforts and costs in order to win, even though the enemy does 
the same in response. 
If each side in the war had based its policy on the assumptions 
of a hawkish folk-model, they would have assumed that by escalating 
their military efforts, their adversary would be forced to deescalate 
theirs, i.e., they would have m a d e the assumption of a negative relation­
ship. According to the Prisoners' Di lemma model of the conflict, h o w ­
ever, each side would eventually escalate if the other did, since mutual 
escalation is more preferable (ranked third) than having one's o w n 
deescalation be exploited by the other side (ranked fourth). 
As w  e have seen in the empirical analysis, the actual pattern of 
conflict during the 1965-67 period of the war was mutual escalation, 
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i.e., a positive relationship, as predicted by the dovish folk-model. In 
the exercise of the two alternative hawkish policies, this same positive 
relationship between the military efforts of both sides would continue 
to hold, and thus the results of the simulation exercises would be valid. 
T h e exercises of the dovish alternative policies should also be valid. 
In these exercises w e are defining the policies in which U . S . military 
commitments are less than they in fact were as relatively deescalatory. 
N o  w the hawkish folk-model assumes that if one deescalates, the enemy 
will try to take advantage of that deescalation and escalate their o w n 
military efforts, i.e., it makes the assumption again of a negative relation­
ship. T h e dovish folk-model, on the other hand, assumes that if one 
side deescalates, .the other side will also do so, i.e., it again makes 
the assumption of a positive relationship. 
Theoretically, this positive relationship assumed by the dovish folk-
model should hold during the deescalation situation for the same reason 
it held during the escalation situation: for each side, mutual deescala­
tion is more preferable (ranked second) than is having one's deescala­
tion exploited by the other side (ranked fourth). Neither side would 
continue to deescalate unless the other side also did. Thus, if each 
side perceived that its deescalation were being exploited, it would soon 
revert to escalation, since mutual escalation (ranked third) is prefer­
able to being exploited (ranked fourth). T h  e pattern of interaction 
between the two sides would therefore be a positive relationship. If 
each side's deescalation is not exploited, then mutual deescalation will 
occur, its being preferred by both sides (ranked second) to mutual 
escalation (ranked third). Mutual deescalation also involves a positive 
relationship between the actions of the two sides. 
Because the structure of the model used in these simulation exercises 
specifies a positive relationship between the actions of the two sides 
in the Vietnam W a r  , the results of these exercises should be valid. 
T h e model and the results of the exercises would be invalid only in 
the unlikely event that one side continued to deescalate over a long 
period of time in spite of the fact that over the same period of time 
its e n e m y continued to exploit that deescalation by escalating instead. 
T h  e results of the simulation exercises are given in table 7. In this 
table the effects of the specific changes in U . S . commitments on the 
seven other variables in the system are compared as the ratio of the 
s u m of the predicted values to the sum of the actual values. T h e table 
also shows the ratio of the sum of the values predicted in the regular 
simulation in which no changes were m a d e in U . S . commitments (i.e., 
the simulation predictions that appear in chapter 6) to the s u  m of 
the actual values. 
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TABLE 7

EXERCISES OF THE SIMULATION WITH U.S. COMMITMENTS

Regular 0.25 x Actual 0.50 x Actual 1.5 x Actual 2.0 x Actual 2.!) x Actual 
Simulation 
Variables E Predictions
 s 2JPredictionse Y. Predictionse £Predictionse ^Predictions 2l Predictions p 
T Actual L Actual £ Actual 2? Actual £ Actual 2- Actual 
N . V .	 + V . C . • 
attrition 1.010 .458 .6*40 1.366 1.730 2.093 
S . V  .	 popular 
confidence .991 .877 .913 1.058 1.130 1.203 
U . S  . casualties 1.012 .148 .432 1.571 2.141 2.710 
U . S  .	 bombing 
of N . V  . 1.050 .647 .776 1.290 1.548 1.805 
U . S  .	 public 
support for the 
president .985 2.218 1.812 .188 - .624 - 1.436 
N . V .	 + V . C . 
defectors .978 .574 .707 1.239 1.504 1.770 
N . V .	 + V . C . 
troops 1.004 .815 .877 1.123 1.247 1.370 
L. Predictionss - sum of predictions m a d e in regular simulation for 33 months

£ Predictionse= sum of predictions made in exercise of simulation for 33 months

<L Actual = sum of actual values for 33 months

Since the sum of the predictions m a d e in the regular simulation 
were a m a x i m u m of 5 percent different from the sum of the actual 
values, w  e can focus our comparison of the results of the exercises 
on the ratio of the sum of the simulated values to the sum of the 
actual values. This ratio will be only slightly different from the ratio 
of the sum of the predictions in the exercises to the predictions m a d e 
in the regular simulation, and is useful to compare the exercises with 
each other as well as with the actual values.1 
In general, the exercises of the computer simulation follow the trends 
of the regular simulation. (See figures 25-31, which show the results 
of the exercise in which U . S . commitments are one-quarter of what 
they actually were, andfigures 32-38, which show the results of the 
exercise in which U . S . commitments are two and one-half times what 
they actually were.) The results of the exercises are in conformance 
with the prediction of the dove folk-theory: w h e  n U . S  . commitments 
are reduced from what they actually were, the military variables of 
North Vietnamese troops, U . S  . casualties, North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong attrition, and U . S . bombing of North Vietnam are also reduced. 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops are not reduced by as great 
a percentage as are U . S  . commitments, indicating the presence of Viet 
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Cong forces even with no American forces present. Popular confidence 
in the South Vietnamese government is also reduced, as are defectors 
from the Viet Cong, although the impact on the latter is proportionally 
greater than the impact on the former. 
Thus, according to this exercise of the computer simulation, had 
the United States conducted the war less intensely and with fewer mili­
tary commitments, the Communists would also have done so, and mili­
tary casualties on both sides would have been m a n y fewer. However, 
politically, the Viet Cong would have benefited and the South Viet­
namese government suffered from such a dovish U . S . policy. President 
Johnson, however, would have enjoyed a m u c h greater margin of popu­
lar support in the United States from such a dovish policy—a margin 
that, in the most dovish policy tested here, would have been 40 percent 
as compared with a negative 8 percent by November 1967. Such a 
margin of popular approval would in all probability have allowed him 
to seek and be reelected to the presidency. 
In the hawkish policy exercises in which U . S  . commitments were 
increased over what they actually were, the consequences again conform 
more to the predictions of the dove than of the h a w k folk-theory: 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops also increase (although their 
increases are not proportionally as great as are increases in U . S . com­
mitments). U . S  . casualties are increased at an even greater rate than 
are U . S . commitments, and North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attrition 
and U . S . bombing of North Vietnam are also increased. Larger U . S . 
commitments increase popular confidence in the South Vietnamese gov­
ernment (20 percent w h e  n U . S  . commitments are 2.5 times their actual 
value), and increase North Vietnamese and Viet Cong defectors even 
more (77 percent in the same exercise). Thus, a more hawkish U . S . 
policy would have hurt the Viet Cong politically more than it would 
have helped the South Vietnamese government. 
These findings are evidence that the main political influence of the 
United States on the people of South Vietnam has been more a negative 
one of working against the Viet Cong through destruction and attrition, 
than it has been a positive one of building the confidence of the South 
Vietnamese people in their government. Thus, U . S . military power has 
more influenced people to withhold support from the Viet Cong for 
fear of their o w n lives than it has influenced them to support the 
government in Saigon. United States coercion and violence have ap­
parently reduced the legitimacy ascribed to the Viet Cong by reducing 
the credibility of their claim that they can protect the people. O  n 
the other hand, the relatively small impact of U . S . coercive power 
on South Vietnamese popular confidence m a  y be due to the fact that 
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a significant number of the South Vietnamese people are not willing 
to ascribe legitimacy to a government whose American ally has caused 
massive civilian destruction, loss of life, and disruption. Thus, more 
hawkish U . S . policies were more likely than more dovish U . S . policies 
to avert a Communist political take-over in South Vietnam. 
According to the computer simulation exercises, in response to greater 
U . S . military commitments, the Communists would also have increased 
their commitments. American escalation accompanied by a Communist 
counter-escalation would have produced the major domestic political 
impact of a more hawkish American policy: an even more precipitous 
decline in President Johnson's domestic political support than actually 
occurred. In the most hawkish of the computer simulation exercises 
analyzed here, his margin of political support would have been negative 
as early as March 1966 (instead of the actual negative margin that 
first occurred in August 1967); and by December 1967 it would have 
been a negative 93 percent (i.e., 3.5 percent of the people for Johnson, 
96.5 percent against). 
Thus, according to these exercises of the computer simulation, more 
dovish policies than were actually in effect during the 1965-67 period 
would have resulted in fewer U . S . military costs and a more favorable 
political outcome in the United States for President Johnson, but a 
less desirable political outcome in South Vietnam. O  n the other hand, 
more hawkish policies during this period would have resulted in a 
more favorable political outcome in South Vietnam for the Johnson 
administration, but greater military costs (especially in terms of U . S  . 
casualties), and a m u c h more rapid political decline for President John­
son. 
The results of the simulation exercises do demonstrate the very real 
dilemma faced by U . S . policy-makers: each general policy alternative-
escalation or deescalation—involves the trade-off of some military and 
political benefits to achieve others. M o r e dovish policies would have 
achieved fewer military casualties and greater political support for 
the president at the cost of a greater risk that South Vietnam would 
be "lost" to the Communists. M o r e hawkish policies, on the other hand, 
would have been more likely to defeat the Communists, but at the 
costs of more American casualties and political disaster for the president 
in the United States. A deescalation policy m a y have had political 
disadvantages in Vietnam, but the domestic political disadvantages 
of a policy of escalation are probably more crucial to the president. 
This m a  y be the reason President Johnson eventually changed his policy 
from one of escalation fe on-? of deescalation in the spring of 1968. 
H  e changed Lnc [ste :: r^y-'•-:'-•:• the public's repudiation of him an 
112 Dynamics of the Vietnam War 
his Vietnam policy, but his experience apparently impressed his succes­
sor. President Nixon's policies of temporarily continuing the bombing 
halt, withdrawing most U . S  . troops, negotiating with the Communists 
in Paris, and trying to "Vietnamize" the war were clearly geared toward 
reducing American military casualties and gaining domestic approval 
in the United States. 
A policy of "Vietnamization" and reduction of U . S  . military commit­
ments in South Vietnam poses the dilemma shown in these computer 
simulation exercises. The reduction of U . S . military commitments weak­
ened popular confidence in the South Vietnamese government. More­
over, the military forces of the South Vietnamese government had been 
unable to contain the Communists without American help. 
W  e shall n o  w turn to an analysis of the empirical patterns in the 
war during the period following the Communist Tet offensive. In this 
period President Johnson began to de-Americanize the war, and Presi­
dent Nixon withdrew U . S  . troops in similar attempts to cope with 
this political-military dilemma. In chapter 9 w e will return to a theoreti­
cal analysis of the policy dilemma the Vietnam W a r posed to the presi­
dent 
1. T o calculate the ratio of the sum of the predictions of an exercise to 
the sum of the predictions m a d e in the regular simulation, for any variable, simply 
divide the ratio of the sum of the predictions in the exercise to the sum of the ac­
tual values by the ratio of the sum of the predictions in the regular simulation to the 
sum of the actual values, 
2 . Negative U . S  . casualties in the exercises can be interpreted as being essential­
ly zero. 
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GRAPHS OF SIMULATION PREDICTIONS OF

HYPOTHETICAL HAWK AND DOVE POLICY

ALTERNATIVES

The following graphs are the values of selected variables which are 
predicted by exercising the computer simulation. The predicted values 
of the selected variables under the hypothetical policy changes are 
indicated by zero (0). The actual values of the variables in each month 
are indicated by X  . 
The values predicted by the computer simulation of different policy 
alternatives can be compared with each other, with the actual values, 
and with the values predicted by the regular computer simulation shown 
in chapter 6. 
Figures 25 through 31 represent a dovish policy alternative (U.S. 
commitments to South Vietnam = 0.25 X actual); figures 32 through 
38, a hawkish policy alternative (U.S. commitments to South Vietnam 
= 2.5 X actual). 
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The Vietnam War from the 1968 Tet 
Offensive to the 1970 Cambodian Invasion 
The Communist Tet offensive started at the end of January 1968 and 
marked a climax and turning point in the Vietnam W a r . The North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces m a d e numerous coordinated attacks 
throughout all of South Vietnam, temporarily occupied some major 
towns and parts of cities in South Vietnam, and severely disrupted 
the South Vietnamese government's "pacification" program in the coun­
tryside. 
The Tet offensive, however, was tremendously costly to the North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong. They suffered tens of thousands of military 
casualties, including at least one top field commander. The political 
organization of the Viet Cong was severely hurt w h e n thousands of 
local political cadre w h o had "surfaced" during the Communist offensive 
were subsequently killed or captured after the offensive was defeated 
and they lost the protection of their military forces. 
Despite its tremendous military and political costs to the Communists 
in Vietnam, however, the Tet offensive was a great international politi­
cal success for the Communists. The Tet offensive clearly demonstrated 
that the intervention of more than a half-million American troops and 
the massive bombing of North Vietnam had failed to defeat the C o m  ­
munists or to prevent them from launching major offensives. It thus 
forced the Johnson administration to reevaluate its entire Vietnam pol­
icy. Starting in March 1968, U . S . policy in Vietnam began to change. 
General Westmoreland was recalled from Vietnam to be army chief 
of staff on 22 March 1968. High past and current officials of the U . S . 
government advised President Johnson to deescalate the war. A n d on 
31 March 1968 President Johnson announced that he would limit the 
bombing of North Vietnam and not seek reelection. The United States 
negotiated with the North Vietnamese to halt the bombing and to 
convene formal talks among all parties to the conflict in Paris. The 
United States began to "de-Americanize" the war, and halted the b o m b ­
ing of North Vietnam on 31 October 1968. O  n 5 November 1968 Richard 
Nixon was elected the n e w president of the United States. 
The Nixon administration launched its "Vietnamization" policy, grad­
ually withdrawing American ground combat troops from Vietnam, 
strengthening the South Vietnamese ground forces, and shifting the 
main effort in the ground fighting against the Communist forces to 
128 
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the South Vietnamese while supporting them with American logistical, 
air, and naval power. 
Thus, in m a n y important respects the period of the war that began 
with the Tet offensive was qualitatively different from the escalatory 
period that preceded it. This qualitative change can be seen in the 
change in the structure of relationships a m o n  g m a n  y of the important 
variables in the war, as m a d e evident in the computer simulation. 
For example, using the multiple regression model based on the structure 
of relationships existing from 1965 through 1967, the simulation was 
unable to predict the huge upsurge in casualties at the time of the 
Tet offensive or the halt in the bombing in North Vietnam. 
The beginning of the shift in the structure of the war can be seen 
in the October through December 1967 values of what was a leading 
indicator of the Tet offensive—North Vietnamese and Viet Cong defec­
tors. The actual number of Communist defectors declined during those 
months even though the simulation predicted an increase based on 
the past structure of relationships. The novel element that contributed 
to the decline in Communist defectors was probably Communist prep­
arations for the Tet offensive. The expectation of a victorious offensive 
probably persuaded m a n y would-be defectors among the Communist 
ranks not to defect. 
The halt in the bombing of North Vietnam, the withdrawal of Ameri­
can ground combat troops from South Vietnam, and the Paris talks 
did not bring peace to Vietnam, however. Indeed, the invasion into 
Cambodia by U . S . and South Vietnamese troops in M a  y 1970 marked 
another turning point in the war—its overt spread throughout Indochina. 
The invasion into Cambodia was followed by two other significant 
invasions—the unsuccessful South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietna­
mese-controlled areas in Laos in February 1971 and the major North 
Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam that began in April 1972—an 
offensive that was responded to by the resumption of U . S . bombing 
of North Vietnam. Since the invasion into Cambodia broke a deescala­
tory trend in the war, it will be useful to analyze the empirical pattern 
of relationships in the war during the two-and-a-quarter-year period 
from the Tet offensive to the Cambodian invasion to help us evaluate 
the policies initiated during that period and continued beyond it. 
DATA 
The data used are monthly values of variables that indicate seven 
major concepts relevant to the war policies of the belligerents during 
the period from the Tet offensive to the Cambodian invasion. The 
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data are corrected for the number of days in a month where such 
correction is appropriate.1 These concepts and variables are:2 
1. "Vietnamization" 
a.	 South Vietnamese ground operations of battalion size or 
larger 
/ South Vietnamese ground operations \

\ U . S  . ground operations /

( U . S  . troops killed \ 
Q 1 i	 I \ 
\ South Vietnamese troops killed J 
2.	 U . S . Actions 
a.	 Bombing missions in North Vietnam 
b.	 Bombing attack sorties in South Vietnam 
c.	 Helicopter attacks 
d.	 U . S  . troop levels and monthly changes 
e.	 U . S  . ground operations of battalion size or larger 
3.	 "Pacification" or Security from North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
Attack 
a.	 Viet Cong abductions of civilians 
b.	 Viet Cong killings of civilians 
c.	 Viet Cong terrorist incidents 
d.	 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese armed attacks 
4.	 Military Outcomes 
a.	 U . S  . troops killed 
b.	 South Vietnamese troops killed 
c.	 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops killed 
5.	 Popular Confidence in the South Vietnamese Government 
a. Adjusted black market piastre value in Saigon, i.e., 
( Dollars] //Money Supply \
Piastre) / [Consumer Price Index)

6.	 Viet Cong Political Support 
a. Military and political defectors from the Viet Cong 
7.	 U . S  . Public Opinion 
a.	 Percentage approving President Johnson's handling of his job 
as president and President Nixon's handling of the Vietnam 
W a r 
FINDINGS 
American policy after the Tet offensive—decreasing U . S  . military 
operations and withdrawing American troops—depended for its success 
upon the achievement of three conditions: (1) "Vietnamization" i.e., 
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the South Vietnamese government's assumption of the major military 
efforts in the war; (2) "pacification" i.e., the South Vietnamese govern­
ment's securing the population from North Vietnamese and Viet C o n  g 
attacks; and (3) the confidence of the South Vietnamese people in 
the stability of the South Vietnamese government.3 W  e will here explore 
the relationships of these three conditions to each other and to U . S  . 
actions, military casualties, and political effects in the United States 
and among the Viet Cong. 
VIETNAMIZATION 
President Nixon stated that the withdrawal of U . S  . troops from Viet­
n a  m required Vietnamization. T  o evaluate this policy, therefore, it is 
important to determine the extent to which the South Vietnamese forces 
took over the combat burden as the Americans withdrew. In addition, 
w  e must determine h o  w the South Vietnamese government forces re­
acted to North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g actions. 
In this study Vietnamization is measured in three ways. The first 
is simply the number of battalion-size or larger ground operations4 
initiated by the South Vietnamese forces. W h e  n measured in this w a y , 
Vietnamization was independent of North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g 
armed attacks of the previous month, and independent of U . S . ground 
operations as well. However, South Vietnamese ground operations in­
creased with Viet C o n g terrorist incidents within the same month.5 
South Vietnamese = 570 + 2.0 V.C. terrorist incidents 
ground operations (0.9) 
(R2 = .16) (1) 
The second operational measure of Vietnamization is the ratio of 
South Vietnamese ground operations to U . S  . ground operations. This 
measure incorporates the concept of the relative combat efforts m a d e 
by the South Vietnamese as compared with those m a d e by the Ameri­
cans. Measured in this w a y , the regression equations show that Viet­
namization was retarded by increased numbers of Viet C o n g abductions 
of civilians and by increased rates of U . S . troop withdrawals. ( S. V. ground operations\ 1O r.riA . .,. , , . , , ,T „ TT Q „„„—j— -. 1= 12 - .004 civilians abducted by V.C, ,y.b. ground operations) / nfm 
(R2 = .21) ' (2) 
/S.V ground operations\ _
 QQ021 monM change •„ 
\U.S. ground operations)
 ( 0 0 0 0 5  ) number of  u s trQQps 
(R2 ­ .37) 
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Declining popular confidence in the South Vietnamese government 
seems to have spurred the government to increase its military efforts 
relative to that of the Americans, probably in an attempt to demonstrate 
the government of South Vietnam's o w  n ability tofight the Communists 
and build popular confidence in that ability. 
IS.V. ground operations\ nA n A n r , o , , . , TT a J— T- I " 24 - .00098 popular confidence. ,AJ.b. ground operations! fOOOIfh 
(R2 = .78) 
(4) 
Considered at the same time, increased numbers of Viet C o n g terror­
ist incidents spurred Vietnamization, whereas increased numbers of re­
gular North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g armed attacks retarded Viet­
namization. 
( S.V. ground operations\ „ , , , n c T r n . . . . . , . TT a -T-^- T- I" 7.2 + .05 V.C. terrorist incidentsU.b. ground operations!
 ( ^., 
(R2 = .62) 
- .01	 N.V. + V.C. armed attacks 
(.003) 
(5) 
The number of civilians killed by the Viet Cong seems to have had 
no systematic effect one w a  y or the other on Vietnamization. 
U.S  . Troops Killed/South Vietnamese Troops Killed:

A Measure of Vietnamization

T h  e ratio of U . S  . troops killed to South Vietnamese troops killed 
is another indicator of Vietnamization. It measures the relative amount 
of combat with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. As Vietnamization 
increases, this ratio decreases. 
T h e bivariate regressions show that as the rate of U . S . troop with­
drawals increased, the casualty ratio declined. As one would expect, 
the ratio also decreased with more South Vietnamese ground operations 
and with fewer U . S . ground operations and air attacks in the South. 
( U.S. trOOpS kUled\ Ar. nnnnnn ,i, , • i /c ,r . — , . „ A- .49 + .000007 monthly change in number ofb.V. troops killed/ ,
 ftrt^nn> T T O * 
' (.000002) U.S. troops 
(R2 = .33) (6) 
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( U.S. troops killed] n~> nnno c \r J *• CTTT^L — L 11 i]- -71 - .0003 S.V. ground operationsS.V. troops killed/ f m r m 
(R2 = .21) (7) 
(U.S. troops killed\
 2  3 + Q( )3 u s ground operations

\S.V. troops killed/ (001)

(R2 = .16) (8) 
( U.S. troops killed] 1 t . m n n n TT o , , . ., ,CTTT^Z j_n ,  F .11 + .00002 U.S. bombing attackb.V. troops killed/ , o m O f t . .. . c T7 * / (.000004) sorties in S.V. 
(R2 = .61) (9) 
U.S. ACTIONS 
United States disengagement from Vietnam was initiated by the John­
son administration's realization that its past policy of escalating Ameri­
can commitments to South Vietnam, increasing U . S  . combat operations, 
and bombing North Vietnam had been unsuccessful in achieving the 
American military objective of defeating the North Vietnamese and 
Viet C o n g armed forces. W h e  n General Westmoreland requested m o r e 
than two hundred thousand additional American troops after the 1968 
Tet offensive, a complete reevaluation of American policy was m a d  e 
because the request for more troops asked for more of the same measures 
that had been shown to be unsuccessful.6 
U.S. Troops in South Vietnam 
W h a t were the determinants of the n u m b e r and the change in the 
number of U . S  . troops in Vietnam from the Tet offensive to the C a m  ­
bodian invasion? O n  e could hypothesize that U . S  . public opinion influ­
enced the number of U . S . troops and the rate of their withdrawal. 
President Nixon stated that Vietnamization also affected the rate of 
U . S . troop withdrawals, as did North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g hostile 
actions. 
Bivariate regressions of operational indicators of the above variables 
with monthly changes in the number of U . S . troops (i.e., the rate of 
change) in Vietnam show that increased numbers of South Vietnamese 
ground operations, indicating greater Vietnamization, did increase the 
rate of U . S  . troop withdrawals. 
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Monthly change in number = 19,000 - 3. S .V. ground operations

of U.S. troops (.8)

(R2 = .29) (10) 
Viet Cong killing of civilians in South Vietnam and other Viet Cong 
terrorist incidents, indicating the degree of pacification, were indepen­
dent of the rate of U . S . troop withdrawals, as was the monthly percen­
tage of the U . S  . public that approved of the w a  y the president handled 
his job. The latter finding indicates that troop withdrawal decisions 
were not continually influenced by U . S . public opinion on a monthly 
basis, although they might have been from a longer time perspective. 
The decisions themselves covered troop withdrawals implemented over 
a number of months. 
W h e  n the ratio of U . S  . troops killed to South Vietnamese troops 
killed declined (an indicator of the decreasing fraction of combat en­
gaged in by the United States as compared with the South Vietnamese), 
the monthly rate of U . S  . troop withdrawals increased. 
Monthly change in number = - 19,000 + OA nnn (U.S. troops killed] 
34,000 {
 o  . , ... ,1 of U.S. troops (14,000)  Tr
'14 000A tro°Ps hilled) 
(11) 
U.S. troop levels were independent of the number of South Vietna­
mese ground operations, Viet Cong killing of civilians, and other Viet 
Cong terrorist incidents. Thus, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong activi­
ties and the progress of Vietnamization did not systematically deter­
mine U . S . troop levels month after month. 
United States troop levels did decrease as the ratio of U . S  . troops 
killed to South Vietnamese troops killed in the previous month de­
creased. Since the ratio of troop casualties is a good indicator of the 
actual combat engaged in by the United States as compared with South 
Vietnamese forces, it is apparent that South Vietnamese forces took 
over more and more of the combat as U . S . troops withdrew. 
( U.S. troops killed\Number of U.S. troops = 420,000 + 190,000 S.V. troops killedj\.\CR2 = .53) (36,000)
(12) 
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Large U.S. Ground Operations 
Even as U . S . forces withdrew from Vietnam, the remaining forces 
continued to engage in large ground operations of battalion size or 
larger. Because of the Vietnamization program, one would expect that 
these U . S . ground operations would have decreased as the number 
of South Vietnamese ground operations increased. This was not the 
case however. Empirically, U . S . ground operations were generally in­
dependent of those of the South Vietnamese. 
O n e would expect that U . S . ground operations would have increased 
as North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attacks increased, and decrease 
after they decreased. The regression equations show that this was the 
case, even when controlling for the number of South Vietnamese ground 
operations. Thisfinding is consistent with a pattern of action and reac­
tion: the U . S  . engaged in fewer major ground operations in response 
to fewer North Vietnamese and Viet Cong armed attacks. 
U.S.	 ground operations = 67 + .07 N . V . + V.C. armed attacks* i 
(R2 = .24) (.03) 
(13) 
The number of U . S . ground operations was entirely independent 
of U . S . public opinion, thus indicating that war operations were carried 
out more in response to the battlefield situation than to the h o m e 
front during the period following the Tet Offensive. 
U.S. Bombing in South Vietnam 
United States air attacks in South Vietnam were m a d e primarily 
to provide close air support for allied troops engaged in combat. The 
number of U . S . bombing attacks in South Vietnam declined after the 
Tet offensive, although the Vietnamization policy of the U . S  . govern­
ment included continued American air support for the South Vietna­
mese forces. 
O n e might hypothesize that as the bombing of North Vietnam was 
reduced and then halted, more airplanes were available for use in South 
Vietnam, and therefore there would be more attacks in South Vietnam. 
This was not the case, however; U . S . bombing in the North and in the 
South were independent of each other. This independence reflects the 
different military objectives of bombing the North and bombing the 
South, as well as different weather patterns in Vietnam. 
Bombing attacks were m a d e in support of South Vietnamese as well 
as American troops; however, the bivariate regressions show that U . S . 
bombing decreased as South Vietnamese ground operations increased. 
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U.S.	 bombing attack - 25,000 -13. S.V. ground operations 
sorties in S.V. (3.4) 
(R2 = .37)	 (14) 
United States bombing in South Vietnam was independent of the 
number of large U . S . ground operations and of the number of North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong armed attacks in the previous month. The 
faster the monthly rate of U . S  . troop withdrawals, however, the fewer 
air attacks there were in South Vietnam. 
U.S.	 bombing attack = 16,000 + .27 monthly change in number 
sorties in S.V. (.07) of U.S. troops 
(R2 = .40)	 (15) 
It is thus significant that the American air war in South Vietnam was 
scaled d o w  n as U . S  . troops were being withdrawn, generally irrespec­
tive of large U . S . , South Vietnamese, or Communist ground combat 
operations. 
U . S  . Helicopter Attack Sorties in South Vietnam 
According to the policy of Vietnamization, U . S  . helicopter attack 
sorties in South Vietnam, like U . S . bombing missions, would continue 
to support the South Vietnamese after U . S  . troops were withdrawn. 
Only Viet Cong terror is found to be associated with increased numbers 
of helicopter attack sorties, while North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
armed attacks, South Vietnamese ground operations, and U . S . ground 
operations are found to be independent of helicopter attack sorties. 
U.S.	 helicopter attack = 68,000 +61 V.C. terrorist incidents 
sorties in S.V. (26) 
(R2 = .19)	 (16) 
"PACIFICATION": NORTH VIETNAMESE 
AND VIET CONG ACTIONS 
"Pacification" in South Vietnam above all means the security of the 
people from attack by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. The success 
of both American withdrawal and Vietnamization was dependent upon 
the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong's willingness to scale d o w  n their 
o w  n actions as the Americans disengaged or on their inability to con­
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tinue their hostile actions at a high rate as the South Vietnamese forces 
were strengthened. Thus, it is important to see to what extent North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong actions were affected by U . S . and South 
Vietnamese actions. 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Armed Attacks 
In the post-Tet period, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong armed 
attacks declined with the decline of U . S  . ground operations in the 
same month. 
N.V.	 + V.C. armed attacks = 56 + 2.9 U.S. ground operations 
(R2 = .18) (1.3) (17) 
Communist armed attacks were systematically independent of these 
other variables that were thought to be related: South Vietnamese 
ground operations, the proportion of South Vietnamese to total U . S  . 
and South Vietnamese ground operations, the total of U . S  . and South 
Vietnamese ground operations, the rate of U . S  . troop withdrawals, the 
number of U . S . troops in Vietnam, and the number of bombing attacks 
in South or North Vietnam. Thus, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
did seem to deescalate their main force armed attacks as the U . S . 
deescalated its o w n major ground combat operations. The motivations 
for the reductions on the two sides were probably different. Deescalation 
of U . S . ground combat was motivated by political pressures in the 
United States. In the aftermath of the unprecedented fighting and 
losses during the Tet offensive and the following few months, the 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were unable to continue their major 
ground combat at high levels for some time. 
Viet Cong Terrorist Incidents 
Viet Cong terrorist incidents were increased by increases in South 
Vietnamese ground operations in the previous month and decreases 
in U . S . bombing attack sorties in South Vietnam in the previous month. 
The Viet Cong apparently reacted to the increased number of South 
Vietnamese ground operations—the indigenous escalation inherent in 
the policy of Vietnamization—especially w h e n they were given more 
freedom to carry out their terrorist attacks as the harassment of U . S  . 
bombing attacks in South Vietnam was reduced. 
V . C . terrorist incidents = 52 + .07 S.V. ground operations.
(.03) 
(R2 = .16) (18) 
 1 
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V.C. terrorist incidents - 210 - .007 U.S. bombing attack 
(.001) sorties in S . V .  M
(R2 = .46)

(19) 
Viet Con g Killing of Civilians 
Both the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese government have 
over the years sought to eliminate each other's political and adminis­
trative leadership. If one hypothesized that Viet Cong political or mil­
itary defectors were evidence of loss of Viet Cong support, then it 
might follow that as they lost more political support, the Viet Cong 
would try to eliminate more Saigon government leaders in an attempt 
to regain control. This was not the case however: Viet Cong killing 
of civilians was independent of Viet Cong defectors. It was also inde­
pendent of U . S  . or South Vietnamese ground operations in the previous 
month. 
Viet Cong Abductions of Civilians 
The Viet Cong abducted civilians to impress them into service in 
the Viet Cong army or into temporary local labor for the Viet Cong. 
These abductions were independent of U . S . or South Vietnamese 
ground operations in the previous month, and of total Viet Cong defec­
tors. 
S u m m a r  y of Findings on Pacification 
In summing up the main findings concerning pacification, it appears 
that as U . S  . ground operations declined, North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong armed attacks also declined. Since, in the post-Tet period, North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong armed attacks were carried out primarily 
by regular North Vietnamese units, it appears that the U . S  . deescalation 
was reciprocated by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Viet Cong 
terrorist incidents, however, increased in the post-Tet period, facilitated 
by a decrease in U . S . bombing attack sorties in South Vietnam, and 
to some extent stimulated by the increasing strength and pacification 
efforts of the South Vietnamese government forces. Terrorism appears 
to have been the major coercive means used by the Viet Cong in 
the struggle for political control while trying to rebuild military units 
and political cadres decimated during the Tet and spring offensives 
of 1968. 
MILITARY CASUALTIES 
The number of troops killed is an indicator of the overall intensity 
of fighting in an armed conflict.7 Moreover, the United States fought 
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the Vietnam W a  r as a war of attrition, in which one of the strategic 
objectives was to kill as m a n y Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops 
as possible in order to so weaken the Communists' military capabilities 
that they would be unable to achieve their political objective of over­
throwing the South Vietnamese government by force. The North Viet­
namese also adopted a policy aimed at increasing the number of Ameri­
cans killed in order to affect public opinion in the United States.8 
There was some difference of opinion as to what affected U . S . casual­
ties. The U . S . military c o m m a n d , for example, argued that North Vietna­
mese and Viet Cong attacks, rather than their o w n military operations, 
were the primary determinants of U . S  . casualties. Domestic critics of 
the war in the United States asserted that one w a y the United States 
could decrease the number of Americans killed in Vietnam was to 
stop the large "search and destroy" operations. Others argued that 
large operations merely send m a n  y m e  n out to "beat the bushes" and 
that relatively few Viet Cong or North Vietnamese were killed in such 
operations. Others have somewhat cynically asserted that large South 
Vietnamese ground operations were aimed not really at engaging the 
Communist forces but at satisfying their American advisers that A R V  N 
forces were making some effort to defend their o w n country. Contact 
with the Communist forces would be evidenced by South Vietnamese 
casualties. 
Empirically, North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g armed attacks in­
creased South Vietnamese casualties. Surprisingly, the greater the 
number of South Vietnamese ground operations the fewer South Viet­
namese soldiers were killed. O n e might infer from this finding that 
the majority of South Vietnamese casualties were suffered not by the 
A R V  N in large ground operations but by the Regional Forces and 
Popular Forces w h  o m a d  e contact with the Viet C o n  g in small unit 
actions. 
S. V.	 troops killed = 2,300 - 2.0 S. V. ground operations 
(.6) 
(R2 = .66) + 3.5 N.V. + V.C. armed attacks 
(.8) (20) 
U.S. Troops Killed 
Rivariate regressions show that fewer troops were killed as the rate 
of troop withdrawal increased, and North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
armed attacks and large U . S  . ground operations decreased. In a multiple 
regression including all three factors, North Vietnamese and Viet Con  g 
armed attacks and the rate of U . S  . troop withdrawals remain significant 
causes of U . S  . troops killed. United States ground operations, however, 
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do not remain a significant factor. Thus, there is some support for 
the statement that U . S . casualties were primarily determined by C o m ­
munist attacks rather than U . S  . ground operations; of course, casualties 
were also reduced as U . S . forces were withdrawn. 
U.S. troops kilted = 52 + 3.4 U.S. ground operations 
(3.6) 
(R2 = .64) + 1.9 N.V. + V.C. armed attacks

(.5)

+ .019	 monthly change in number of 
(.007) U.S. troops 
(21) 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Troops Killed 
The bivariate regressions show that Communist casualties were in­
creased by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong armed attacks. Communist 
casualties were systematically independent of U . S . ground operations, 
South Vietnamese ground operations, and U . S . bombing attacks in South 
Vietnam. Thus, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong armed attacks were 
the primary determinant of casualties on both sides during this post-
Tet period. F r o m this w e can infer that the Communists generally 
controlled the intensity of the fighting during this period. 
N.V.	 + V.C. killed = 960 + 39 N.V. + V.C. armed attacks 
(R2 = .59) (7) 
(22) 
POPULAR CONFIDENCE IN

THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

In this study, the ratio of the black market value of the South Viet­
namese piastre in terms of dollars to the value of the piastre in goods 
and services, i. e. 
( Dollars\ //Money Supply \ Piastre) / [Consumer Price IndexI 
is	 used as a measure of the confidence of the South Vietnamese people 
in their government.9 (See chapter 2 for the development of this mea­
sure.) 
After the Tet offensive the primary influence on popular confidence 
in the South Vietnamese government was U . S . troop withdrawals from 
South Vietnam. Th  e greater the rate of U . S  . troop withdrawals and 
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the smaller the number of remaining U . S . troops, the less confidence 
the South Vietnamese had in their government. Thus, confidence in the 
regime was highly dependent upon the presence of U . S . forces, and that 
confidence was shaken as the rate of withdrawal increased. 
Popular Confidence = - 1.6 + 60 Number of U.S. troops 
Off2 = .45) (14) (23) 
Popular Confidence = 15000 + 19 monthly change in number of 
(R2 = .40) (.5) U.S. troops
 ( 2 4 ) 
Vietnamization negatively affected popular confidence. T h  e smaller 
the ratio of U . S  . troops to South Vietnamese troops killed, the lower 
was South Vietnamese popular confidence in the following month. 
n i /-r r j orrnn , 1 /(Ann I U.S. trOOpS killed] 
Popular Confidence = 8700 + 14000 Io T7 . —, .,, J 
(& = .34) (3900)  \ S V ' trOOps kllled/t-l 
(25) 
United States troops killed can be taken as another indicator of 
the intensity of fighting assumed by the U . S . forces. As the number 
of U . S  . troops killed declined, so did popular confidence in the follow­
ing month. T h e confidence of the South Vietnamese in their government 
depended not only on the presence of U . S  . forces but also on the 
part these forces took in combat. 
Popular Confidence = 12000 + 3.8 U.S. troops killedt_i 
(R2 = .39) (1.0) (26) 
Popular confidence appeared to be independent of the number of North 
Vietnamese and Viet C o n g armed attacks and the number of terrorist 
incidents and civilians killed and abducted by the Viet C o n g in the 
previous month. 
Thus, w e m a y conclude that as U . S . troops withdrew and Vietnamiza­
tion increased, popular confidence in the Saigon regime declined. 
These findings indicate that one of the major policy objectives of 
the Vietnamization program was not being achieved between the Tet 
offensive and Cambodian invasion: popular confidence in the South 
Vietnamese government. They thus have important significance both 
for the American and for the South Vietnamese governments: the Viet­
namization program and U . S . disengagement weakened the regime 
politically rather than strengthened it. 
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VIET C O N G POLITICAL SUPPORT: DEFECTORS 
If fighting weakened the political position of the South Vietnamese 
regime, what was its effect on the political support for the Viet Cong? 
A  n indicator of lack of popular support for the Viet Cong is the number 
of political and military defectors. Defecting can be viewed as "voting 
with one's feet," although the behavior of defection m a  y not follow 
the desire because of mitigating circumstances. Likewise, actual defec­
tion m a  y not be politically motivated, but simply an attempt to survive 
by giving oneself up to government forces w h o locally or temporarily 
have military superiority. Defection m a y often be motivated by the 
desire to return to one's family or h o m  e at harvest time. Past studies 
have shown that the longer a soldier remained with the Viet Cong, 
the less likely he was to defect. Most of the defectors did so within 
a few months of their joining or impressment into the Viet Cong. 1 0 
A plausible hypothesis is that as the South Vietnamese regime gained 
support, the Viet Cong would lose support, and vice versa. Empirically, 
however, in the two and a quarter years following the Tet offensive, 
popular confidence in the South Vietnamese government declined while 
the number of political defectors from the Viet Cong increased. It 
thus appears that both the South Vietnamese regime and the Viet Cong 
lost political support after the Tet offensive. 
The number of defectors was independent of the number of North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops killed. This finding presents clear 
evidence that simply "killing Viet Cong" did not change the allegiance 
of the South Vietnamese people in this war. 
The fewer civilians the Viet Cong abducted, the more Viet Cong 
defectors there were. This finding suggests that w h e n the Viet Cong 
was less coercive, people took the opportunity and defected more read­
ily. 
Total V.C. defectors = 3300 - 1.3 civilians abducted by V.C. 
(R2 = .19) (.5) (27) 
After the Tet offensive, U . S . b o m b i n g attack sorties in South Vietnam 
declined as the total n u m b e  r of Viet C o n  g defectors increased. A  s 
the intensity of thefighting decreased (thus requiring less U . S  . air sup­
port), m o r e Viet C o n g h a d the opportunity to defect because they were 
less frequently under attack. 
Total V.C. defectors = 4600 - .15 U.S. bombing attack 
Off2 = .30) (.04) sorties in S.V. (28) 
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The Viet Cong's loss of support as the Americans withdrew offers 
some supporting evidence to the contention that the Viet Cong gained 
political support by emphasizing their protection of the Vietnamese 
people against the foreigners w h  o wreaked destruction on their country. 
As the Americans disengaged, this argument was less relevant, and 
therefore support for the Viet Cong declined. As voluntary support de­
clined, the Viet Cong increasingly used terror in their attempt to control 
the population. 
Most strongly associated with the total number of Viet Cong defectors 
is the number of South Vietnamese ground operations. 
Total V.C. defectors = 1500 + 5.0 S.V. ground operations 
(R2 = .76) (.6) (29) 
As these large ground operations increased, Viet C o n g defected in 
greater numbers in order to survive w h e  n and where government forces 
showed military superiority and overran Viet C o n g areas. 
U.S. PUBLIC OPINION:

DOMESTIC POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE W A  R

Almost every month the American Institute for Public Opinion (the 
Gallup Poll) measured the percentage of the U . S  . public w h  o approved 
and disapproved of the w a  y the president (Johnson and Nixon) had 
been handling the war, as well as his job as president. The responses 
to those two questions have been highly correlated, especially during 
the Johnson administration. Since it is translated into votes, public 
opinion has important consequences, as Lyndon Johnson found out 
when his public approval was so low that he could not realistically 
seek reelection. Public approval of President Johnson did increase, h o w  ­
ever, as the number of bombing missions over North Vietnam the pre­
vious month declined. This increased approval near the end of his 
administration was no doubt related to the implication that peace would 
finally be achieved. 
Percentage U.S. public = 52 - .001 U.S. bombing missions 
approval (.0003) in N. V.
 M 
(R2 = .40) (30) 
The more South Vietnamese ground operations in the previous month, 
the greater was the public approval for the president and his Vietnam 
policy. 
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Percentage U.S. public = 31 + .02 S.V. ground operationst ^ 
approval (.006) 
(R2 = .33) (31) 
This finding shows that the U . S  . public responded positively to the 
Vietnamization program and to the South Vietnamese assuming more 
ground combat. The regression analysis supports this conclusion, for 
the greater the Vietnamization (as measured by the ratio of U . S  . to 
South Vietnamese troops killed), the greater was the public approval 
for the president's Vietnam policy. 
Percentage U.S. public = 65 - 34 fe trooPs 
approval (11) \S'V- trooPs 
(R2 = -27) (32) 
Th  e domestic political implications of these findings are clear: since 
(1) greater public approval for the president and his Vietnam policy 
depended upon fewer U . S . casualties relative to those of the South 
Vietnamese; (2) fewer U . S . casualties depended upon fewer North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong armed attacks; and (3) fewer North Vietna­
mese and Viet Cong armed attacks depended upon fewer large U . S . 
ground operations, then President Nixon's policy of decreasing U . S  . 
involvement in the war was a correct one for his purpose of maintaining 
his popular support in the United States. 
However, the analysis above has shown that the policy of U . S . troop 
withdrawals and Vietnamization that strengthened the political position 
of the president in the United States by reducing American involvement 
and casualties in South Vietnam weakened the political position of 
the South Vietnamese government. These findings pose a continuing 
dilemma for the president of the United States. President Johnson faced 
this dilemma in 1965: whether to intervene in South Vietnam with 
massive U . S . military power and save the South Vietnamese government 
from collapse and overthrow by the Viet Cong at the risk of losing 
popular support in the United States. H  e intervened, and the subse­
quent escalation of the war and the massive participation by United 
States forces that was required to save the South Vietnamese govern­
ment from overthrow led directly to large numbers of American casual­
ties and other war costs that badly reduced President Johnson's support. 
President Nixon apparently faced a similar dilemma. His Vietnamiza­
tion policy required that there be fewer U . S  . troops and fewer U . S  . 
casualties in Vietnam. As this was done, he maintained U . S . public 
support. However, this very withdrawal of U . S . troops led to a severe 
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loss of popular confidence in the South Vietnamese regime. Thus, both 
Presidents Johnson and Nixon have faced the same dilemma: whether 
to achieve domestic political objectives in the United States or interna­
tional political objectives in Vietnam. Although both presidents obvious­
ly preferred to have it both ways, both have had to choose because 
of the very structure of the war and its political consequences. Each 
president m a d  e a fundamentally different choice. President Nixon's 
choice was no doubt informed by his predecessor's early retirement. 
The domestic political success of his choice was evident in his landslide 
reelection victory. 
A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF THE VIETNAM WAR 
FROM THE TET OFFENSIVE TO THE CAMBODIAN INVASION 
Figure 39 is a simplified model in flow diagram form, i.e., a chain 
of relationships a m o n g the variables. Regression analysis has been used 
to reveal the simplified structure of relationships that are in reality 
interwoven into a complex whole. 
Figure 39. Major Relationships in the Vietnam War from the Tet Offensive to the Cambodian Invasion 
South Vietnamese 
Popular Confidence 
• = negative relationship 
= positive relationship 
This structure of relationships and the regression equations upon 
which the structure is based can be used to trace what would have 
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been the probable consequences of any particular action engaged in 
by either side during the period from the Tet offensive to the Cambodian 
invasion. The policy implications of this structure of relationships are 
clear: one can see the necessary actions or conditions that are linked 
to certain policy objectives. For example, if the president of the United 
States was concerned about increasing his popular support, he would 
find that if he decreased the number of U . S . ground operations, this 
would lead to decreases in North Vietnamese and Viet Cong armed 
attacks and to decreases in U . S . troops killed, which in turn would 
lead to an increase in U . S  . public support for the president and his 
policy. 
Like the structure of relationships of the pre-Tet offensive period, 
the structure represented in the regression equations and in the flow 
diagram for the period from the Tet offensive to the Cambodian invasion 
is partly based on time-lagged relationships. Thus, the entire structure 
can be used to forecast likely outcomes resulting from specified actions. 
As described in chapters 3 and 6, with a complex structure, this forecast­
ing can be done by means of computer simulation in which the predicted 
value of each dependent variable is used as the value for that variable 
w h e  n it appears as an independent variable in another regression equa­
tion farther along the chain of relationships. As long as there is at 
least one time-lagged relationship, one can reiterate this procedure 
to m a k e month-by-month predictions of each variable by boot-strapping 
from only the initial values of each variable. If the predictions from 
such a computer simulation prove to be close to the actual values 
for the period from which these regression equations were derived 
(i.e., from February 1968 through April 1970), then one has more confi­
dence in the predictions of the value of each variable in the months 
beyond the last real data point. 
Once such a simulation model proves to m a k e valid predictions, 
one could exercise the model (as demonstrated in chapter 7) to see 
what the likely outcome in a number of dependent variables would 
be w h e  n one changes the values of manipulable independent variables. 
For example, one could estimate the magnitude of the likely effect 
on public approval of the president's Vietnam policy if large U . S  . 
ground operations in Vietnam were increased or decreased by given 
amounts. O  r one could find the likely effect of increasing or decreasing 
the rate of U . S  . troop withdrawals from Vietnam on such variables 
as South Vietnamese popular confidence, political support for the Viet 
Cong, or U . S . public opinion. 
A simple example of h o  w one can predict the value of a variable 
(with or without a computer) is as follows: for every additional ten 
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thousand U . S . troops withdrawn from Vietnam each month, the ratio 
of U . S . to South Vietnamese troops killed would be reduced by approxi­
mately .07. (See equation 6.) For every additional monthly reduction 
of approximately .07 in the ratio of U . S  . to South Vietnamese troops 
killed, there would be an increase of about 2.4 percent in U . S . public 
approval of the president. (See equation 32.) Following through this 
chain of relationships, one can thus forecast the probable consequences, 
measured in numerical terms, of a number of possible actions that 
a policy-maker is considering and a m o n g which he must choose. 
This ability to predict consequences of alternative actions is one 
of the purposes of scientific and quantitative analysis of international 
relations. Such analysis strengthens our capability for critical evaluation 
of existing policies, and potentially could enlighten policy-making so 
that future tragedies can be avoided. 
1. In this chapter the newer data for the 1968-70 period are analyzed as 
individual variables, rather than as weighted composite indices. This approach 
allows one to use the regression equations to calculate the estimated value of each 
individual dependent variable. 
2. Except for the black market piastre value, money supply, consumer price 
index, and the public opinion data, all data come from "Unclassified Statistics 
from Southeast Asia," a table prepared monthly by the Directorate for Information 
Operations of the U . S  . Department of Defense. The public opinion data come 
from the "Gallup Poll," (the American Institute of Public Opinion in Princeton, 
N.J.). The monthly data on the black market value of the South Vietnamese 
piastre come from dealers in Saigon, H o n g Kong, and San Francisco. 
3. Robert H  . Johnson, "Vietnamization: Can It W o r k ? " Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, "Vietnam: December, 1969," section 7, p . 18. 
4. All ground operations used as measures in this study are those of battalion 
size or larger. 
5. As described in chapter 3, the structure of relationships set forth in all 
of the regression equations in this study can be used to estimate the consequences 
of given actions or conditions. The regression coefficients (b) state (within some 
stated standard error(SE)) the magnitude of the effect of an independent variable 
on a dependent variable. These equations can be used to predict the value of a 
dependent variable given the value of an independent variable, assuming that the 
value of the independent variable stays within the range of the values it has had 
in the past and from which these regression equations were derived. The propor­
tional reduction in the error of the prediction of a dependent variable, as compared 
with the error associated with using the mean value as the predicted value of the 
dependent variable, is measured by the square of the multiple correlation coefficient, 
or  R 2 . Values for all variables in the regression equations are monthly. Values are 
within the same month except those marked "t-1," which are of the previous month. 
6. Clark  M . Clifford, "  A Vietnam Reappraisal: The Personal History of O n e 
Man's View and H o  w It Evolved," and E  .  W . Kenworthy, "The Tet Offensive 
and the Turnaround," in Pentagon Papers, chap. 10. 
7. Rudolph J. R u m m e l  , "Indicators of Cross-National and International Pat­
terns," p . 134. 
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8. Tad Szulc, Hanoi Calls for the Infliction of Heavier Combat Losses on 
U . S . , " p. 13. 
9. During the period under study the piastre was worth an average of about 
one-fourth of one cent on the black market. 
10. Paul Berman, "The Liberation Armed Forces of the N L F  : Compliance 
and Cohesion in a Revolutionary Army," chap. 4. 
The Paradox of Waging War 
to Achieve Power 
A major political paradox emerges from an analysis of the Vietnam 
W a r . The war was conducted by each side to increase its o w n , and 
to diminish its opponent's, political power in Vietnam. Each side in­
creased its o w  n efforts w h e  n it appeared that the other side might 
prevail. Thus, the escalation of the war. 
Yet in seeking political power through the use of increased military 
force in Vietnam, the leaders of each side tended to lose the political 
support of their o w  n people. This chapter will seek to analyze both 
theoretically and empirically this general paradox and what underlies 
it. 
Presidents Johnson and Nixon both faced a dilemma in the Vietnam 
W a r  . Th  e objective of both administrations, following precedents estab­
lished by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, was to prevent 
the Communists from achieving power in Indochina, particularly in 
South Vietnam after 1954. Since this objective was shared byfive Ameri­
can presidents, one can infer that it was widely supported by the 
political, military, and economic elite in the United States.1 Th  e motiva­
tions for this general objective were economic, strategic, and political. 
Southeast Asian markets and resources were to be kept open to the 
United States and its allies for trade and investment. Through the 
use of military bases and alliances, the United States sought to resist 
the expansion into Southeast Aisa of the spheres of influence of C o m m u  ­
nist China and of the Soviet Union. In addition, the United States 
sought to frustrate a Communist-led "war of national liberation" in 
Vietnam so as to deter similar Communist or nationalist challenges to 
American hegemony elsewhere in the world, particularly in the under­
developed areas of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Finally, the U . S  . 
government repeatedly maintained that unless it honored its commit­
ment to South Vietnam to resist Communist subversion and aggression, 
U . S . commitments elsewhere in the world would not be credible. Such 
loss of credibility would weaken or eliminate the deterrent value of 
American political commitments, thus inviting Communist challenges 
or accommodations to C o m m u n i s m by other nations. 
The Johnson administration sought to prevent the Communists from 
gaining political control over South Vietnam by a continuing escalation 
of U . S . troop levels, supplies, military assistance, combat operations 
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in South Vietnam, and bombing in North Vietnam. At enormous mone­
tary expense and with vast destruction and the loss of tens of thousands 
of American and Vietnamese lives, this massive effort did avert a C o m  ­
munist take-over of South Vietnam during the Johnson administration. 
However, the American people became greatly frustrated and dissatis­
fied with the war and with the Johnson administration. As a conse­
quence, President Johnson paid the ultimate political cost of pursuing 
the international objectives of the American elite: the loss of both 
his domestic political support and of the office and power of the presi­
dency. 
As the Vietnam W a  r progressed during the Nixon administration, 
U . S . popular support for the war continued to decline, and a majority 
of Americans came to desire an end to the U . S . role in the war. Aware 
of both this popular sentiment in the United States and the political 
costs of President Johnson's experience, President Nixon attempted to 
avoid similar consequences. During his last nine months in office Presi­
dent Johnson had initiated some leveling-off of U . S . ground commit­
ments in Vietnam and a reduction in, and eventual halt to, the bombing 
of North Vietnam. President Nixon extended this strategy by withdraw­
ing American ground troops from Vietnam while simultaneously pursu­
ing the Vietnamization policy of improving South Vietnamese ground 
and air combat capabilities, and supporting the South Vietnamese mili­
tary effort with massive U . S . air and naval power. President Nixon 
correctly saw that fewer American ground forces in Vietnam would 
result in fewer American casualties and lower financial costs of U . S  . 
support of an anti-Communist South Vietnam. With fewer costs and 
U . S . casualties in Vietnam, President Nixon was able to retain strong 
political support in the United States for his Vietnam policy. 
However, in escaping, through its Vietnamization policy, one horn 
of the dilemma of the Vietnam War—declining popular support—the 
Nixon administration risked being caught on the other—losing the U . S  . 
objective in the war. Vietnamization included the withdrawal of U . S . 
ground troops, their replacement by South Vietnamese ground troops, 
and the extension of both the air and ground war into Laos and C a m  ­
bodia, using South Vietnamese ground troops and American air and 
naval power. This policy constituted, however, a less effective defense 
against the expansion of Communist power in Indochina—the stated 
U . S . objective in the war. The withdrawal of the majority of U . S . 
ground forces in South Vietnam weakened the combined American-
South Vietnamese military strength in South Vietnam. The combined 
fighting strength of the South Vietnamese and U . S  . troops had been 
unable to defeat the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. It was most 
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unlikely that the South Vietnamese army would be able to do so on 
its o w n . Indeed, without the help of massive American air power and 
naval firepower, the South Vietnamese army could not have withstood 
the major offensive launched by the North Vietnamese in the spring 
of 1972. 
If the Communists were able to take over South Vietnam by military 
means after American troops were withdrawn from Vietnam, the long 
history of American commitments and costs in Vietnam would have 
been futile. Such a defeat of U . S . objectives would likely lead to a 
questioning of the credibility of U . S . commitments to less powerful 
nations around the world to help resist Communist aggression or subver­
sion, and to those nations' accommodation to Chinese or Soviet de­
mands. In short, the Nixon administration's Vietnamization policy, 
though being more likely than the previous policy of escalation to 
minimize domestic political dissatisfaction with President Nixon, none­
theless risked losing the objective of an anti-Communist South Vietnam. 
Thus, the Nixon administration, like the Johnson administration, was 
locked in the dilemma of incompatible domestic and international polit­
ical objectives. 
In Vietnam, too, the pursuit of political power by means of military 
force by the leaders of South Vietnam on the one hand, and of North 
Vietnam and the Viet Cong on the other, also had a paradoxical effect. 
Successive South Vietnamese governments fell as they tried to press 
the war against the Communists and as the South Vietnamese A r m y 
and people halfheartedly continued the struggle. As the Communists 
intensified their efforts in the war, they lost thousands of both military 
and civilian defectors. Thus, in Vietnam as well as in the United States, 
the pursuit of power by political leaders through the use of military 
force resulted in a lessening of the popular support upon which their 
political power was based. 
The paradox of the Vietnam W a r , then, is that leaders on both sides 
were forced to m a k  e the trade-off between their o w  n political support 
and the pursuit of their war objectives. This paradox is represented 
graphically in figure 40 as an inverse functional relationship.2 
W h a  t underlies this paradox of national leaders' being unable to 
increase their power over others by waging war without eroding the 
popular basis of their domestic political power? A theoretical answer 
can be found in an analysis of the w a y in which the costs and benefits 
of the war goals are differently evaluated by elites and masses. C o n  ­
sider the set of expected benefits that the elites of the participating 
countries m a y expect to achieve by waging the Vietnam W a r : having 
a particular kind of government in South Vietnam; controlling markets, 
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Figure 40. Loss of Political Support in Pursuit of W a r Objectives 
resources, or people in Southeast Asia; using South Vietnam as a prece­
dent-setting example of what happens w h e n guerrilla wars of "national 
liberation" are attempted and succeed or fail; proving the credibility 
(or incredibility) of U . S  . (or Russian or Chinese) political treaties 
or military commitments; and so on. Both Communist and anti-Commu­
nist leaders are commited to the achievement of these goals, although 
they m a y evaluate them differently. Consider further the set of expected 
costs associated with attempting to achieve these goals by means of 
war: lives lost, physical destruction, tax dollars spent, families uprooted, 
people maimed, diminished purchasing power of national currency, psy­
chological fear and frustration, loss of a nation's moral prestige, the 
general waste of people and resources, and so on. 
W  e can postulate that members of both masses and elites in a coun­
try will have some system of preferences regarding the trade-offs be­
tween these expected net benefits and expected net costs that are the 
result of a policy of waging war. These are shown infigure41.3 
There w  e see a family of indifference curves, or equal utility contours. 
W  e m a y postulate that for any individual, there will be some set of 
associated net expected costs and benefits to which he will be indifferent, 
i.e., that will yield the same satisfaction to the individual (e.g., points 
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Figure 41. Trade-offs between Expected Net Benefits 
and Expected Net Costs of Waging War 
Net Expected Cost 
A and B ) . 4 The connection of these points is represented by a single 
indifference curve, e.g., U2. Each indifference curve is assumed to be 
convex upward to represent the psychological fact that as marginal 
costs become greater, the marginal benefits expected to accrue from 
them must be still greater for people to be willing to bear them. Each 
indifference curve in figure 41 is drawn in such a w a y as to indicate 
that there is some positive relationship between the expected net costs 
and benefits of a war policy; i.e., people realize that the more benefits 
they expect to achieve by a war, the more effort is required and the 
more costly the war is likely to be. 
For any individual w  e can define a higher indifference curve for 
the net expected costs and benefits of war, e.g., U3. For the same 
expected net cost, Cx, any individual would prefer to receive a larger 
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net benefit, i.e., B2 to  B x . Thus, an individual would prefer the combina­
tion of net expected costs and benefits represented by point B' to 
those associated with A  . Put another w a y  , if the net expected benefit 
is to remain constant, e.g.,  B x , one would prefer to have fewer associ­
ated net costs rather than more, i.e., point A  ' rather than point B. 
Thus, an individual would prefer  C 2 to Clf and so on. 
For any individual w  e can postulate a large number of such indiffer­
ence curves, the totality of which is his preference system and which 
w  e can represent graphically as his indifference m a p  . O  n this m a  p 
each indifference curve could be considered a contour line at a constant 
height on a mountain that is the individual's utility, which w  e can 
imagine getting higher as it comes out of the page in the third dimen­
sion toward us. As w e m o v e from indifference curve U1 to U2 to U3 etc., 
and cross successive indifference curves w  e are indicating higher levels 
of satisfaction or utility. 
W  e k n o w that the major burdens of warfare are usually borne by 
the mass of people in any country, rather than by the political and 
economic elites. It is the masses w h  o provide the soldiers w h  o are 
m a i m e d and killed, the taxes that finance war efforts, and w h o expe­
rience the destruction, dislocation, and terrible fear for their o w  n lives 
and safety. 
W  e also k n o  w that because of their particular social and economic 
perspectives, the mass of people in any country are usually minimally 
concerned about m a n  y of the international objectives of their govern­
ments (Campbell et al., 1960). Because they have less to gain directly 
than do the political, military, and economic elites, the masses are less 
concerned with such things as the placement of strategic bases or control 
of world resources and markets, including competition for such control 
by different powers in the world. T h  e masses of people are primarily 
concerned with issues they perceive as directly affecting their o w  n 
lives. Elites, on the other hand, generally take into account economic, 
strategic, and political conditions that are more remote temporally and 
geographically. Moreover, as shown in the "Pentagon Papers," elites 
base their evaluations of policies on different information than is avail­
able to the masses. 
Given these facts, w  e can postulate that elites and masses give dif­
ferent subjective evaluations to the associated net expected benefits 
and costs of waging war. T h e sets of trade-offs preferred by elites 
are different from those preferred by the masses. Specifically, because 
the masses bear the greater costs of war, w  e can assume, as shown 
in figure 42, that they desire a greater marginal benefit (B4 — B 3 ) 
for a given marginal cost (C2 — C  J than do the political, military, 
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and economic elites (B2 — B J  . Put another w a y  , the political, military, 
and economic elites are more willing to have their country assume 
a greater marginal net cost (C4 —  C s ) for a given expected marginal 
net benefit (B4 — B 3 ) than are the masses (C2 — C J , since the costs 
of war are borne mainly by the masses. Thus, w  e assume that in the 
indifference curves of the masses the net expected benefits increase 
more steeply as a function of the net expected costs than in the indiffer­
ence curves of members of the political, military, and economic elite. 
Figure 42. Trade-offs of Elites and Masses between Expected Net 
Benefits and Expected Net Costs of Waging War 
X D o • 
Net Expected Cost 
Our discussion so far has considered only the subjective preference 
systems of members of the elites and masses. In waging war, however, 
there are some objective functional relationships between costs and 
benefits (e.g., the relationship between U . S  . casualties and diminishing 
Communist support in South Vietnam as measured by numbers of 
defectors). T o produce some expected net benefit (e.g., "pacification" 
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in Vietnam), there are associated real net costs (e.g., lives and m o n e y ) . 
W  e can represent this objective relationship by the straight line, OP, 
as shown infigure43.5 
W  e can combine our analysis of objective reality and subjective pref­
erences by superimposing the objective price line on an individual's 
indifference m a p , as shown infigure 44. If he had the power to decide 
a trade-off point, this individual would still be constrained by the objec­
tive price line OP. Since any individual would prefer the greatest possible 
satisfaction, he would choose the combination in which his highest 
indifference curve is touched by the objective price line, i.e., the point 
at which the objective price line is tangent to his highest possible 
indifference curve. In figure 44 that point is X on indifference curve 
U2. A n y other point on OP lies on a lower indifference curve than 
Figure 43. Expected Net Benefits and Real Net Costs 
P(Price line)t 
Net Cost 
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Figure 44. Real Net Costs and Individual's Indifference M a p 
Net Expected Cost 
X. At the tangency point X  , the slope of U2 is equal to the slope of OP, 
i.e., the rate at which the individual is trilling to trade-off net expected 
costs for benefits is the rate at which he can do so. 
It is the elites w h o formulate and influence foreign and military 
policy. They actually have the power to choose trade-off points in 
a war between such expected costs as tens of thousands of people 
being killed and tens of billions of dollars being spent in exchange 
for such expected benefits as military victory, the credibility of political 
commitments, successful challenge to domination, and open markets 
and resources. Figure 44 can thus be considered to represent the consen­
sus preference system of those w h o m a k e war policy. 
W h e  n w  e superimpose the objective price line OP onto the different 
consensus preference systems of elites and masses taken from figure 
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42, w  e see in figure 45 that the policy combining the optimum trade-
off of net expected costs and benefits by the policy-making elites, point 
X  , is actually less preferred by the masses than point Y , which is the 
point at which the objective price line OP is tangent to the highest 
possible indifference curve of the masses. 
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Figure 45. Real Net Costs and Different Preference Systems of 
Elites and Masses 
Point X lies on a higher indifference curve for the elites (E2) than 
does point Y , which lies on Ex. However, point X lies on a lower 
indifference curve for the masses ( M x ) than does point Y , which lies 
on  M 2 . Since it is the elites, however, w h  o choose the policy, they 
choose the trade-off point which they most prefer, i.e., point X  , even 
though X is less satisfying to the masses than is point Y  , given the 
difference in preference systems between elites and masses and the 
objective constraints of the objective price line OP. 
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T h e trade-off point the masses would prefer, point Y , has associated 
with it fewer net expected costs and benefits than does point X  . H o w  ­
ever, w e can find a point Y * on the same mass indifference curve  M 2 
at which the net expected benefit for the mass is equal to that at the 
trade-off point X  , i.e. B = B T h e masses would be indifferent in 
choosing between trade-off points Y and Y * . However , the net expected 
costs which the mass would be willing to pay at the trade-off point Y * 
(i.e., Cv ), for the net expected benefit of B (or B ) is less than the 
net expected costs which they are forced to pay by the elites' choice of 
the trade-off point X (i.e., C ). This difference in net expected costs 
(Cx — CyJ) is the amount that the elites are exploiting the masses by 
the elites' choice of their most preferred trade-off point X .  6 
F r o  m this analysis w  e can see that given the assumption of different 
preference systems for elites and masses, the choice of a trade-off point 
or policy by the elites not only exploits the masses but causes them 
to be dissatisfied as well, since the masses are forced to accept a trade-
off point lying on a lower indifference curve than they would prefer 
(i.e., a point on  M x instead of  M 2 ) . W  e shall n o  w analyze h o  w exploita­
tion and dissatisfaction are affected by changing objective costs and 
by changing preference systems. 
First, let us consider what happens w h e n the objective marginal 
costs per unit of benefit increase while the subjective preference systems 
of masses and elites remain the same as in our previous analysis. A n 
example of this occurring in the Vietnam W a r is w h e n both sides 
have escalated their commitments and costs over what they had previ­
ously been and both sides are stalemated as before the escalation. 
Under such circumstances neither side is closer to winning the war, 
yet the objective costs have increased. W  e can represent this situation 
of increased objective costs in figure 46. T h  e objective price line OP 
represents the lower marginal costs per unit of benefit and the objective 
price line O P  " represents a higher marginal cost per unit of benefit. 
In figure 46 w  e can see that as the objective marginal costs per 
unit of benefit increase from price line OP to price line OP", the elites 
will choose the n e w trade-off point X "  , since it is the point at which 
the n e  w objective price line is tangent to the highest possible elite 
indifference curve, which in this case is n o  w  E t . Thus, with the higher 
objective costs, the elite have had to m a k e a choice less satisfying 
to them, i.e., they have had to m o v e from point X on elite indifference 
curve E2 to point X" on the lower elite indifference curve Ei. 
W  e will also note that the n e  w price line OP" intersects the mass 
utility curve M  i at X "  . Given the n e  w constraints of greater objective 
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Figure 46. Increasing Real Costs and Consensus Preference 
Systems of Elites and Masses 
costs, however, the masses would most prefer the trade-off associated 
with point Y "  , where O?" is tangent to the highest possible mass indif­
ference curve  M 2 . 
As in our previous analysis, w  e can find a trade-off point Y "  * on 
the mass indifference curve  M 2 that represents a net expected benefit 
equal to that at X  " i.e., B „. However, the net expected costs that the 
masses would be willing to pay at Y "  * (i.e.,  C y / /  J is again less than 
the net expected costs C „ that the masses must pay because of the 
elites' choice of the trade-off point X "  . 
Thus, the masses continue to be exploited as the objective costs 
of the war increase. Moreover, w  e have assumed that the shape of 
the indifference curves of the masses and elites differ in such a w a  y 
that the masses would prefer to pay fewer net expected costs per 
unit of net expected benefits than the elites; in proportion to what 
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the masses have to pay as a result of the elites' decision (i.e. exploita­
tion of the masses), the difference between what they are willing to 
pay and what they actually have to pay increases. Thus, in figure 46, 
(Cx" — CY"*) is greater than (Cx — CY*) . In effect, then, the more 
Cx" Cx 
costly the objective net expected benefits become, the more the masses 
are exploited by elite choices of trade-off points. 
W  e should also note that as the objective costs per unit of net ex­
pected benefits increase, and as the masses are more exploited, they 
become more dissastisfied with the policy choice of the elites; as the 
objective price line shifts in figure 46 from OP to OT", the trade-off 
points selected by the elites lie on a lower mass indifference curve. 
(Point X  " lies on a lower indifference curve than does point X .  ) 
W  e will n o w consider what happens w h e n dynamic changes in 
preference systems of elites and masses occur. Although they are deter­
mined in part by socialization, education, and persuasion, the prefer­
ence systems of people do change as a result of their experience. In 
the Vietnam W a r , for example, U . S . political elites came to include 
in their evaluation of the net expected benefits of victory not only 
the value held early in the war of defeating a Communist attempt 
to gain control in South Vietnam but also the goal of maintaining 
American prestige after more than half a million American troops were 
committed and more than 40,000 American lives were lost in Vietnam. 
Such values as making good on American political commitments to 
governments challenged by the Communists and of not losing American 
"face" were added to the U . S . political elites' net expected benefits 
of victory in Vietnam. 
As value was added to the net expected benefits of the elites, they 
became willing to permit their country and people to incur greater 
net expected costs for a given net expected benefit than they had 
previously. In figure 47 this effect is represented as a flattening-out 
of the elites' indifference curves. Thus, the slopes of the elites' changed 
indifference curves E \ and E '  2 are less steep than they were before 
{Ex and E  2 ) w h e n victory had relatively less value to them. 
The preference system of the masses can also change with their 
experience. If they perceive themselves to be personally threatened 
by the enemy, they m a y become attracted to appeals to national loyalty 
and m a y change their preference system to be more like that of the 
elite, as happened with the American public in World W a  r II. If this 
occurs, the slopes of the mass indifference curves would also become 
less steep. 
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However , in a stalemated war like the Vietnam W a r  , the masses 
learn that additional objective costs they bear do not increase their 
net expected benefits; they learn of additional costs previously hidden 
by official secrecy; the opportunity costs of pursuing the war become 
more salient (i.e., people become more and more aware of the goods 
and services they must forgo because of the war effort); and the 
contagion effect of concern and dissatisfaction occurs (i.e., people com­
municate their dissatisfaction to each other, influence each other, and 
reinforce each others' dissatisfaction). In such a war the masses are will-
Figure 47. Changes in Elites' and Masses' Preference 
Systems Over Time 
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ing to pay fewer net expected costs for any given net expected benefit, 
and thus, as shown in figure 47, the slopes of the masses changed indif­
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ference curves M \ and M '  2 become steeper than they were before ( M i 
and  M 2 ) . 
W  e can see from our previous analysis that as the elites become 
willing to pay more, and the masses less, for a given net expected 
benefit, the slopes of the indifference curves of each group become 
increasingly different,7 the trade-off point chosen by the elites with 
any objective price line will exploit the masses more; and the masses 
become even more dissatisfied with the policy trade-off point chosen 
by the elites. 
T h e objective costs of waging war increase with the war efforts m a d e . 
As w  e have seen in the empirical analysis of the Vietnam W a r  , the 
war effort of each side increases with the resistance and war effort 
of the other side. Thus, in a war like that in Vietnam, in which there 
is a disparity between the preference systems of the policy-making 
elites and the masses, w e can deduce that the greater the war efforts 
m a d e and the greater the objective costs incurred, the greater mass 
dissatisfaction there will be with the war policy chosen by the elite. 
This then is what underlies the political analyst's paradox and the 
elites' policy dilemma in the Vietnam W a r . As the elites increase their 
efforts to extend their control over others, and as these efforts are 
resisted and the costs of the efforts increase, the dissatisfaction of the 
masses in the elites' o w  n polity—who provide the popular basis of 
the elites' o w  n domestic political power—must bear the disproportionate 
costs of those efforts. 
O  n the other hand, if the elites decrease their efforts to extend their 
control over others, the masses in the elites' o w n polity will be more 
satisfied, but the elites will be less likely to achieve their war policy 
goals. Thus, there is an objective inverse functional relationship be­
tween, on the one hand, the achievement of international political objec­
tives by waging a war for which elite and mass preference systems are 
not the same, and, on the other hand, the elites' retention of domestic 
mass political satisfaction and support (seefigure 40). 
T h e basis of this paradox and policy dilemma is that the masses 
of people are in general less willing to pay the costs of achieving 
the international political objectives than are the elites, because the 
masses bear the disproportionate burden of those costs. 
This analysis has demonstrated that the amount of exploitation of 
the masses by the elites and the dissatisfaction of the masses is depen­
dent upon h o w divergent the preference systems of elites and masses 
are. A  n important implication of this point is that in a war, the masses 
on the side that has a relatively greater consensus of preferences be­
tween elites and masses will feel relatively less exploited by, and dis­
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satisfied with, their elites' war policy. In the Vietnam W a r , whether 
because of indoctrination or self-interest, there has been evidence from 
m a n y sources indicating a closer agreement on war policy and the 
necessity of sacrifice on the part of the North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong masses and elites than on the part of the South Vietnamese 
or American masses and elites. In a test of wills between societies 
in a protracted war, that side with the least feeling of mass exploitation 
and dissatisfaction has the greater chance of prevailing. 
W h a t empirical evidence do w e have that would support this general 
theoretical analysis in the case of the Vietnam W a r  ? O n  e of the basic 
hypotheses deduced in this theoretical analysis is that as the objective 
costs of achieving a war goal increase, mass dissatisfaction with the 
policy the elites chose to pursue that goal will also grow. F r o m 1965, 
with the initial escalation of massive American commitments to the 
Vietnam W a r  , to 1971 the American people considered the Vietnam 
W a r to be the most important problem facing the United States (AIPO, 
17 March 1971). In repeated surveys by the American Institute of Public 
Opinion, the American people were asked whether they agreed with 
this statement: "In view of the developments, it was a mistake for 
the U . S . to be involved in Vietnam." There is a linear trend upward 
in the affirmative response to this question that begins with 24 percent 
in August 1965 and continues to increase to 61 percent in M a  y 1971. 
In more than twenty such surveys m a d e over time, the increasing linear 
trend is highly correlated with various cumulated costs of the war in 
Vietnam, e.g., American casualties in the war (the correlation coeffi­
cient is .94),8 money spent on the war, number of servicemen w h o 
have served in Vietnam, and so on. 
Even during the Nixon administration, as the costs of the war con­
tinued, the American people were dissatisfied with the slow pace at 
which the administration seemed to be "winding d o w n " American par­
ticipation in the war. In two public opinion surveys taken by the Ameri­
can Institute of Public Opinion, the following percentages of the nation's 
adults thought that the United States should follow the four policies 
listed below; the questions were asked in December 1969 and February 
1970. 
Dec. 1969 Feb. 1970 
A . Withdraw all
nam immediately
 troops from Viet­
 19& 21% 
B. Withdraw
1970
 all troops by end of 
 22$ 25% 
(Withdraw all
18 months) 
 troops by end of 
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Dec. 1969 Feb. 1970 
C  .	 Withdraw troops but take as 
m a n  y years to do this as are need­
ed to turn the war over to the 
South Vietnamese 40% 38% 
D  .	 Send more troops to Vietnam and 
step up the fighting 11% 7% 
N  o opinion 8% 9% 
(AIPO, 10 Jan. 1970; 14 M a r . 1970) 
It is clear that the American public overwhelmingly favored with­
drawing American troops from Vietnam: 81 percent of the people sup­
ported this viewpoint in December 1969; 84 percent in February 1970. 
Indeed, a large percentage of the people wanted faster troop withdraw­
als than was later carried out in the Nixon administration's Vietnami­
zation policy. 
This public sentiment was reiterated in the results of two later surveys. 
In September 1970, 55 percent of the American public stated their 
support for Congressional approval of the McGovern-Hatfield Senate 
proposal that would require the U . S  . government to withdraw all U . S  . 
troops by the end of 1971. Only 36 percent expressed opposition, and 
9 percent had no opinion. In a subsequent poll taken in January 1971, 
73 percent favored the above Senate proposal (AIPO, 30 January 1971). 
Our analysis so far has shown that increased objective costs increase 
the dissatisfaction of the masses in the policy chosen by the elites. 
W  e m a  y further hypothesize that those increased objective costs also 
increase the dissatisfaction of the mass public with the political elites 
w h o choose the policy. The empirical evidence also supports this hy­
pothesis. During the 1965-67 period of escalation in the Vietnam W a r  , 
the percentage of the American public that disapproved of President 
Johnson's handling both of the situation in Vietnam and of his job 
as president was highly correlated with the monthly number of Ameri­
can casualties in Vietnam (the correlation coefficient is .79 for both 
questions). 
The expected continuation of costs implicit in the policy of Vietna­
mization contributed to some decline in political support for President 
Nixon and his policy. This long-term policy of gradual transfer of com­
bat responsibility from U . S  . to South Vietnamese ground forces in a 
continuing stalemated war drew a negative response from those Ameri­
cans favoring a more immediate end to the war. The February 1971 
invasion of Laos by South Vietnamese forces supported by American 
air power, for example, was seen as lengthening the Vietnam W a  r 
(and continuing the costs) by more than twice as m a n y Americans 
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(40%) than as w h o viewed it as shortening the war (19%) (AIPO, 27 
February 1971). 
This expectation of a lengthened war was followed by some decline 
in President Nixon's popular approval. In a Gallup Poll taken 19-21 
February 1971 the percentage of people w h o approved of the way 
President Nixon was handling his job as president was 5 percent lower 
(51%) than it had been the previous month (56% on 9-10 January), 
before the Laos invasion began (AIPO, 3 March 1971). The same 
poll indicated that 69 percent of the people felt that the Nixon adminis­
tration was not being truthful in telling the American people the facts 
about the Vietnam W a  r (AIPO, 6 March 1971). It further indicated 
that 18 percent more Americans disapproved of Nixon's handling of 
the war in February 1971 than did so in August 1970. 
From September 1969 to February 1971 the public's ratings of Presi­
dent Nixon became less positive both in terms of his overall popularity 
and the public's intensity of feeling. In that time his overall popularity, 
measured in terms of approval of the w a y in which he handled his 
job, dropped from 61 to 51 percent. The percentage of people saying 
they "strongly approved" of the president dropped from 23 to 14 per­
cent, whereas those w h  o strongly disapproved increased from 8 to 
16 percent (AIPO, 3 March 1971). Finally, the percentage of Americans 
w h  o agreed with the statement, 'In view of the developments since 
w e entered in Vietnam, do you think the U . S . made a mistake sending 
troops to Vietnam?", rose from 52 percent in March 1969 to 61 percent 
in M a  y 1971 (AIPO, July 1971).9 
The Nixon administration thus appeared to be caught in a similar 
political dilemma as faced by the Johnson administration. In continuing 
the costs of the Vietnam W a r  , even with diminished U . S  . ground in­
volvement and fewer American casualties, the Nixon administration 
lost some political support from an increasingly dissatisfied American 
people. 
In Vietnam, too, there is evidence that the masses of people became 
more dissatisfied with the war policies of the ruling elites as the objec­
tive costs of pursuing those policies increased. As the terrible costs 
of war in Vietnam rose, the elites lost mass support. In the pre-Tet 
period, for example, defections from the Viet Cong are significantly 
correlated with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attrition (r = .54), 
and in the post-Tet period, defections from the Communists are highly 
correlated with South Vietnamese military ground operations (r = 
.86). Vietnamese peasants, including those w h o support the Viet Cong, 
have shown themselves to be committed primarily to their o w n safety 
and the protection of their loved ones. W h e  n caught in a South Vietna­
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mese military operation where the Viet Cong cannot protect them, they 
defect to save their o w  n lives. 
In South Vietnam in the post-Tet period, as American troops with­
drew and the war continued, there was less popular political support 
given the South Vietnamese government, as indicated by the measure 
of popular confidence given in chapter 2. (The correlation between 
the number of U . S . troops and popular confidence in South Vietnam 
is .90.) Without U . S . military support the war became more costly 
to the South Vietnamese, w h  o had to assume greater combat and casual­
ties and w h o were less well protected. 
In summary, the general theoretical analysis presented in this chapter 
is that ruling elites and mass publics have different subjective values 
regarding the trade-offs between the net expected costs and benefits 
of waging war. The implications of this assumption explain the observed 
objective trade-off in the ability of political elites both to extend their 
power over others and to retain the political support of their o w n 
people. In Vietnam the mass of people w h  o were most vulnerable 
to physical danger placed more value on their o w n safety and less 
value on the outcome of the military and political struggle between 
the Communists and anti-Communists than did the elites w h o chose 
the war policies. 
In the United States, too, the mass public felt more than did the 
elite U . S  . policy-makers that the costs of the Vietnam W a  r outweighed 
the expected benefits of the stated objectives of the war. The U . S . 
public and the U . S . policy-makers had different preference systems 
regarding the trade-offs between the lives of American soldiers and 
tens of billions of additional tax dollars on the one hand and the ex­
pected benefits of keeping South Vietnam within the American sphere 
of influence and retaining the credibility of American political commit­
ments on the other hand. 
Mass dissatisfaction has grown in the United States as the American 
people have begun to experience and realize the growing indirect costs 
as well as the direct objective costs not only of the Vietnam W a  r 
but of excessively high military expenditures in general. M a n p o w e r  , 
resources, and skills have been diverted from activities that enhance 
production and general welfare in the United States into generally 
nonproductive military and war expenditures. The consequences—es­
pecially for members of the lower social strata—have included inad­
equate housing, medical care, education, mass transportation, and gen­
eral social services, as well as unemployment, underemployment, and 
decaying and polluted environments. The resultant lack of opportunity, 
crowding, and sense of frustration—combined with a sense of power­
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lessness regarding either the war policy or the allocation of resources-
have contributed to alienation and asocial behavior. Domestic violence 
has increased, and the use of hard drugs as an escape has grown 
to epidemic proportions. These have not only weakened the social 
fabric of the country by leading to a breakdown of family life and 
further asocialization of the young, but have led also to alarmingly 
rapid increases in crime rates against both persons and property, par­
ticularly in the cities where the lack of resources has been most severely 
felt. High crime rates have contributed to a growing fear and further 
alienation of people from each other.10 Moreover, the response of polit­
ical elites to this personal fear has been a call for "law and order." 
This sentiment, combined with the vast purchase of private arms, has 
produced the beginnings of a militarization of the domestic society. 
Thus, conducted in tfre cause of "national security" and strength, the 
Vietnam W a  r and the excessive military spending that has accompanied 
it have instead contributed to a weakening of American society inter­
nally and to what truly can be called national insecurity. 
T h  e Vietnam W a  r has also contributed directly to the weakening 
of the international economic position of the United States. Deficit 
financing and the resource and production requirements of the war 
initially placed an excessive d e m a n d on the U . S . economy. A steep 
rise in inflation and an extremely unfavorable balance of payments fol­
lowed, partly because of the inability of American-manufactured goods 
with their inflated prices to compete with foreign products. Thus, the 
international economic position of the United States has weakened 
with regard to its industrial competitors in the world—particularly Japan 
and West Germany—as a direct consequence of the U . S . involvement 
in the Vietnam W a r  . Moreover, the moral prestige of the United States 
has fallen throughout the world because of the devastating U . S  . policy 
in Vietnam. 
Thus, there is an appropriateness and rationality in the dissatisfaction 
of the mass public with both the policy-makers and the policy that 
have involved the United States in the Vietnam W a r  , for that involve­
ment has weakened the United States in political, economic, social, 
and moral ways, both domestically and internationally. This is the great­
est paradox of the Vietnam W a r  . 
1. The term elite in this chapter refers to the political, military, and bureaucratic 
leaders w h  o formulated and executed policy in Vietnam, and to those corporate 
and financial owners and executives whose interests were served by that policy. 
It does not refer simply to the above-average, e.g., to those in the U . S  . population 
with incomes over $12,000 or w h  o have a college education. 
Tke Paradox of Waging War to Achieve Power 169 
2 . The functional curve is assumed to be convex to reflect the assumption 
that domestic political support falls faster the more that national energies and 
resources are allocated to the achievement of international objectives. 
3. Indifference curves between positively valued goods are assumed to be 
convex to the origin. Because the net expected costs in figure 40 and in the 
other figures in this chapter can be considered negatively valued goods, w  e have 
shifted the origin of the horizontal axis from the righthand to the lefthand side 
of the figures. 
4 . Indifference curve analysis is explained in detail in Paul A  . Samuelson, 
Economics: An Introductory Analysis, pp. 429-34; and in Lloyd G  . Reynolds, Eco­
nomics: A General Introduction, pp. 329-39. 
5. This objective function is similar to the price line or consumption-possibility 
line in economics. 
6. W  e can state this exploitation in terms of net expected benefits forgone 
by the masses, rather than additional costs they are forced to pay. O  n the same 
mass indifference curve  M 2 on which Y lies, w  e can find another trade-off point 
Y *  * at which the net expected costs, Cr**, are equal to those at the trade-off 
point X  , i.e., Cx. The masses would be indifferent in choosing among the trade-off 
points Y  , Y *  , and Y * *  . However, the net expected benefit Br** that the masses 
would want in exchange for net expected costs as high as Cr** (or Cx) is greater 
than the smaller net expected benefit Bx, which is the amount they get because of the 
elites' choice of the trade-off point X  . Th  e difference (By** — Bx) is the amount of 
net expected benefit desired but forgone by the masses because of the elites' choice 
of X . 
W  e can combine these two different ways of thinking about exploitation by 
noting that the ratio of additional net expected benefits forgone to the additional 
net expected costs borne by the masses at the trade-off point X  , i.e. [(Br** — 
Bx)/(Cx — CY*)], is the slope of the mass indifference curve M  i where it is inter­
sected by the objective price line OP at point X  . This slope is the same as that of the 
line AB tangent to M  i at X  . Comparing the slopes of AB and OP, w  e can see that 
the masses are forced by the elites' choice of the trade-off point X to exchange net 
expected costs for net expected benefits at a greater rate than they would prefer. 
The ratio of the slope of AB to the slope of OP is both the ratio of the 
marginal net expected benefits desired by the masses to those that can actually 
be expected to be forthcoming for a given marginal net expected cost and the 
ratio of the marginal net expected costs that must actually be borne by the masses 
to the marginal net expected costs that the masses would be willing to pay for a 
given marginal net expected benefit. 
7. I.e., as the angle BXP in figure 45 widens. 
8. Controlling for the linear trend over time, the partial correlation between 
U . S  . troops killed in the previous month and agreement with this statement is 
.50. 
9. The percentage of Americans w h o agreed with this statement had been 
as low as 24 percent in August 1965. 
10. In a national survey in December 1972, the Gallup Poll found that in 
a randomly selected sample of the population 18 years of age and older, 21 
percent had been victims of one or more crimes surveyed during the previous 
12 months. Seven percent had had their homes broken into or an attempt m a d e 
to do so; 2 percent had been mugged or assaulted; 8 percent had money or 
property stolen from their person or from some other m e m b e r of their household; 
8 percent had had their home , car, or other personal property vandalized; and 
2 percent had had their car or the car owned by a m e m b e r of their household 
stolen. The incidence of crime in the inner city is 33 percent—far higher than 
in the suburbs (19 percent) and smaller communities or rural areas (13 percent). 
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Moreover, the high incidence of crime has made people fearful: 49 percent 
of the national population are afraid to walk alone at night in their neighborhoods 
(an increase from 31 percent in 1968); 61 percent of w o m e  n are afraid to go 
out alone in their neighborhoods at night; and 17 percent of the people do 
not even feel safe and secure in their o w n homes at night (George Gallup, " O n e 
in Three Is City Crime Victim," Washington Post, 14 January 1973). 
10

United States Policy in Vietnam: 
Calculated or Miscalculated? 
Successful action in international relations requires an accurate under­
standing of past and present events and an ability to predict realistically 
future events. In foreign policy-making, where experimentation can 
be especially costly and perilous, reasonably accurate prediction of 
the consequences of alternative policies is particularly desirable. This 
research has focused on the specification and testing of models that 
represent the interrelationships between policy choices and their mili­
tary and political consequences in the Vietnam W a r  . These models 
include those based on social and behavioral theories and observed 
empirical relationships as well as the "folk theories," or assumptions 
and hypotheses, of principal policy-makers. T h  e former, interrelating 
key variables, permitted, through computer simulation, more reliable 
and systematic prediction than the latter. These models facilitated an 
analysis of military and political behavior and consequences in the 
war under actual and assumed alternative policies. 
The importance of valid and reliable models can be appreciated 
w h e n contrasted with negative examples. In chapter 4 it was d e m o n ­
strated that m a n y of the crucial assumptions upon which U . S . policy 
and actions in Vietnam were based were empirically invalid. Military 
escalation to achieve military victory and to retain political control 
in South Vietnam resulted instead in counterescalation by the C o m m u  ­
nists, and the war was stalemated at higher levels of violence and 
h u m a n and material costs. T h e escalated and stalemated war that took 
the lives of tens of thousands of American m e n and tens of billions 
of American dollars was repudiated by the American people. Policy-
makers seemed to believe that by their unilateral decisions and actions 
they could control military and political outcomes and achieve their 
policy objectives; they appeared to ignore the interdependence of deci­
sions m a d e and actions taken by both sides in the war. 
H a  d principal policy-makers consciously explicated their o w  n as­
sumptions and hypotheses about actions and outcomes in the war, 
tested them systematically against the available facts, and modified 
their objectives and actions accordingly, they would have enhanced 
their ability both to predict the consequences of their actions and per­
haps to formulate and implement less costly policies. 
As cited in chapter 4, there is ample documentary evidence from 
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the "Pentagon Papers" that m a n  y important agencies and advisers in 
the U . S  . government repeatedly analyzed Vietnam policy alternatives 
and their expected effects at the time that policy was being formulated, 
demonstrated to the principal U . S  . policy-makers the invalidity of cru­
cial policy assumptions, and argued against policy and actions based 
upon those invalid assumptions. Yet, policies were m a d e and actions 
taken by the U . S . government that were based on these invalid assump­
tions and the predictions derived from them. 
A major question then arises: W h  y were the invalid assumptions 
acted upon as though they were true w h e n there were arguments, 
evidence, and analysis presented to the principal policy-makers at the 
time to demonstrate that they were in fact not true? T w  o different 
answers to this question will be discussed in this chapter, and they 
have vastly different implications about the nature of the making of 
foreign policy in the United States. T h efirst characterizes U . S . policy 
in Vietnam as having been directed through miscalculation, inadver­
tence, ignorance, and misjudgment; i.e., the principal U . S  . policy-makers 
honestly disagreed with the consequences accurately predicted by some 
of their advisers and decided instead to follow their o w  n judgments. 
T h  e second characterizes U . S  . policy in Vietnam as having been calcu­
lated and carefully orchestrated by policy-makers w h o were cognizant 
of the probable consequences of their policies, but decided to risk 
those consequences rather than those they predicted would result from 
alternative policies. 
T h e question of whether U . S . policy in Vietnam was a result of 
calculation or miscalculation hinges on the accuracy of the various 
forecasts m a d e concerning the consequences that would follow from 
policy choices and actions and the extent to which those forecasts 
were considered by principal policy-makers. W  e have already seen 
that accurate forecasts depend upon valid models. W  e have also seen 
that m a n y of the crucial assumptions and hypotheses held by key policy-
makers were empirically false. W  e shall n o w look at the "miscalculation" 
and "calculation" theses in more detail in order to understand their 
components and implications. 
U.S. VIETNAM POLICY AS MISCALCULATION 
United States policy in Vietnam has been described as the result 
of miscalculation and inadvertence (Schlesinger, 1968, p. 47). This 
interpretation characterizes the U . S  . leadership as having been ignorant 
of the potential consequences of American involvement in Vietnam. 
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From this point of view, U . S . involvement in Vietnam occurred as 
the result of a series of blunders within the entire governmental structure 
and in all American administrations from President T r u m a  n on. 
M a n  y explanations have been offered as to w h  y U . S  . policy in Vietnam 
was one of blunder and miscalculation. First of all, there was a signi­
ficant lack of Vietnam or Indochina expertise a m o n  g U . S  . policy-makers 
(Thomson, 1968). This lack of area expertise permitted the acceptance, 
distortion, and misapplication of historical analogies, including the M u  ­
nich "sellout," (i.e., the failure to challenge small aggressions that would 
"inevitably" result in more serious ones), the containment of the Soviet 
Union, and North Korean aggression. 
Miscalculation occurred through the interplay of various objective 
and subjective factors. Optimistic predictions about the success of var­
ious U . S . policies and actions were based partially on information de­
rived from field reports and intelligence sources that were biased to 
show the positive progress of U . S . efforts. Field reports were often 
biased because the evaluation and promotion offield personnel within 
their o w n military or civilian bureaucracies were to a large extent based 
on their job performance as measured by their o w n progress reports. 
They also knew that their superiors wanted to see "progress." Positive 
evaluations of this already-biased information led to reinforced opti­
mism and self-deception. Thus, General Maxwell Taylor concluded: 
"The intelligence upon which w  e based our judgments or, for that 
matter, the intelligence supporting the government decisions . . . was 
very poor" (Public Broadcasting Service discussion with Martin Agron­
sky, 27 June 1971, quoted in Schlesinger, New York Review of Books 
21 October 1971, p. 32). 
The realities of the military and political situation in Vietnam were 
distant from the principal policy-makers in Washington. Information 
was no doubt selectively passed up the chain of c o m m a n d in the 
military and civilian bureaucracies. At each step the information was 
reassessed and reinterpreted according to a particular bias that com­
bined personal and bureaucratic interests with the national interest, 
protecting and advancing personal and bureaucratic investments in 
particular policies and programs. T h e memoranda written and read 
at the highest levels of the U . S  . government semantically interpreted 
the bullets, bombs, blood, terror, death, and destruction of the war 
in Vietnam as movements in a lofty and romantic symphony (Thomson, 
1968). A  n example of this semantic blurring of reality is a paper drafted 
by Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton on 6 November 1964, 
entitled "Action for South Vietnam": 
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O P T I O  N C  . Progressive squeeze-and-talk. Present policies plus 
an orchestration of communications with Hanoi and a crescendo 
of additional military moves against infiltration targets,first in Laos 
and then in the D R V  , and then against other targets in North Viet­
n a m . The scenario would be designed to give the U . S . the option 
at any point to proceed or not, to escalate or not, and to quicken 
the pace or not. The decision in these regards would be m a d e from 
time to time in view of all relevant factors. ( N Y T  , PP, p. 366) 
T h  e evaluation of current progress, the predictions of the anticipated 
effects of policies and actions, and the advice, warnings, and recommen­
dations the principal policy-makers received were of mixed optimism 
and pessimism. Different advisers and agencies (e.g., the commanding 
generals in thefield and the Central Intelligence Agency) often gave 
contradictory assessments. This raised the problem for the principal 
policy-makers, particularly the president, of deciding whose predictions 
and advice to believe. Given this ambiguity, the president was able 
to draw any conclusion that suited his purposes (Schlesinger, 1971). 
A m o n  g the principal policy-makers, however, certain fundamental 
assumptions were rarely questioned. Those within the inner circle of 
policy-making usually chose to pose questions and alternatives in such 
a w a  y as to remain within the general consensus. Questioning of funda­
mental assumptions usually led to exclusion from the inner circle of 
real influence on policy. Thus, the pressure to retain some influence 
led to a mutual reinforcement of mistaken fundamental assumptions. 
Policy-makers usually dealt with tactical rather than fundamental argu­
ments (Gelb, 1971). 
T h  e self-reinforcing optimism characterizing President Johnson's cir­
cle of closest advisers derived not only from the ambiguity of mixed 
evaluations and advice but also from deeply held beliefs about the 
omnipotence of American power. Principal policy-makers felt that they 
were guaranteed success in solving their difficulties in Vietnam if they 
applied superior American military and technological power. A m e m o  ­
randum from Walt Rostow to Secretary of State Dean Rusk written 
in the fall of 1964 illustrates this faith in American power: 
I k n o w well the anxieties and complications on our side of the line. 
But there m a y be a tendency to underestimate both the anxieties 
and complications on the other side and also to underestimate that 
limited but real margin of influence on the outcome that flows from 
the simple fact that w e are the greatest power in the world—if w e 
behave like it. ( N Y T , PP, p. 256) 
T h e principal policy-makers met difficulties from m a n y sources: fear 
of escalating the war to such an extent that Communist China or the 
 175 U . S  . Policy in Vietnam: Calculated or Miscalculated?
Soviet Union would directly intervene; frustration with the weakness 
of the South Vietnamese government and fear of its defeat by the 
Viet Cong in spite of U . S . commitments; fear of declining U . S . prestige 
should the South Vietnamese government be defeated, of future chal­
lenges to U . S  . influence throughout the world, and of political defeat 
at h o m e should the Communists win in Vietnam. 
Fatigued, anxious, frustrated, not wishing to appear impotent, princi­
pal U . S  . policy-makers repeatedly turned to the use of increasing levels 
of military force, rather than to political or diplomatic solutions (Thom­
son, 1968). In particularly frustrating times, actions were undertaken 
just for the sake of "doing something," or just to encourage the South 
Vietnamese, rather than because they were expected to be effective 
in defeating the Communists. According to the "Pentagon Papers": 
"But in the end, the decision to go ahead with the strikes [against 
North Vietnam] seems to have resulted as m u c  h from the lack of 
alternative proposals as from any compelling logic in their favor" ( N Y T  , 
PP, p. 344). M e  n accustomed to gambling and winning in their respec­
tive climbs to positions of power led themselves to believe that policies 
based on a whole chain of optimistic assumptions about risky outcomes 
would somehow work out to their advantage (Gelb, 1971). 
Optimistic expectations of policies led to their adoption; once adopt­
ed, the policies acquired a bureaucratic m o m e n t u  m of their o w n  . People 
in the military and civilian bureaucracies tended to ask what they 
should do next, rather than whether they should be doing anything 
in Vietnam at all (Gelb, 1971). Means became ends in themselves, 
and concern about the magnitude of U . S  . commitments to South Viet­
n a m was answered by self-fulfilling prophecies of success, as the war 
was escalated to avoid rendering meaningless what had already been 
lost (Thomson, 1968). The marginal cost of each n e w commitment 
was perceived as being less costly than total disengagement. 
The policies actually implemented were the results of numerous com­
promises among competing international and domestic political objec­
tives of the president and among conflicting factions, interests, and 
bureaucracies. International and domestic political goals—assuaging the 
hawks and doves in American politics, avoiding Soviet or Chinese inters 
vention, maintaining an anti-Communist South Vietnam, and avoiding 
defeat by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong—led to the compromise 
of gradual escalation. But that compromise policy itself was flawed 
by its o w n internal contradictions. The North Vietnamese adapted to 
gradual escalation, rather than being broken by it. The South Viet­
namese had the Americans to defend them, and so were less motivated 
to defend themselves. 
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According to the "miscalculation" thesis, then, U . S  . policy in Vietnam 
was a series of miscalculations. Even though some within the govern­
ment had accurately forecast the poor results of policies and actions, 
that knowledge was not adequately taken into account as U . S . policy 
in Vietnam was being m a d e . As a result, according to this view, the 
United States became entrapped more and more deeply in the quagmire 
of the Vietnam W a r . 
T h e "miscalculation" thesis explicates U . S . policy in Vietnam as the 
ultimate product of incorrect albeit conscientiously held assumptions 
and predictions m a d e by principal policy-makers. T h e contradictory 
advice given by other governmental agencies and advisers was not 
followed because the principal policy-makers genuinely had greater 
faith in the reports that supported their initial convictions. These con­
victions led to military, economic, and political commitments that be­
came self-sustaining. As the war progressed, U . S . leaders were faced 
with a choice between admitting failure (and accepting all the negative 
political consequences they believed would accrue from such an ad­
mission) or declaring a self-fulfilling prophecy of success (and under­
taking the concomitant increase in military commitments that such an 
attitude required). T h e latter course was chosen, and each successive 
step seemed to lead inevitably to a network of h u m a n and material costs 
that had to be further justified to domestic and international critics. 
If U . S . policy in Vietnam was indeed the result of a long series 
of miscalculations by each administration since Truman's, there is, at 
least theoretically, a remedy for the future. If principal policy-makers 
become misinformed or over-optimistic about the effectiveness of their 
means or the feasibility of their ends, a detailed government-wide pre­
scription for the future is suggested: collect better information; have 
experts analyze it with better empirical methods; ensure more frank 
communication in governmental organizations, particularly between ad­
vocates of conflicting positions; reveal the limitations of military means 
to accomplish political ends; fully consider h o  w the counteractions 
of opposing parties will affect conditions and events; enforce the pursuit 
of only clearly defined national goals on each bureaucracy; test policy-
makers o w  n models against the facts; develop valid models that allow 
more accurate forecasting of the likely consequences of alternative pol­
icies under consideration; and demonstrate the truth of the situation to 
the national leaders. They should act accordingly, choosing more effec­
tive and less costly policies. 
These remedies are based on the liberal tradition of political thought, 
dating from at least Locke and H u m e  , that assumes that good leaders, 
if they recognize the truth about good means and good ends, will 
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choose them. Thus, from the point of view of the "miscalculation" 
thesis, the barriers to good policy are mainly technical; better organiza­
tion, information collection, and analysis can act to overcome them. 
A major implication of viewing U . S  . policy in Vietnam as a result of 
miscalculation is that the "fault" of U . S  . policy-makers overfive adminis­
trations was simply that of insufficient wisdom and understanding. 
In this view such a fault is forgivable, particularly since expert technical 
knowledge had not yet been sufficiently developed to be applied to 
U . S  . policies and actions in Vietnam (Ellsberg, 1971). Th  e implications 
are very different, however, if U . S  . policy in Vietnam is viewed as the 
result of calculation rather than miscalculation. 
U.S. VIETNAM POLICY AS CALCULATED 
The thesis that U . S  . policy in Vietnam was calculated and informed 
by accurate predictions of the consequences that would follow from 
that policy has been articulated in two forms. Thefirst emphasizes 
the domestic political motivations, and the second the interplay between 
international and domestic political motivations of principal U . S  . policy-
makers. The m a n w h o has most strongly asserted the thesis incorporating 
calculation of Vietnam policy for domestic political reasons is Daniel 
Ellsberg, w h o was also the person w h o released the "Pentagon Papers" 
to the press. 
The major point of this "calculation" thesis is that principal U . S . 
policy-makers since the Truman administration were aware that their 
policies and actions were not and would not be adequate to achieve 
their main policy objective of defeating the Communists in South Viet­
n a m , and that other actions would have to be undertaken subsequently 
(Ellsberg, 1971). 
According to this thesis, the evidence that policy-makers were acutely 
aware of the faults of their o w n actions is that they were presented 
with remarkably accurate forecasts of the likely consequences of the 
policies they considered, and remarkably accurate evaluations of the 
limited effectiveness of the policies and actions they actually took. 
For the Johnson administration, m a n y analyses were done by the intelli­
gence agencies and other analytic groups, and even by members of 
President Johnson's close circle of top policy advisers (in particular 
Undersecretary of State George Ball). These studies showed, for ex­
ample, the futility of bombing North Vietnam in order to defeat the 
Communists in the South, and warned against increasing the commit­
ment of U . S  . ground forces in South Vietnam because it would increase 
the U . S . stake in the outcome of the war. (See, for example, the as­
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sessment on the bombing done by the Institute for Defense Analysis, 
quoted in chapter 4.) 
Th  e second form of the "calculation" thesis, as developed most clearly 
by Leslie Gelb, w h  o also had overall direction of the "Pentagon Papers" 
project in the Department of Defense, emphasizes the interplay between 
the international and domestic political objectives of the principal U . S  . 
policy-makers (Gelb, 1972). If U . S  . policy-makers had accurate fore­
casts and analyses that warned of the impending dangers of U . S . en­
tanglement in Vietnam, of the ineffectiveness of U . S  . efforts, and of 
the necessary future commitments of lives and resources that would 
entangle the U . S  . still further, w h  y did they proceed with increased 
U . S . commitments to Vietnam? T h e answer, according to this second 
form of the "calculation" thesis, is that principal U . S  . policy-makers 
wanted to achieve simultaneously their international and domestic po­
litical objectives. These objectives were to maintain an anti-Communist 
South Vietnam and to retain political power in the United States. The 
dilemma of trying to achieve both at the same time (as analyzed in 
chapter 9) led to the policy of gradual escalation, a policy that, accord­
ing to this view, was the result of planning rather than inadvertance. 
Over the years Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular 
had come to be defined as being of vital strategic importance to the 
United States. A "Statement of Policy" m a d e by the National Security 
Council in early 1952 noted the various economic, political, military, 
and psychological stakes the U . S  . had in Southeast Asia. Excerpts from 
this policy statement include the following: 
2. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia 
would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger 
in the long term, United States security interest. 
a. T h  e loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to communist 
aggression would have critical psychological, political and economic 
consequences. In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, 
the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively 
swift submission to or an alignment with communism by the remain­
ing countries of this group. Furthermore, an alignment with c o m m u  ­
nism of the rest of Southeast Asia and India, and in the longer 
term, of the Middle East (with the probable exceptions of at least 
Pakistan and Turkey) would in all probability progressively follow: 
such widespread alignment would endanger the stability and security 
of Europe. 
b. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would render the 
U . S . position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would 
seriously jeopardize fundamental U . S  . security interests in the Far 
East. 
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c. Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, is the principal 
world source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum 
and other strategically important commodities. Th  e rice exports of 
Burma and Thailand are critically important to Malaya, Ceylon and 
H o n g Kong and are of considerable significance to Japan and India, 
all important areas of free Asia. 
d. The loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia, 
could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as 
to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommoda­
tion to communism. ( N Y T , PP, pp. 27-28) 
Given these general considerations, the stated U . S  . objective for 
Southeast Asia according to the "Statement of Policy" was: "To prevent 
the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit, 
and to assist them to develop will and capability to resist communism 
from within and without and to contribute to the strengthening of 
the free world" ( N Y T , PP, p. 27). 
This statement of policy clearly demonstrates the official view of the 
continuing international interests and objectives of the United States 
in Southeast Asia, and therefore in Indochina and Vietnam: the eco­
nomic advantage of the natural resources and food produced in the 
area; the military advantage of allies and bases on the periphery of 
Communist China; the political advantage of keeping Southeast Asia 
from Communist domination so as to avoid political accommodation 
with the Communists by the remaining Asian countries (particularly 
Japan and India); andfinally, the fear that if Southeast Asia "went 
Communist," not only would the rest of the countries in Asia topple 
like dominoes but so would those in the Middle East and Europe. 
Thus, the prevention of a Communist take-over in South Vietnam 
was a major motivation for the escalation of U . S . commitments in South 
Vietnam, not only for the material resources to be gained there, but 
also for the real psychological advantage to be gained against the 
Communists in the cold war. If the U . S . were successful in defeating 
the Communist challenge in South Vietnam, the credibility of U . S . 
commitments would be enhanced around the world, and the C o m m u  ­
nists would be less likely to mount subversive or aggressive challenges 
to the United States elsewhere in the world. Thus, issues of international 
prestige and power and the deterrence of future conflict motivated 
U . S  .	 policy-makers in Vietnam. 
Former President Johnson stated this motivation in his memoirs: 
. . . Our allies . . . throughout the world would conclude that our 
word was worth little or nothing. . . . [Moscow and Peking] could 
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not resist the opportunity to expand their control into the vacuum 
of power. . . . With M o s c o w and Peking . . . moving forward, 
w e would return to a world role to prevent their full takeover of 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East—after they had committed them­
selves. (Quoted in Gelb, 1972) 
The commitment of the U . S . political, military, and economic elites 
to prevent the spread of communism in Asia had become in official 
rhetoric over the years an ideology of anticommunism that went back 
at least as far as the Russian Revolution; this ideology m a d  e its greatest 
domestic political impression in the wake of the Communist assumption 
of power in mainland China in 1949. The political reaction in the United 
States to this event was so severe—with right-wing McCarthyites ac­
cusing the T r u m a  n administration of treason, with thousands of gov­
ernment officials losing their jobs, and with most of the rest intimidated— 
that, according to the "calculation" thesis, no U . S  . president after Tru­
m a  n dared allow another country to be "lost to C o m m u n i s m  " while 
he was in office. Each president believed that he could expect his 
o w  n and his party's electoral defeat at the hands of an outraged public 
if that should occur. Indeed, no president wished to show any evidence 
of being "soft on C o m m u n i s m " lest that evidence be used against him 
politically (Ellsberg, 1971). 
Thus, according to the "calculation" thesis, each U . S . president felt 
he could not afford politically to lose South Vietnam to the Communists, 
especially after initial commitments to South Vietnam were m a d  e that 
publicly gave America's word that it would help defeat Communist 
subversion and aggression. T h  e presidents feared a loss of political 
power in the United States and a loss of international power for the 
United States relative to the Communists. 
President Johnson wrote in his memoirs: 
I k n o w our people well enough to realize that if w e walked away 
from Vietnam and let Southeast Asia fall, there would follow a divi­
sive and destructive debate in our country. . .  . A divisive debate 
about "who lost Vietnam" would be, in m  y judgment, even more 
destructive to our national life than the argument over China had 
been. . . . (Quoted in Gelb, 1972, p. 461) 
There were, on the other hand, particularly during the Johnson ad­
ministration, countervailing political pressures in favor of decreasing 
U . S . involvement in Vietnam. These pressures came from left-wing 
doves w h  o viewed U . S  . policy in Vietnam as a moral outrage. Ironically, 
it was Secretary M c N a m a r a w h o voiced these concerns late in the 
escalation of the war (19 M a y 1967): 
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The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously 
injuring 1000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny 
backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly 
disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a costly 
distortion in the American national consciousness and in the world 
image of the United States—especially if the damage to North Viet­
n a m is complete enough to be "successful." (New York Times, 4 
July 1971, p. El) 
Another pressure that mitigated against further U . S  . commitments 
in Vietnam was the public's opposition to an unending land war in 
Asia. Further, the fear that the Soviet Union and Communist China 
could be provoked into direct intervention in the Vietnam W a  r led 
U . S  . policy-makers to limit their attacks on North Vietnam and to re­
frain from attacking Soviet or Chinese military supplies en route to 
North Vietnam. 
According to the "calculation" thesis, then, U . S  . policy-makers felt 
they could not "lose" South Vietnam to the Communists; yet they also 
knew that politically feasible policies and actions would not allow 
them to win. They therefore decided to take the m i n i m u m actions 
necessary to maintain the status quo until after the next U . S . presidential 
election (Ellsberg, 1971). That necessary m i n i m u m  , given the interna­
tional and domestic military and political considerations, was the policy 
of gradual escalation of U . S . military commitments and activities in 
Vietnam (Gelb, 1971). 
Thus, making "incremental" decisions over a long period of time, 
U . S . policy-makers attempted to do just enough to balance domestic, 
bureaucratic, and international pressures. Each decision became a small 
experiment to balance those pressures; as n e  w imbalances developed, 
further decisions and actions were m a d e and taken. This behavior is 
characteristic of m a n y decisions on U . S . troop levels and bombing m a d e 
during the escalatory phase of the war under President Johnson and 
during the deescalatory and Vietnamization phase under President 
Nixon. This kind of decision-making suggests that policy-makers were 
acting like those described by stress theory (see chapter 1), i.e., re­
sponding to pressures and tensions w h e  n events and conditions upset 
their equilibria. 
Insofar as the pressures policy-makers perceived were related to their 
domestic and international goals, their decisions and actions did exhibit 
a type of rationality—that of minimizing pressures. However, policy-
makers learned to cope successfully with only some of their pressures; 
the Johnson administration failed to prevent public disaffection with 
its Vietnam policy even though that policy did prevent the Communists 
from taking over South Vietnam during that administration. 
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The "calculation" thesis provides one possible explanation of w h y 
the Johnson administration lost public support for its Vietnam policy: 
the "credibility gap." According to this explanation, U . S  . policy-makers, 
in order to retain their domestic political support, deliberately misled 
the public about the probable success of the various holding actions 
it was implementing to achieve U . S . objectives in Vietnam (Ellsberg, 
1971). For example, President Johnson said in his public speech at 
Johns Hopkins University on 7 April 1965: "In recent months attacks 
on South Vietnam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for 
us to increase our response and to m a k e attacks by air. . . . W e do this 
in order to slow d o w n aggression." H e implied that the bombing would 
at least be effective in slowing d o w n the Communist infiltration and 
attacks. However, his o w n chief assistant for national security, 
McGeorge Bundy, wrote about sustained bombing in a m e m o r a n d u m 
to President Johnson on 7 February 1965: 
W  e cannot assert that a policy of sustained reprisal will succeed 
in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam. It m a  y fail, and 
w  e cannot estimate the odds of success with any accuracy—they 
m a y be somewhere between 25% and 75%. W h a t w e can say is that 
even if it fails, the policy will be worth it. At a m i n i m u  m it will 
d a m p d o w n the charge that w e did not do all that w e could have 
done, and this charge will be important in m a n y countries, including 
our o w n . Beyond that, a reprisal policy—to the extent that it demon­
strates U . S . willingness to employ this n e w norm in counter-insur­
gency—will set a higher price for the future upon all adventures 
of guerrilla warfare, and it should therefore somewhat increase our 
ability to deter such adventures. W  e must recognize, however, that 
that ability will be gravely weakened if there is failure for any 
reason in Vietnam. ( N Y T  , PP, p. 426) 
This private Bundy m e m o r a n d u m shows far less optimism about the 
effectiveness of bombing in slowing d o w n the North Vietnamese than 
did President Johnson's public statement. The optimistic public state­
ments of the principal policy-makers were soon belied by events that 
became obvious to the public. The public gradually came to doubt 
the veracity of the statements m a d e by policy-makers; this loss of faith 
became k n o w n as the "credibility gap." According to the "calculation" 
thesis, the policy-makers k n e w ahead of time that their actions would 
be ineffective in defeating the Communists in Vietnam; they were in­
tended instead to cope with and to balance domestic and international 
political pressures. The Bundy m e m o r a n d u m , for example, does indicate 
that the sustained bombing of the North was calculated to cope with 
domestic political pressures from the military and civilian hawks w h o 
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called upon the administration to do more in Vietnam, and with interna­
tional political pressures concerning the need to demonstrate U . S  . deter­
mination not to let Communist insurgencies go unchecked. 
The "calculation" thesis views the principal policy-makers' decisions 
to escalate U . S . commitments and actions in Vietnam as leading to 
ill-founded optimism (Ellsberg, 1971). T h  e "miscalculation" thesis, on 
the other hand, maintains that initial optimistic expectations for success 
led to the adoption of the actions taken (Schlesinger, 1971). T h  e policy-
makers themselves m a  y well have become optimistic through self-decep­
tion based on the psychological principal of cognitive consistency. 
Lower-ranking members of the military and civilian bureaucracies could 
have become optimistic because they were uninformed about the vari­
ety of domestic and international pressures and interests the principal 
policy-makers were trying to balance; they were subject also to the 
process of cognitive consistency w h e  n their o w  n jobs, career functions, 
and interests were concerned. T h e public was persuaded to be opti­
mistic, until events belied official optimism. 
If the "calculation" thesis is correct, it would be naive to believe 
that policy-makers would have acknowledged their error and stopped 
the war if only they had been informed of the inadequacy of their 
policies. Rather, they would have used whatever means they had to 
achieve their goals, because the stakes of international and domestic 
power were so high. This is true for policyr-makers on both sides of 
the war. United States leaders would only most reluctantly give up 
their goals of retaining the U . S  . sphere of influence over Southeast 
Asia and its resources, of strengthening the credibility of U . S . com­
mitments elsewhere, or of keeping political power in the United States. 
It is equally unlikely that North Vietnamese and Viet C o n g leaders 
would give up their goal of political power in all of Vietnam. 
Thus, if the "calculation" thesis is correct, the policy that led to 
such bloody consequences in Vietnam could not have been remedied 
by better information and analysis. T h  e only information and analysis 
that would have been used by the policy-makers is that which indicated 
h o w they might achieve their interests more efficiently and effectively. 
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM

AS BOTH CALCULATED AND MISCALCULATED

In reviewing the assertions of both the "calculation" and "miscalcula­
tion" theses of U . S . policy in Vietnam, one can extract and synthesize 
those aspects that appear to be commonly valid in both. Only theoreti­
cal analysis is possible because, at this writing (early 1973), the com­
plete empirical truth about U . S . policy-making in Vietnam cannot be 
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k n o w n . T h e presidential papers from the Johnson and Nixon adminis­
trations, in particular, are still not publicly available. 
T h  e "miscalculation" thesis suggests m a n  y plausible reasons w h  y U . S  . 
policy-makers chose to escalate their use of force in Vietnam: misinfor­
mation; a poor understanding of the interactive dynamics of the war; 
bad models and analysis; bureaucracies seeking their o w n interests; 
and anxieties, frustrations, and over-optimism. The "miscalculation" the­
sis asserts the proposition that U . S  . policy-makers escalated military 
commitments in the war because less force was found ineffective and 
because they did not realize that marginal increments of force would 
also be ineffective. 
This thesis does not, however, explain the motive forces behind the 
escalating use of force; it offers no insight into the original objectives 
for which force was initially employed. The "calculation" thesis provides 
an explanation of those objectives: to prevent the fall of South Vietnam 
to the Communists and the consequences presumed to be entailed in 
that fall—a decline in the international credibility and influence of the 
United States, the loss of international power relative to the C o m m u  ­
nists, and the loss of political power in the United States. 
T h  e incremental decision-making of U . S  . policy-makers characterized 
by the "miscalculation" thesis is a kind of calculation over time, even 
though it was not a comprehensive and simultaneous calculation of 
costs, benefits, and probabilities of all possible alternatives. According 
to the "calculation" thesis, the policy-makers did have a goal for their 
incremental force commitments, i.e., to balance various international 
and domestic political pressures. 
In chapter 4, w e saw that the principal U . S . policy-makers were 
wrong in several of their assumptions: that U . S . bombing of North 
Vietnam and commitment of combat troops in South Vietnam would 
defeat the Communists, strengthen popular confidence in the South 
Vietnamese government, and win the support of the American public. 
But they apparently thought they could begin to m o v  e in the direction 
of achieving these goals and reduce, at least temporarily, the interna­
tional and domestic pressures they sought to balance. 
T h e "calculation" and "miscalculation" theses can be further synthe­
sized. In defining the focus of U . S  . policy-makers' goals as maintaining 
both their political power in the United States and U . S  . influence in 
the world, the "calculation" thesis overlooks the fact that the policy-
makers did miscalculate the effects of U . S . military commitments in 
Vietnam on the achievement of these goals. In general, U . S  . military 
commitments in Vietnam had the opposite of the desired effect. Because 
of the war, for example, President Johnson lost the public support on 
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which his political power was based. T h e military stalemate in Vietnam 
had a divisive political effect in the United States, producing great 
public resistance to any similar interventions by the United States in 
the future. T h e war had a very great inflationary effect on the U . S . 
economy and weakened its world trade and monetary positions. Ameri­
can influence and the credibility of U . S . commitments throughout the 
world declined. A n d these effects of the Vietnam W a  r have probably 
encouraged rather than deterred future challenges to U . S . hegemony 
in the world. After Vietnam, the United States seems less omnipotent. 
It is therefore the conclusion of this analysis that the making of 
U . S . Vietnam policy was in part calculated and in part miscalculated. 
The "calculation" thesis is correct in identifying some of the major 
domestic and international political motivations of the principal U . S  . 
policy-makers. Thus, actions were taken with the hope of simultaneously 
satisfying different domestic and international political objectives de­
spite forecasts warning that these actions might not be adequate to 
defeat the Communists in Vietnam. T h e "miscalculation" thesis is correct 
in its analysis of the policy-makers' failure to choose effective means 
to achieve those different objectives, particularly that of defeating the 
Communists in Vietnam. 
11

Afterword: 
The 1973 Cease-Fire Agreement 
Th e cease-fire in Vietnam and the withdrawal of U . S  . troops from that 
country is a long-hoped-for achievement. However fragile and incom­
plete, the cease-fire was m a d e possible only because of a constellation 
of international and domestic U . S  . political and economic conditions. 
Until the diplomatic record becomes fully available, w e can only trace 
the outlines of what brought about the cease-fire, what its terms are 
and what they imply, the degree of compliance with those terms, what 
the consequences of the cease-fire are likely to be, and what the future 
possibilities for real peace in Vietnam might be. 
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

CONTRIBUTING TO THE CEASE-FIRE

A m o n  g the factors that contributed to the cease-fire were the enor­
mous accumulated political and economic costs of the war to the United 
States. Political division in this country over the issue of the Vietnam 
W a r and U . S . policy in Vietnam was as great as any since the Civil W a r 
and needed to be healed. The domestic U . S . economy and international 
economic position of the United States had been weakened by the war 
and needed to be strengthened. 
Internationally, the bipolar system of a Communist bloc versus an 
anti-Communist bloc had changed. The Sino-Soviet split deepened into 
mutual hostility between these two Communist giants. President Nixon 
and his administration began a significant rapprochement with the Peo­
ple's Republic of China, and moved away from cold war confrontation 
with the Soviet Union by negotiating important agreements in the con­
trol of strategic weapons and on economic issues. The Ostpolitik of 
the West Germans moved Western European-Soviet detente ahead. 
Meanwhile, conflicting economic interests strained relations between 
the United States and the Japanese and the United States and the 
Western Europeans. 
Thus, the global system had changed from the post-World W a  r II 
confrontation of the two mutually hostile blocs of Communists and 
anti-Communists to a multipolar system of crosscutting interests among 
the major powers. 
T h e leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's 
Republic of China n o  w recognize that their larger self-interests and 
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mutual interests are far more important than the distribution of power 
among the Vietnamese, or among the Indo-Chinese in general. United 
States leaders wanted to cut the domestic and international political 
and economic costs of direct U . S  . military involvement in Vietnam. 
Chinese leaders wanted to be on better terms with the United States 
as problems with the Soviet Union grew more serious. Soviet leaders 
wanted more cooperation with the United States, both because of prob­
lems with China—e.g., Chinese claims on Soviet territory in Asia—and 
because the Soviet Union wants American grain and technology to feed 
itself and to develop its o w n economy. 
Thus, the leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the 
People's Republic of China all had good self-interested reasons to in­
fluence the contending Vietnamese parties to agree to a cease-fire so 
that the United States could get its troops out of Vietnam and its 
prisoners of war returned, and the Vietnamese could start working 
out their o w  n accommodation with each other. 
TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN VIETNAM 
The "Agreement on Ending the W a  r and Restoring Peace in Viet­
nam"1 was initialed in Paris on 23 January 1973 by the principals w h o 
worked out the Agreement, Dr. Henry Kissinger on behalf of the United 
States and Special Adviser Le D u e Tho on behalf of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam. The Agreement was signed in Paris on 27 January 
1973 by Secretary of State William P. Rogers for the United States, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Nguyen D u y Trinh for the government 
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Tran Van L a  m for the government of the Republic of Vietnam, and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Nguyen Thi Binh for the Provisional Revo­
lutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The agree­
ment was acknowledged and supported by the participants in the In­
ternational Conference on Vietnam on 2 March 1973 by the above 
four parties plus the foreign ministers of France, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Poland, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Canada, and the Peo­
ple's Republic of China. The secretary general of the United Nations 
also attended the conference. 
The Agreement includes four protocols specifying the means by which 
the Agreement should be implemented. These focus on the return of 
prisoners of war, the International Commission of Control and Super­
vision (the ICCS) , the Joint Military Commissions, and the deactivation 
and removal of mines in North Vietnam. 
The provisions of the Agreement are contained in nine chapters. 
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T h  efirst chapter affirms the Vietnamese national rights of independence, 
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, as well as the 1954 Geneva 
Agreements on Vietnam, which established two zones divided by a mil­
itary demarcation line. 
T h  e second chapter calls for a cease-fire in place in Soufli Vietnam 
and the withdrawal of American and all other foreign combat forces 
from the country, a prohibition against introduction of additional forces, 
and a prohibition against the introduction of n e w military equipment 
except as replacement on a one-to-one basis of existing military equip­
ment that might be used up. 
T h  e third chapter specifies the internationally supervised release of 
all military prisoners and foreign civilians, and civilian prisoners within 
South Vietnam. 
Chapter four is concerned with the self-determination rights of the 
South Vietnamese people. It calls for free elections to be decided by the 
two South Vietnamese parties, organized by a National Council for N a ­
tional Reconciliation and Concord. It also calls for a reduction of the 
armed forces of both South Vietnamese parties. 
The fifth chapter of the Agreement repeats the existence of the pro­
visional demarcation line along the Seventeenth Parallel, as stated in 
the 1954 Geneva accords, restricts military movement through the D e ­
militarized Zone, and leaves the reunification of the country up to future 
negotiation between the leaders of North and South Vietnam. 
T h  e sixth chapter specifies the international organizations that are 
to recognize or supervise the cease-fire. These include the Four-Party 
Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Military C o m m i s ­
sion. These have the task of ensuring joint action by the parties to the 
conflict to implement the provisions of the cease-fire. T h e Agreement 
established the International Commission of Control and Supervision 
(consisting of Canada, Indonesia, Hungary, and Poland), including 
1,160 members to supervise the implementation of the Agreement's 
provisions. Th  e International Conference, consisting of the participants 
in the war, the participants in the I C C S , the remaining permanent 
members of the Security Council of the United Nations, and the secre­
tary general of the United Nations, is also established to contribute 
to and guarantee peace in Indochina. 
Chapter seven is concerned with Cambodia and Laos. It affirms the 
national rights of these two countries as specified in the 1954 Geneva 
Agreement on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos. 
It prohibits the use of Laos and Cambodia for military and any other 
operations against any of the signatories of the Paris Agreement or 
against any other country. It also requires that foreign troops be with­
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drawn from the two countries, including North Vietnamese troops. It 
also notes that the internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled 
by the people of these two countries without foreign interference. 
The eighth chapter announces the intent of the governments of the 
United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to normalize 
their relations with each other, and for the United States to aid in the 
postwar reconstruction of North Vietnam as well as reconstruction 
throughout Indochina. 
The ninth chapter puts the Agreement into legal force with the signa­
tures of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. 
DISCUSSION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT 
The provisions of the cease-fire agreement have brought about the 
withdrawal of U . S . combat forces from Vietnam, a reduction in the 
fighting, the return of prisoners of war, and have prevented the impo­
sition of a Communist-dominated government in South Vietnam. These 
significant results have achieved some of the most important objectives 
of the Nixon administration's Vietnam policy, and were the prerequisites 
for an "honorable" settlement from the point of view of the United 
States government. 
The provisions of the cease-fire, however, still leave unresolved some 
of the most central issues of the entire Vietnam conflict. These include 
the questions of whether Vietnam is one or two countries and the cor­
ollary question of whether North Vietnamese forces have a right to 
intervene in the South; whether the government of the Republic of 
Vietnam is the sole legitimate sovereign power in all of South Vietnam; 
and the related question of whether the Provisional Revolutionary Gov­
ernment (the Viet Cong) has a legitimate political role in South Viet­
n a m . 
Article 15 of chapter five of the Agreement states: "Pending Reuni­
fication: (a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at 
the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial 
boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration 
of the 1954 Geneva Conference." The same article states: "The reunifi­
cation of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful 
means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and 
South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and 
without foreign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed 
upon by North and South Vietnam." 
Thus, the agreement recognizes the existence of South as well as 
North Vietnam, but also the fact that their separateness is provisional 
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and depends on negotiations and agreement on reunification among the 
North and South Vietnamese sometime in the future. Furthermore, 
article 15 of chapter five clearly denies either North or South Vietnam 
the right to use military force against the other to achieve reunification. 
Thus, the Agreement leaves Vietnam with a dual status: it is recognized 
as being one country in principle, but there are in fact two zones n o w 
and until such time as the North and South Vietnamese agree to reunite. 
Th  e militarily, and thus politically, significant question of the 145,000 
North Vietnamese troops estimated to be in South Vietnam at the time 
of the cease-fire is also left to the Vietnamese to settle among themselves. 
Article 13 of chapter four states: "The question of Vietnamese armed 
forces in Sourth Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese 
parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and 
mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the 
postwar situation." T h  e presence of the North Vietnamese troops in 
South Vietnam obviously adds to the military power of the Communists 
in South Vietnam, and therefore to their viability as a political power. 
Throughout the Agreement, "the two South Vietnamese parties" are 
referred to in both political and military contexts. Although neither 
is designated until the signature pages of the Agreement, the Agreement 
clearly recognizes the two contending South Vietnamese political and 
military forces. Indeed, chapter four of the Agreement seems to legiti­
mate both parties by referring to their future behavior. Article 10 states: 
"The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect the cease-
fire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle all matters of contention 
through negotiations, and avoid all armed conflict." Article 12 states: 
"Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties 
shall hold consultations in a spirit of national reconciliation and con­
cord, mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination to set up a National 
Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal seg­
ments." It further states: "The National Council of National Reconcil­
iation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Viet­
namese parties' implementation of this Agreement, achievement of na­
tional reconciliation and concord and ensurance of democratic liberties." 
T h  e Provisional Revolutionary Government is thus given a legitimate 
political role in the post-cease-fire period in South Vietnam. That role is 
central to the "South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination," 
the right explicitly recognized in article 9 of chapter four of the Agree­
ment. Thus, a central theme of the Agreement is that the political reso­
lution of the Vietnamese conflict is to be left to the Vietnamese to work 
out among themselves. 
Notwithstanding the language of the Agreement, in the months im­
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mediately following the cease-fire the government of the Republic of 
Vietnam has behaved as though it were the only legitimate political 
authority in South Vietnam, and has sought to deny the legitimacy 
of the representatives of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, 
e.g., in isolating the P R  G representatives in the Four-Party Joint Mili­
tary Commission from other people in Saigon. Moreover, in his very 
announcement of the cease-fire agreement, President Nixon declared: 
"The United States will continue to recognize the Government of the 
Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate government of South Viet­
nam." 2 Thus, the central question of whether the Viet Cong has a legit­
imate political role and power in South Vietnam—one of the key issues 
contributing to the entire Vietnam War—in fact remained an unresolved 
issue after the signing of the Agreement. 
DEGREE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE 
AND STATUS OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT 
Immediately after the initialing of the cease-fire agreement on 23 
January 1973, but before the Agreement was formally signed and given 
legal status on 27 January 1973, each side in South Vietnam sought 
to bolster its military and political control over the South Vietnamese 
people, and to avoid losing whatever control it had. Each side sought 
to raise its flag and assert its control, however nominal, over as m a n y 
people, hamlets, villages, towns, and cities as possible. Military activity 
increased before and during this "land grab" period. 
Prior to the cease-fire, South Vietnamese President Thieu declared 
a state of martial law, and authorized his police and armed forces 
commanders to shoot people w h o incited riots, "applauded the C o m ­
munists," or used or distributed currency issued by the Communists. 
The martial law also authorized commanders to arrest summarily any­
one w h o distributed Communist propaganda, flew a Communist flag, 
interfered with government officials attempting to maintain order, urged 
people to m o v  e to Communist-controlled areas, or engaged in neutralist 
or pro-Communist political activities.3 The Viet C o n g similarly used 
coercion to bolster their political control in South Vietnam immediately 
before and after the Agreement. 
Indeed, the cease-fire agreement did not achieve a real cease-fire. 
Fighting within Vietnam continued, although at a lower level. General­
ly, fewer and smaller military units fought for shorter periods of time. 
However, in thefirst three months following the signing of the Agree­
ment, the respective statements by the two delegations to the T w o  ­
Party Joint Military Commission cited some 12,000 violations of the 
cease-fire, with the resultant deaths of some 25,000 soldiers and civil­
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ians.4 These events are clear evidence that the Agreement did not 
achieve its objective of "national reconciliation and concord," at least 
in the short run. 
Both sides expected and prepared for continued fighting after the 
Agreement. The United States gave the South Vietnamese government 
billions of dollars worth of military equipment and bases either i m m e  ­
diately before the cease-fire or during the sixty-day period following 
the signing, w h e n U . S . military forces withdrew from Vietnam. The 
South Vietnamese government was left so m u c h equipment by the 
United States that it had to hire thousands of civilian technicians, in­
cluding American civilians, to maintain it. 
O  n their side, the North Vietnamese reequipped and resupplied their 
troops in the South with considerable military power. Thus, following 
the Agreement, both sides prepared themselves militarily for renewed 
hostilities. In m a n y cases, these very preparations precipitated preemp­
tive violence that violated the cease-fire. 
The significant achievements of the cease-fire agreement were the 
withdrawal of U . S  . and allied foreign military forces from Vietnam, 
the halt in the bombing of North Vietnam, and the return of the pris­
oners of war. Moreover, the South Vietnamese government was not re­
moved by force of arms; indeed, it has been given the military means to 
defend itself while it engages in the continuing political struggle with 
the Communists. 
The Agreement did not formally settle the conflicts in Laos and C a m ­
bodia, which, although spillovers from the Vietnam W a r  , took on a 
character and dynamic of their o w n  . In Laos, soon after the signing 
of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement, the Communist Pathet Lao and 
the Royal Laotian Government did reach a basis for their o w n agree­
ment and resolution of their conflict. After this agreement, only a very 
small amount offighting occurred in Laos; and Communists and non-
Communists appeared willing to stay within the geographical areas 
each controls, without attacking areas the other side controls. 
The Cambodians fared worse. Although a de facto cease-fire had 
been hoped for there, the Communist forces in Cambodia were under 
the c o m m a n d of different political factions. From 1970 to 1973, the 
indigenous forces (both Communist and non-Communist) had grown 
to be a formidable military power, especially w h e n backed by the North 
Vietnamese army forces. 
The military forces of the Cambodian government, headed by Lon 
Nol, showed themselves to be quite weak; and by M a y of 1973, these 
forces required American bombing of the Communist forces attacking 
them to stave off defeat, the siege of the capital city P h n o m Penh, 
and the fall of the Lon Nol government. 
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The original target of American bombing within Cambodia was the 
North Vietnamese troops w h o supported the war in South Vietnam. 
According to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report, h o w ­
ever, by April 1973 the mission of the U . S . bombing and strafing within 
Cambodia had shifted from interdiction of North Vietnamese troops 
to support for the military forces of the government headed by L o n 
Nol. In thefirst two weeks of April, the daily average bombing was 
fifty-eight B-52 sorties (of 65,000 pounds each) and about 180 fighter-
bomber and gunship bombing and strafing missions.5 
The Nixon administration, having extricated itself from direct mili­
tary involvement in Vietnam, seemed to be involving itself in a situation 
in Cambodia that has an unfortunately strong resemblance to the situa­
tion in which the United States government found itself in late 1964 
and early 1965: having to use U . S . bombers in Vietnam to stave off 
the military defeat and political overthrow of a weak anti-Communist 
government by strong Communist-led forces. O n e would hope that 
U . S  . leaders will learn from their past mistakes in Vietnam and avoid 
a repetition of the tragic policy of military entanglement in Indochina.6 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT FOR THE FUTURE 
O n e of the greatest concessions by the Communists in the January 
cease-fire agreement was their accession to demands by the United 
States that the military issues in Vietnam be separated from the politi­
cal issues. The Agreement spells out in considerable detail proscriptions 
against the use of military force. It is m u c h more vague on the political 
issues, and generally leaves their resolution to the Vietnamese to deter­
mine sometime in the future. 
The separation of the military from the political issues was of great 
benefit to the non-South Vietnamase parties to the Vietnam W a r , the 
United States and the North Vietnamese. It halted the bombing of 
North Vietnam, allowed the withdrawal of U . S . troops, and accom­
plished the return of prisoners of war. The South Vietnamese C o m m u  ­
nists, however, gave up considerable bargaining ground w h e n they 
finally agreed to this separation. Their position prior to the Agreement 
had been to tie military and political issues together. They had de­
manded that, before they would cease fighting, there would have to 
be a n e w government in Saigon that included the Communists and 
excluded President Thieu. The cease-fire agreementfinally signed, h o w ­
ever, does not impose this condition. Thus, the Communists in South 
Vietnam are left in the position of having to continue to struggle to 
achieve power at the national level as well as at the local level. 
Since the signing of the Agreement, representatives of the Provisional 
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Revolutionary Government and of the government of Vietnam have 
been meeting in Paris to talk about their differences and possibly to 
m o v e to some kind of political accommodation as stipulated by the 
Agreement. O n e would hope that some kind of reconciliation will be 
achieved through these talks. 
At the same time, however, the South Vietnamese government has 
not allowed the Communists to participate politically at either the na­
tional level or local levels not already under Viet Cong control. Instead, 
the thousands of cease-fire violations are clear evidence that each side 
has sought to increase its political power by means of force and to 
prevent the other side from doing the same. Thus, even though there 
are some local military and political accommodations being m a d e be­
tween Communists and non-Communists in South Vietnam, political 
conflict and guerrilla war continues at this writing. 
Th  e situation of the South Vietnamese people is thus one of neither 
war nor peace. This situation might continue indefinitely. It has within 
it, however, the seeds for the resumption and reescalation of the war. 
Dr. Kissinger and Le D u e T h o held additional meetings in Paris in 
M a  y and June 1973 to talk about this continuing conflict in South Viet­
n a m . They reached and signed an additional agreement along with 
the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the government of the 
Republic of Vietnam on 13 June 1973. Their fourteen-point communique 
is designed to improve observance of the original cease-fire agreement 
of 27 January 1973. 
As long as President Thieu has reason to feel that the United States 
will continue to support his government and country with economic 
aid, and will come to his rescue militarily should he ever be faced 
with the possibility of military defeat by the Communist forces in Viet­
n a m  , he has little incentive to reach a political accommodation with 
the Provisional Revolutionary Government. However, the less accom­
modating President Thieu is, the more incentive the Communists have 
for reverting to the use of large-scale military forces, including the 
main-force units of the 145,000 North Vietnamese army troops still 
in South Vietnam, to try to gain political power, as was their policy 
prior to the Agreement. 
Such a military reescalation by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 
could reinvolve the United States in the war militarily to save the 
South Vietnamese government from a military defeat. O n  e possible 
form that U . S . military involvement might take would be through the 
use of bombing from U . S . aircraft that continue to be stationed in 
Southeast Asia and off the shores of Vietnam. Whether the United 
States Congress would allow such reintervention by U . S . armed forces 
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is questionable at this point. Thus, the North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong m a y not be deterred by the threat of resumed U . S . bombing. 
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of 
China can continue to play a positive role in moving the Vietnamese 
toward political accommodation and reconciliation. Th  e United States 
could visibly tie its offer to North Vietnam of economic aid for recon­
struction to North Vietnamese military restraint in South Vietnam. At 
the same time, in the interests of their respective bilateral relationships 
with the United States, the governments of the Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic of China could separately persuade the North Viet­
namese (by control of military and economic aid, for example) to re­
strain their military behavior in South Vietnam. 
In return for such restraint by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, 
the United States government could firmly m a k e it known to the South 
Vietnamese government that continued U . S  . economic and political 
support is contingent upon the Republic of Vietnam government's 
reaching some political accommodation with the Provisional Revolu­
tionary Government. Moreover, the U . S  . government can m a k  e it clearly 
known to the South Vietnamese government that the United States 
will not be reinvolved in Vietnam militarily. This would give the South 
Vietnamese government the incentive to m a k  e a reasonable political 
accommodation with the Communists in South Vietnam and thus avoid 
provoking the Communists to reescalate the war militarily to gain poli­
tical power. 
Such a policy by the the government of the United States, as well 
as by the governments of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic 
of China, could give to all Vietnamese the hope for a real peace. 
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cease-fire, the return of prisoners, the ICCS, and the deactivation of mines can 
be found in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Monday, 29 January 
1973, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 43-74. 
The statement and news conference of Secretary of State William Rogers and 
the text of the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam can be found 
in the Department of State Bulletin, vol. 67, no. 1761, 26 March 1973, pp. 
337-47. 
2. Richard M  . Nixon, "Ending the W a  r and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," 
(The President's Address to the Nation Announcing the Conclusion of an Agree­
ment), 23 January 1973, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, p . 
43. 
3. "Saigon Puts All Troops on Full Alert to Counter Expected Drive by E n e m y  / 
New York Times, 23 January 1973, p . 6. 
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4. "3 Months after the Truce, N  o Let-up in the Charges," New York Times, 
28 April 1973, p. 3. 
5. " U . S  . Data on Cambodia Raids Show Shift to a Support Role," New York 
Times, 28 April 1973, p. 3. 
6. The U . S . Congress did learn a lesson from the Vietnam experience. It passed 
a law prohibiting the use of any U . S  . military forces in, from offshore, or over In­
dochina effective 15 August 1973. 
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APPENDIX A 
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATIONS 
For purposes of this study the communication data were aggregated into the 
eight indices described in Appendix B  . Messages about the^  specific referents in­
cluded within each index were coded to pick up two characteristics: one, h o w fre­
quently the referent was mentioned, and two, whether the referent was perceived 
or preferred to be increasing or decreasing. The following code was used: 
Blank = referent not in statement.

Perceptions of referent as:

0 = certainly decreasing

1 = possibly decreasing

2 z= unchanging

3 = possibly increasing

4 = certainly increasing

Preferences for referent:

5 = for decreasing

7 = for continuing unchanged

9 = for increasing.

Thus, all policy-makers' communications about any of the specific referents were 
reduced to a single digit on one of two ordinal scales. A statement by President 
Johnson that domestic dissension weakened the United States' posture of firmness 
in Vietnam would be coded " 9  " in column 36 (specific referent: U . S  . domestic 
support of Johnson administration's Vietnam policy; popularity of Johnson and his 
Vietnam policy; determination, will, patience, of U . S  . public for continuing war )  . 
It is hypothesized that the sums of the numerical values of each specific referent 
comprising an index is related to the behavior of the policy-makers w h o communi­
cate. 
Coding Sheet for Public Communications and Diplomatic Contacts 
IBM 
Columns 
2 Communication code = 1 
3 New York Times Index code: 1 = annual; 0 = semimonthly 
4-7 New York Times Index page number 
8 New York Times Index column number (1,2,3) 
9-11 New York Times Index line number 
12-13 Date published in New York Times: Month 
14-15 Day 
16 Year 
199 
200
17-18
19
20-21
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 Week number within year (01-52) 
Source of message: 
1 = United States 
2 = North Vietnam 
3 = Viet Cong (National Liberation Front) 
4 = South Vietnam 
Speaker (highest ranking if more than one from single source involved): 
(United States) 
00 = Other 
01 = President L  . B  . Johnson 
02 = Secretary of Defense R . S. McNamara 
03 = Secretary of State D  . Rusk 
04 = U . S  . ambassadors in Saigon: H  . C  . Lodge; M  . Taylor; U  . A  . Johnson; 
W . Porter; E  . Bunker; E  . Locke 
05 = Field Commander Gen.  W . C  . Westmoreland 
06 = Joint Chiefs of Staff: Gen. E . Wheeler et al. 
07 = Other U . S  . military officials 
08 = Vice President H  . H  . Humphrey 
09 = Presidential assistants and advisers: M c G  . Bundy; B  . D  . Moyers;  W . 
W . Rostow; R .  W . Komer; G . Christian; T . Johnson; J. Califano; R . 
Kinter; Bryant; M  . Taylor; C  . Clifford; A  . Fortas; D  . Acheson; J. 
Gardner; CIA Directors  W . F . Raborn, J. McCone, R . Helms 
10 = Assistant and deputy secretaries and other inner elites: Undersecre­
taries of State G  .  W . Ball, N  . Katzenback, E  . V  . Rostow; Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asia  W . P. Bundy; Deputy Assistant Sec­
retary of State for East Asia L  . Unger; Deputy Secretaries of Defense 
C  . Vance, P. Nitze; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs J. T  . McNaughton; Deputy Director of A I  D  W . S. 
Gaud; Ambassador-at-Large A . Harriman; USIA Director L . Marks 
11 = U  N Ambassadors A  . Goldberg, A  . Stevenson 
12 =: "Unidentified spokesmen" from executive branch of U . S . government 
13 = Other special U . S  . envoys and ambassadors 
(North Vietnam) 
14 = President H  o Chi Minh 
15 = Premier Pham Van Dong 
16 = Defense Minister V  o Nguyen Giap 
17= Vice Premier Truong Chinh 
18 = Other inner North Vietnamese elites: Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy 
Trinh; Le Duan, [North] Vietnamese Workers' [Communist] Party 
head; Ton Due Thang, president of Vietnam Fatherland Front; Le 
Due Tho, Politburo member and leader of Committee for Supervision 
of the South 
19 = Official North Vietnamese media: Quan Doi Nhan Dan, Hoc Tap, 
Tien Phong, Hanoi Radio 
(National Liberation Front) 
20 = Official spokesmen Nguyen H u u Tho, president of Presidium of 
N F L S  V Central Committee; Nguyen Van Tien, permanent represen­
tative of N L  F in Hanoi 
21 = Official media: clandestine Liberation Radio 
(South Vietnam) 
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22 = President Nguyen Van Thieu; heads of government N . Khanh, T . V . 
Huong, X . N . Oanh, P. H . Quat

23 = Vice President (formerly Premier) Nguyen Cao Ky

24 = Other South Vietnamese government spokesmen

25 = Official South Vietnamese media

22-23 Audience directly receiving message: 
00 = Other 
01 = Executive branch of U . S  . government 
02 = U . S . Congress 
03 = General U . S  . domestic public 
04 = North Vietnamese government or public 
05 = Viet Cong leadership or public 
06 = South Vietnamese government or public 
07 = Government or public of nation supporting United States (not South 
Vietnam) 
08 = Government or public of nation supporting North Vietnam and Viet 
Cong 
09 = Government or public of neutral nation, or a neutralfigure (e.g., the 
pope) 
10 = International organization (e.g., U N )  , its leadership, membership, 
and committees 
11 = General world audience 
12 = Unknown or none 
24-25 Target audience of action within message: 
(Primary sources: those capable of enacting policy; target is their enemy. 
Secondary sources: those w h  o can only hope to influence primary sources; 
target is their own government's executive.) 
00 = Other 
01 = Executive branch of U . S  . government 
03 = General U . S  . domestic public 
04 = North Vietnamese government or public 
05 = Viet Cong leadership or public 
06 = South Vietnamese government or public 
07 = Government or public of nation supporting United States (not South 
Vietnam) 
08 = Government or public of nation supporting North Vietnam and Viet 
Cong 
09 = Government or public of neutral nation, or neutral figure (e.g., the 
pope) 
10 = International organization (e.g., U N )  , its leadership, membership, 
and committees

11 = General world audience

12 = Unknown or none

26-27 Medium: 
00 = Other 
01 = Diplomatic note or letter 
02 = Government communique, press release, or message from official 
media 
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03 = International conference (three or more parties) 
04 = Domestic speech, public television interviews 
05 = Foreign speech 
06 = N e w  s conference 
07 = Background briefing; unidentified source; "reportedly" 
08 = Private interview; ambassadorial and diplomatic personal contacts 
09 = Congressional hearing or address 
10 = Quote or paraphrased quote (code source as person quoted; target 
is target in original quoted statement.)

11 = U n k n o w n

Specific Referents 
Code: Blank = Referent not in statement 
Perceptions:

0 = Certainly decreasing

1 = Possibly decreasing

2 = Unchanging

3 = Possibly increasing

4 = Certainly increasing

Preferences:

5 = For decreasing

7 = For continuing unchanged

9 = For increasing

29 U . S  . bombing, shelling, mining, invading, blockading, and other armed hos­
tilities against North Vietnam; effects and effectiveness of U . S  . hostilities 
in North Vietnam; destruction in North Vietnam; military, economic, indus­
trial, and agricultural costs to North Vietnam 
30 U . S  . troop strength, bases, weapons,firepower, mobility, and other military 
capabilities in South Vietnam 
31 U . S  . bombing, armed hostilities, and effectiveness in South Vietnam 
32 U . S  . aid to, alliance with, commitments to, shield for, interest in, influence 
on, support for, strengthening of, South Vietnam; S .V . dependence on 
United States 
33 U . S  . casualties 
34 U . S  . plane losses 
35 U . S  . dollar, economic, and material costs of war 
36 U . S  . domestic public support of Johnson administration's Vietnam policy; 
popularity of Johnson and his Vietnam policy; determination, will, patience 
of U . S  . public for continuing war 
37 World opinion, prestige, support of United States in Vietnam 
38 A R V  N military activity and effectiveness in South Vietnam and in North 
Vietnam 
39 A R V  N casualties 
40 A R V  N morale, determination, motivation, will to continue war, confidence, 
optimism, lack of defections 
41 Civilian casualties in South Vietnam 
42 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong infiltration, troop strength, supplies, m u  ­
STRENGTH

REJECT 
reject, veto, refuse, 
oppose, bar, resist, 
deny a charge or 
accusation 
T H R E A T E N 
threaten, warn, 
give ultimatum, 
either... or, 
punish, coerce 
HOSTILITY 
ACCUSE

accuse, charge, blame,

attack, criticize,

denounce, repudiate,

derogate, score,

complain,

protest,

object FEAR

fear, (show) 
distress, alarm, 
shame, grief, failure, 
indecision, doubt, ambi­
valence; defend, guard, 
vindicate, deny, admit, 
concede, capitulate, with­
draw 
D O M I N A T E 
demand, order, insist, 
challenge, decree, 
instruct, stress, 
set terms, assert, 
announce 
P R O M I S E 
promise, offer, 
propose, invite, bid, 
recognize, approve, 
praise, support, encourage, 
assure, reward, back 
FRIENDLINESS 
COOPERATE 
cooperate, accept, agree, 
consent, trust, assent, 
inform, convey, share, 
state, explain, 
explicate, say, 
report 
DEPEND 
depend, ask, 
request, solicit, 
seek, beg, petition, 
urge, suggest, apolo­
gize, comply 
WEAKNESS 
9 = Unclassifiable communication or other 
0 = Conspicuous absence of response 
Figure 48. Primary Message Types 
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nitions, recruitment in South Vietnam and in D M Z  ; other military capabil­
ities 
43 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong armed hostilities and effectiveness in 
South Vietnam 
44 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong morale, determination, motivation, will 
to continue war, confidence, optimism, lack of defections 
45 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong casualties 
46 Civilian casualties in North Vietnam 
47 Extension, spillover of war into neighboring countries (e.g., Laos, C a m  ­
bodia, Thailand) 
48 Extension of communism into Southeast Asian countries; extension (lack of 
containment) of China and Chinese influence in Southeast Asia; lack of 
security in Southeast Asia; spreading of other wars of national liberation 
49 Communist Chinese participation in war, aid to North Vietnam and Viet 
Cong; "volunteers"; threats to U . S  . security and interests; likelihood of U . S  . 
war with China, U . S  . (nuclear) bombing of China; North Vietnamese de­
pendence on China 
50 Soviet participation in war, aid to North Vietnam and Viet Cong; "volun­
teers"; protection of North Vietnam, likelihood of U . S  . war with U . S . S . R .  ; 
tensions between United States and U . S . S . R  . over Vietnam; North Vietna­
mese dependence on U . S . S . R  . 
51 North Vietnamese control of N L  F (Viet C o n g )  ; Viet Cong dependence on 
North Vietnam 
52 G V  N control of, and support from, South Vietnamese population; stability 
of G V N  ; degree of pacification 
53 Viet Cong political activities, effectiveness, strength, structure, influence; 
implementation of N L  F program; political and administrative control in 
South Vietnam; popular support for Viet Cong in South Vietnam 
54 Reciprocity in military deescalation 
55 Stalement, standoff, standstill militarily and politically; each side controls 
only part of South Vietnam, de facto territorial division or partition of South 
Vietnam; enclaves 
56 Victory, winning war militarily; defeating, destroying enemy; enemy capit­
ulation, withdrawal, retreat, fade-out 
57 Diplomatic contacts and communications of unknown content (Code 8 = 
present) 
58 Third party (e.g., U N  , nonbelligerents) mediation in achieving peace ne­
gotiations and settlement, and in supervision of settlement 
59 Talks or negotiations between United States and North Vietnam; new in­
ternational conference at Geneva or elsewhere 
60 Talks or negotiations between United States and Viet Cong; recognized 
Viet Cong role in negotiations 
61 Sincerity, trustworthiness, honesty, seriousness of U . S  . peace proposals and 
moves 
62 Sincerity, trustworthiness, honesty, seriousness of North Vietnamese and 
Viet Cong peace proposals and moves 
63 Cease-fire, truce, armistice, temporary cessation of warfare 
64 Permanent cessation of warfare, peace, settlement, negotiated compromise, 
end of aggression and hostilities; international order and security 
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65 Reunification; independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic 
freedom of reunified Vietnam; implementation of 1954 Geneva accords 
66 Neutralization, nonalignment of South Vietnam; coalition government in­
cluding Viet Cong and non-Viet Cong 
67 Buddhist or other South Vietnamese third political party's activity and 
strength 
68 Independence, sovereignty, democracy, and territorial integrity and security 
of South Vietnam; political self-determination, absence of foreign interfer­
ence 
69 Material and economic reconstruction, development, modernization in South 
Vietnam; prosperity, better living conditions; land reform; economic re­
form, sharing wealth; price stability 

APPENDIX B 
COMPONENTS OF THE EIGHT COMMUNICATIONS INDICES 
1. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (NV -f- VC) Preferences for Their Own 
Military and Political Activities. This index is a sum composed of (a) the product 
of the preference value times the frequency of N  V + V  C statements concerning 
N  V + V  C troop infiltration, troop strength, supplies, munitions, recruitment, and 
other military capabilities in South Vietnam and in the De-Militarized Zone; plus 
(b) the product of the preference value times the frequency of N  V + V  C state­
ments concerning N  V + V  C armed hostilities (terrorism, conventional and guer­
rilla operations) and effectiveness (military control) in South Vietnam; plus (c) 
the sum of the frequency of N  V + V  C preference statements plus the frequency of 
N  V + V  C perception statements referring to N  V + V  C morale, determination, m o  ­
tivation, confidence, optimism, lack of defections, and will to continue the war; plus 
(d) the frequency of N  V + V  C preference statements referring to Viet Cong po­
litical activities, effectiveness, strength, structure, influence, popular support, politi­
cal and administrative control, and implementation of the N L  F program in South 
Vietnam. This index of statements is so constructed that high values should cor­
respond to greater N  V + V  C military and political activity. 
2. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (NV -f VC) Perceptions of United States 
and South Vietnamese (US -f SV) Military and Political Activities. This index is 
composed of the sum of the frequencies of N  V + V  C statements concerning (a) 
N  V -f V  C perceptions of U . S  . bombing, shelling, mining, invading, blockading, and 
other armed hostilities against North Vietnam, including the effects and effective­
ness of these hostilities, destruction in North Vietnam, and military, economic, in­
dustrial, and agricultural costs to North Vietnam; (b) N  V + V  C preferences con­
cerning U . S  . troop strength, bases, weapons, firepower, mobility, and other military 
capabilities in South Vietnam; (c) N  V + V  C perception of U . S  . domestic public 
support of the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy, the popularity of President 
Johnson and his Vietnam policy, and the determination, patience, and will of the 
U . S  . public for continuing the war; (d) N  V + V  C perceptions of A R V  N military 
activity and effectiveness; (e) N  V + V  C perceptions of civilian casualties in North 
Vietnam; plus (f) the value of N  V -f- V  C perceptions of the South Vietnamese 
government's stability and its control of and support from the people of South 
Vietnam. This index of statements is so constructed that higher values should cor­
respond to greater U  S + S  V military and political activity. 
3. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (NV + VC) Preferences for Negotiations. 
This index is composed of the sum of (a) the product of the preference value times 
the frequency of N V - f - V  C statements concerning third party (e.g., U N  , nonbel­
ligerents) mediation for achieving peace negotiations and a settlement, and for 
supervision of a settlement; minus (b) the frequency of N  V + V  C preference 
statements concerning reciprocity in military deescalation; plus (c) the product 
of the preference value times the frequency of N  V 4- V  C statements concerning 
talks or negotiations between the United States and/or the South Vietnamese on 
the one hand and the North Vietnamese on the other, including a new international 
conference at Geneva or elsewhere, plus the frequency of N  V + V  C statements 
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perceiving such talks; plus (d) the product of the preference value times the fre­
quency of N  V -f- V  C statements concerning talks between the United States and 
the Viet Cong, including a recognized role for the Viet Cong in negotiations; minus 
(c) the frequency of N  V -f- V  C perception statements concerning the sincerity, 
trustworthiness, honesty, and seriousness of U . S  . peace proposals and moves; plus 
(f) the product of the value times the frequency of N  V -f V  C perceptions of the 
sincerity, trustworthiness, honesty, and seriousness of N  V + V  C peace proposals 
and moves; plus (g) the product of the preference value times the frequency of 
N  V + V  C statements for a cease fire, truce, armistice, or temporary cessation of 
the war; plus (h) the frequency of N  V -f- V  C diplomatic contacts and communi­
cations the content of which are unreported. This index was constructed so that 
higher values should correspond to less N  V -f- V  C military activity. 
4 . North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (NV + VC) Preferences for Outcomes and 
Goals. This index of N  V + V  C statements is composed of the sum of (a) the 
product of the preference value times the frequency of N  V + V  C statements con­
cerning N V + V C victory, winning the war militarily, defeating or destroying their 
enemy, and having their enemy capitulate, withdraw, retreat, or fade out, plus the 
frequency of N  V -f- V  C statements perceiving such victory; minus (b) the product 
of N  V -f- V  C perception values times the frequency of such perceptions concerning 
a permanent cessation of warfare, peace, settlement, negotiated compromise, an 
end to aggression and hostilities, and international order and security; plus the 
frequency of N  V + V  C preference statements for such a peaceful settlement; plus 
(c) the frequency of N  V + V  C preferences for the reunification of Vietnam, inde­
pendence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic freedom, and the implemen­
tation of the 1954 Geneva accords; plus (d) the frequency of N V + V C preferences 
for neutralization and non-alignment of South Vietnam, and a coalition government 
that would include Viet Cong and non-Viet Cong elements. This index was con­
structed so that higher values should correspond to increased N  V -f- V  C military 
and political activities. 
5. U.S. and South Vietnamese (US -f SV) Perceptions of North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong (NV -f- VC) Military and Political Activities. This index is composed 
of the sum of the products of the perception value times the frequency of percep­
tion by U S + S V leaders concerning the following items: (a) N V + V C infiltration, 
troop strength, supplies, munitions, recruitment and other military capabilities in 
South Vietnam and in the De-Militarized Zone; (b) N  V -f- V  C armed hostilities 
(terrorism, conventional, and guerrilla operations), effectiveness, and military con­
trol in South Vietnam; (c) N  V -f- V  C morale, determination, motivation, confi­
dence, will to continue the war, optimism, and lack of defections; (d) Viet Cong 
political activities, effectiveness, strength, structure, influence, popular support, po­
litical and administrative control, and implementation of the N L  F program in South 
Vietnam; (e) Communist Chinese participation in the war and aid to North Viet­
n a m and the Viet Cong, including "volunteers," threats to U . S . security and in­
terests, likelihood of U . S  . war with China, possibility of U . S  . (nuclear) bombing 
of China, and North Vietnamese dependence on China; (f) Soviet participation in 
the war and aid to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, including "volunteers," 
Soviet protection of North Vietnam, likelihood of U . S . war with the U . S . S . R . , ten­
sions between the United States and U . S . S . R  . over Vietnam, and North Vietnamese 
dependence on the U . S . S . R . This index was constructed so that higher values should 
correspond to greater N  V -f- V  C military and political activity. 
6. U.S. and South Vietnamese (US + S V ) Preferences for U.S. and South Viet­
namese Military and Political Activities. This index of U S + S V statements is com­
posed of the sum of (a) the preference value minus the perception value, times 
the frequency of preference statements concerning U . S  . bombing, shelling, mining, 
invading, blockading, and other armed hostilities against North Vietnam, the effects 
and effectiveness of these hostilities, including destruction in North Vietnam, and 
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military, economic, industrial, and agricultural costs to North Vietnam; plus (b) 
the preference value minus the perception value, times the frequency of preference 
statements concerning U . S  . troop strength, bases, weapons, firepower, mobility, 
and other military capabilities in South Vietnam; plus (c) the preference value 
times the frequency of preference statements concerning U . S  . bombing, armed 
hostilities, and effectiveness in South Vietnam; plus (d) the preference value times 
the frequency of preference statements concerning U . S  . aid to, alliance with, c o m  ­
mitments to, shield for, interest in, influence on, support for, and strengthening of, 
South Vietnam and South Vietnam's dependence on the United States; minus (e) 
the frequency of preference statements concerning U . S  . domestic public support 
for the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy, the popularity of President John­
son and his Vietnam policy, and the determination, patience, and will of the U . S  . 
public for continuing the war; plus (f) the frequency of preference statements 
concerning A R V  N military activity and effectiveness; plus (g) the frequency of 
perception statements concerning A R V  N morale, determination, confidence, op­
timism, lack of defections, motivation, and will to continue the war; plus (h) the 
perception value times the frequency of perception statements concerning the gov­
ernment of South Vietnam's stability and control of and support from the South 
Vietnamese people. This index of communications was constructed so that high 
values should correspond to greater U  S -f- S  V military and political activity. 
7. U.S. and South Vietnamese (US + S V ) preferences for Negotiations. This 
index of U  S -f- S V statements is composed of the sum of (a) the frequency of pref­
erence statements plus the frequency of perception statements concerning world 
opinion, prestige, and support of U . S  . policy in Vietnam; plus (b) the frequency 
of preference statements concerning reciprocity in military deescalation; plus (c) 
the frequency of diplomatic contacts and communications the content of which 
were unreported (e.g., special visits by envoys or ambassadors); plus (d) the fre­
quency of preference statements plus the perception values concerning third party 
mediation in achieving peace negotiations and supervision of a settlement; plus 
(e) the frequency of preference statements plus the perception values concerning 
talks or negotiations between the United States and/or the South Vietnamese on the 
one hand, and the North Vietnamese on the other, including a n e  w international 
conference at Geneva or elsewhere; plus (f) the preference value times the fre­
quency of preferences concerning talks or negotiations between the United States 
and the Viet Cong, including a recognized role for the Viet Cong in negotiations; 
plus (g) the perception value times the frequency of U.S. statements concerning 
the sincerity, trustworthiness, honesty, and seriousness of U . S  . peace proposals and 
moves; plus (h) the perception value times the frequency of U.S. statements con­
cerning the sincerity, trustworthiness, honesty, and seriousness of North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong peace proposals and moves; plus (i) the preference value times 
the frequency of U  S + S  V statements concerning a ceasefire, truce, armistice, or 
temporary cessation of the war. This index was constructed so that higher values 
should correspond to less U  S + S  V military and political activity. 
8. U.S. and South Vietnamese (US -f- SV) Perceptions and Preferences for Out­
comes and Goals. This index of U  S -f- S V statements is composed of the sum of 
(a) the perception value times the frequency of perceptions concerning extension 
or spillover of the war to neighboring countries (e.g., Laos, Cambodia, Thailand); 
plus (b) the perception value times the sum of the frequency of perceptions plus 
the frequency of preferences of U . S  . speakers concerning the extension of c o m m u  ­
nism into Southeast Asian countries, the extension or lack of containment of C o m  ­
munist China and its influence in Southeast Asia, and the spread of other wars of 
national liberation; minus (c) the perception value times the frequency of U . S  . 
speakers' perceptions concerning military or political stalemate in the war, includ­
ing reference to each side controlling only part of South Vietnam, enclaves, or de 
facto territorial division of South Vietnam; plus (d) the preference value times 
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the frequency of preferences, plus the frequency of perceptions concerning military 
victory in the war, defeat or destruction of the enemy, enemy capitulation, with­
drawal, retreat, or fade-out; minus (e) the perception value times the frequency 
of perceptions, plus the frequency of preferences concerning peace, permanent 
cessation of the war, settlement, negotiated compromise, end of aggression and 
hostilities, and international order and security; plus (f) the frequency of prefer­
ences by South Vietnamese speakers concerning neutralization or nonalignment of 
South Vietnam, or a coalition government that would include Viet Cong and non-
Viet Cong elements; plus (g) the frequency of U S + S V preferences concerning 
the independence, sovereignty, political self-determination, territorial integrity, ab­
sence of foreign interference, and security of South Vietnam; plus (h) the frequency 
of U  S + S  V preferences for material and economic reconstruction, development, 
and modernization in South Vietnam, including land and economic reform, price 
stability, and the sharing of wealth. 
APPENDIX C 
TIME PLOTS OF COMPOSITE INDICES A N D INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES 
O  n each of the following plots, " M O N  " is the month (month 1 = January 1965, 
month 36 = December 1967, month 69 = September 1970, etc.). " V A L U E  " 
(plotted with 0's) is the amount of the variable in each month. "1ST D  " (plotted 
with l's) is the difference in the amount from the previous month, i.e., the rate of 
change. " 2 N  D  D " (plotted with 2's) is the difference in the rate from the previous 
month, i.e., the acceleration. 
For N . V . + V . C . Armed Attacks, V . C . Terrorist Incidents, and Combined U . S . 
+ S.V- Ground Operations, 0's in 1965 and 1966 indicate missing data, not zero 
amounts. 
In the following charts, successive months in the war run from top to bottom; in­
creasing values run from left to right. 
211 
U.S . Troops in S.V. 
24.0 0.0 
25.0 1.0 
27.0 2.3 
29.0 2.0 
42.0 3.0 
54.0 2.0 
80.0 6.0 
90.0 0.0 
132.0 2.0 
148.0 6.0 
166.0 8.0 
184.0 8.0 
197.0 3.0 
201.0 4.0 
231.0 0.0 
255.0 4.0 
255.0 0.3 
267.0 2.0 
285.0 8.3 
303.0 8.0 
345.0 2.n 
361.0 6.0 
389.0 8.0 
403.0 4.0 
414.0 1.0 
421.0 7.0 
436.0 1 5.0 
443.0 7.0 
449.0 6.0 
458.0 9.D 
466.0 8.3 
460.0 - 6.0 
467.0 7.0 
470.0 3.0 
486.0 16.0 
498.0 12.3 
506.0 8.0 
5?0.0 5.0 
536.0 16.0 
536.0 0 . 3 
537.0 1.0 
537.0 0.3 
538.0 1.0 
534.0 - 4.0 
538.0 4 . T 
537.0 - 1.0 
542.0 5.3 
541.0 - 1.0 
538.0 - 3.0 
543.0 5.3 
540.0 - 3.0 
539.0 - 1.3 
537.0 - 2.0 
510..0 -2 7.0 
510.0 3.0 
495.0 -I 5.0 
480.0 -I 5.0 
474.0 - 6.0 
473.0 - 1.0 
467.0 - 6.0 
439.0 -2 8.n 
428.0 -1 1.3 
414.0 -1 t.o 
415.0 1.3 
390.0 5.0 
387.0 - 3.0 
390.0 3.0 
U . S . Ground Operations of Battalion Size or Larger 
V A L U E 1ST 1 
1 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 
2 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 
3 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 
4 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 
5 0 . 0 0 D 0 . 
7 12.0 8 0 4 . 
8 21.0 Q 0 1. 
9 19.0 - 2 . 0 - 1 1 . 
10 55.0 36 0 39. 
11 38.0 - 1 7 0 - 5 3 . 
12 42.0 4 0 21. 
13 40.0 - 2 0 - 6 . 
1* 70.0 10 0 3 2 . 
15 65.0 - 5 0 -35 . 
IS 74.0 9 3 1 4 . 
17 78.0 4 0 - 5 . 
18 [05.0 27 0 2 3 . 
1<» 91.0 - 1 4 3 -41 . 
20 89.0 - 2 0 1 2 . 
21 104.0 15 0 1 7 . 
22 93.0 -1 I 0 -26 . 
23 85.0 - 8 0 3 . 
24 S5.0 0 0 8 . 
25 105.0 20 0 2 0 . 
26 125.0 ?.O 3 0 . 
27 111.0 - 1 4 0 - 3 4 . 
28 120.0 9 3 2 3 . 
29 118.0 - 2 0 -11 . 
30 121.0 3 0 5 . 
31 114.0 - 7 0 -10 . 
32 L21.0 7 0 1 4 . 
33 Lll.O -10 0 -17 . 
3* l 'O.O 9 3 19 . 
35 40.0 20 1 1 . 
36 25.0 -1 q 0 -35 . 
37 125.0 0 3 1 5 . 
39 25.0 6 3 1 2 . 
40 L04.0 -?1 0 - 2 7 . 
41 03 .0 -1 1 3 1 0 . 
42 81 .0 -12 0 - 1 . 
43 8 8 . 0 7 0 1 9 . 
44 fc3.0 - 2 5 0 - 3 2 . 
45 70 .0 7 0 3 2 . 
46 R 2 . 0 ! 2 3 5 . 
47 8 9 . 0 7 0 - 5 . 
l>8 91 .0 - 8 0 -15 . 
49 8 1 . 0 0 0 8 . 
50 106.P 25 3 ? 5 . 
51 9 3 . 0 -13 0 -38 . 
52 0 1 . 0 8 3 2 1 . 
53 0 8 . 0 "» 0 - 1 . 
5* t l . O 3 0 - 4 . 
55 0 7 . 0 - 4 3 - 7 . 
54 0 8 . 0 I 3 «;. 
!7 1 0 3 . 0 - 5 . 3 - 6 . 
58 9 1 . 0 - 1 2 . 0 - 7 . 
59 8 8 . 0 - 3 . 0 g# 
»0 8 7 . 0 - 1 . 3 2 . 
SI 8 5 . C - ? . 3 - 1 . 
b2 6 2 . 0 - ? 3 . 0 -21 . 
S3 5 4 . 0 - B . 0 1 5 . 
S4 4 8 . 0 - 6 . 0 2 . 
i5 5 4 . 0 6. 3 1 2 . 
>6 <.4.C 1 T . 3 4 . 
7 bb.n 2 . 3 - R . 
>R 71 . 0 5. 0 • \ , 
S9 ' 1 . 3 l * , . 
U.S. Bombing of S.V. 
r> 
0.0 0.0 
28.0 0.0

*1 9.0 36 3.0

966.0	 156.0

- 6 * 9 . 0

*?85.0

-2033.0 
9.0

6094.0 0 -105.0

0 2*?R.O

8133.0 205. 3 -1629.0

79*6.0 -IR7. 0 -392.0

"039.0 1093. 0 12P0.0

0572.0

2636.0 2 06'f 0 531.0

9871.0 -27S5.

0071.0 210, 0 2965.0

0799.0 7 '9 . 0 52B.O

3613.0 291*. 0 2086.0

-613*.0 
21 2298.0 
22 1781.0 -507. 0 -2502.0 
2* 
25 2192.0 892. 0 2215.0 
26 31*9.0 957. 0 75.0 
27 *395.0 12*6. 0 289.0 
28 *092.0 -303. 0 -15*9.0 
30 5106.0 -12S0. 0 -353*.0 
31 6023.0 91 7 . 0 2177.0 
33 2575.0 
-55.0 1077.1

3517.0 -920.0 -665.1

5371.0 195*. 0 277*.I

8757.0 3396.0 1532.1

8682.0 -75.0 -3*61.1

8**7.0 -235.0 -ISO.I

13.0 27S6.0 3001. 
8389.0 -3097.0	 -3370.0 
*972.0 3*<U.O •1717.

5815.0 9*3.0 * 3 ? * .

6373.0 558.D -285.

5*80.0 *77.0 18*7.'

6*85.0 1005.0 528.1

6370.0 -115.0 •1120.1

58 92*6.0 -2396.0 12*1 
60 -1208 
61 8936.0 ll*.O 930 
6* 1003*.0 1710.0 132 8 
65 8795.0 -1239.0 -29*9 
bt> 777* .C -1021.0 218 
B1UN0S ON V4LJFS &*? 0.00 71*96.00 
BO'JNDS IN FIRST DIFFERENCES ARF -3627.00 *183.0C 
33JMDS ON S?;3"J0 01 =FEBCCNCES M  E -6134.00 5315.0 
U.S. Commitments 
3 OPbo !b7,,< ' i'"^ 3 
4 1 / .  4 ,•> in5fic' «s0.2 
5 >489, 1 34 5. ? - 7 U . 8 
6 171 5o 5 )i25.f> 88OO4 
7 > 2 :>!>.. 5 15*0., C 314,. 3 
a J 1. F 5 1 o 5 U . 5 
9 r837o ? l f U J -52Oc5 
10 K 033. • 2'9S,5 1164.6 
602. •1431,1 • 3626.8 n 7Clo 3 9<!U7 153',O 
12 )2<;7. -404»8 -5C4o6 
13 3C36of 3440.8 
14 1 
15 ) >210. i l°P8o9 100.S 
16 1 ' • 2tS.-l • 2?54-o' 
17 1' 46C J 3S14.9 37P0oV 
18 1 $ 7 0 . 3 ' ?10 o C 20C4.9 
19 1< t?l. 3 1(61, ; J5I.2 
20 2 837-, f ! ?C6O 5 • 454, 8 
21 2 
3 7. 1 ^04.4 
24 2 021* 7 352«5 2123^1 
25 2 4 1 9 , » 13S7.7 1C45.2 
28 21 620. 1844,1 436,4 
It 2 ; 4H9,4  - ) 3E4o7 2 1 
30 2 952U 842,4 35?,0 
31 2 - 1 58. 8 - 1 0 D . 2 
3 2 K C29. 2J^b.t 2->S5.,3 
33 2 464. 2 54'j, a - 4 7 82.4 
35 30232. 2.758, J ' 763. 2 
BOUNOS ON VILUtS A " I- 7 7 ' o O ' 
BOUNDS ON FIRST 011-K F fNLt S AO 
BOUNOS (IN Sif.nND P I FFf F t L NC C S ­
U.S. Bombing of N.V. 
VALUF 1ST 1 
Combined U .S . + S.V. Ground Operations of Battalion Size or Larger 
I V A L U E 1ST 1 2N3 D 
0 . 0 0 . 3 3 . 0 
2 0.0 0 . 0 3 . 0 
3 0.0 0 . 0 3 . 0	 2 1
'54 0.0 0 . 3 3 . 0	 2 I 
5 0.0 0 . 3 3 . 0	 2 I
}
9 
\\\4 0.0 0 . T 3 . 0	 2 1 7 0.0 0 . 0 3 . 0	 2 I 
8 0.0 0 . 3 3 . 0	 2 I 
9 0.0 0 . 0 3 . 0 •9{	 2 I 10 0.0 0 . 0 3 . 0 \	 2 I 11 0.0 0 . 0 3 . 0 \	 2 I 1.2 0.0 0 . 0 3 . 0	 2 I\13 0.0 0 . 0 3 .0	 2 I514 0.0 0 . 0 3 .0	 2 I615 0.0 0 . 3 3 .0	 2 I 
16 0.0 0 • 0 3 .0 \	 2 I 
17 3.0 0 . 0 3 .0 \\	 2 I 18 0.0 0 . 3 3 . 0 , \	 2 I 19 0.0 a. 3 1.0	 2 I\20 0.0 0 . 0 3 .0 \	 2 I 71 0.0 0 . 3 3 .0	 2 I 
22 0.0 . 3 1.0	 2 I 
23 0.0 . 3 3 .0	 2 I 
I\6
& • —24 0.0 . 0 3 .0 2 I 
25 16.C 1 6. 0 ] S .O 3 - 1 2 I 
26 19.0 . 3 -1 3.0 1 7 ] 
27 9.0 -10 . 3 -1 3 .0 1 2 1 
28 U . O . 0 1 I. 0 Tx. I 2 I 
29 12.0 . 0 - . 0 1 2 I 
30 " . 0 - 4 . 3 - 5.0 1 2 I3<T 31 14.0 . 0 1 3.0 13 1 2 I 
32 " . 0 - 6 . 1 -1 ' . 0 1 2 I 
0 . 0 . 0 . 0 \	 1 2 I 0 . 0 . 0 - ?.o	 1 2 1 
1.0 . 3 . 0	 1 2 I 
5 .0 - 6 . 0 - • r.o	 1 2 I^— 3 . 0 - 2 . 3 . . 0	 1 2 I 
-0 . 0 -? . 0 . 0	 1 2 I 
3 . 0 1 3. 0 1 • . . 0 
——(	 1 2 I 
30.0 . 3 ».o

' 7 . 0 . 0 - 1 ' r>~-— " ' °{

.1 .0 14	 .3 7.0 1 2! 
. 3 . 0 ~~z^° I' 7 . 0 - 4 -1	 1 ce —  I 
58.0 2) . 3 7 ^ • 0 ~\ i 9 2 I 
.0 .0 -1 D . 3 - 7 3 .0 i 2 (>-— 1 
.1 .0 . 3 1 ?.o 2 1 
. 7 .0 . 0 . 0 1 ^ ~ ~ " - ~ P 2 I 
48	 .6 .0 -1 . 3 - r.o 1 <2-i i 
72.0 . 0 2 ' . 0 
. 5 . 0 
- ?7 . 3 -c 3.0 I 2 _ _ _ - o • i 
>7 .0 - 8 . 0 1 J.O 
____J  0 - ' 
52	 P . 0 - 1 9 . 3 -1. . 0 0 - 2 ] 
J O . O 1 2. 3 3 . 0 I 2 1 
6 . 0 - 4 . 0 -1 . 0 r  ^ -L 2 I 
. 9 . 0 7 3 . 0 2 r.o —=«n l 2 i 
4 . 0 - 5 . 3 -2 3.0	 1 2 
1.0 1 7. 0 7 . 0	 S \ 20 1 
0 . 0	 -?1 . 3 - 3 ' • P i 1 ^ 
7 .0	 - 3 3 . 3 -l; . 0 Cfc— 1 ? i 
0 . 0 . 0 ->( . 0 > 3 - ^ 1	 2 1 
4 . 0 . 3 . 0	 1 2 I 
5 . 0 . 0 - . 0 ^b 1 2	 I 
1.0 - 4 . 0 . 0	 1 2 | 
64 4.0 - 7 . 3 - . 0	 1 2 1 
65 3.0 - ! . 3 
. 0	 1 2 I 
66 7.0 . 0 . 0	 1 2 I 
67 5.0 - 2 . n • 0 / 1 2	 I 
68 4.0 - I . 3 . 0	 1 2 I 
69 5.0 1. 3 . 0 {	 1 2 1 
R3)Mr>S ON V* .J:S 3.00 3 0 . 3 0 
0 V&L  U c 
N.V. + V . C . Troops 
ON VAlliE •ST 11 
1 J i 3o 0 
3 ' ?8o C 21

4 14 5o C 27

5 It 5o n c

6 It C c

7 18 7o '1 2 2

8 21 Oo r 23

9 21 C 3

0 ?2 lo n «

1 22 8o C 7

2 23 n 2

3 23 i 8

5 23 5° n o

6 25 Co ( ' I

7 2t 7 , 0 1 7

8 27 J , C 4

9 27 7O C 6

1 28 C 1

2 27 C - A

3 2P ° 1

r. 4 
6 ?3 4°

7 2H 7, i1 3

fl 26 C -1

9 2 = " e

0 29 6. c <.

1 2° 7o '"* 1

2 29 
V.i I 
6 2 = 
BOUNDS PN V A L U L S 
BOUNDS UN F U S T C

BOUNDS ON SECOND

C VALUt

N.V. + V . C . Armed Attacks 
MHN V A L U ? 1ST 
0 . 0 0 .3 0 . 0 •9
7 0. 0 0 .3 0 . 0 If3 0. 0 0 .0 0 . 0 l{4 0 . 0 0 .3 0 . 0 \5 0 . 0 0 .0 0 . 0 {0 0 .0 3 . 0 
0 0 . 0 3 . 0

0 O . D 0 . 0

0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 0 .0 0 . 0 
0 0 .0 0 . 0 
0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 0 .1 0 . 0 
{\\
\
\
\\{ 
\
\
\\\I\
\ 
0 0 .0 0 . 0 
0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 .1 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
{\&
0 137 .3 13 7 . 0 .

5. 0 - 1 2 . 0 - 1 4 9 . 0 ~p 
2. 0 R 7 . 3 9 . 0

1, 0 - 5 0 . 0 -13 7 . 0

7 . 0 2 5 . 0 5 . 0 
8 . 0 - 1 9 . 0 - 4 4.0 '	 0 
1 . 0 23 .0 2 . 0 
7 . 0 6 .0 -1 7 . 0 
0 . 0 6 3 . 0 7 . 0 
5 . 0 - 5 . 1 - 6 8 . 0

>4. 0 9 . 0 4 . 0

7 . 0 1 3 . 0 4 . 3 
6 . 0 11 9 .3 10 6 . 0 
0 .	 0 134 .0 5 . 0

0 - 5 0 . 0 - 2 4 4 . 0 2

0 - 1 4 9 . 0 - 9 9 . 0 1

0 178 .0 3? 7.0

0 - 2 A 1 . 3 -45 9 . 0 1

0 - 1 5 5 . 0 12 6 . 0

0 101 .0 25 6 . 0

5 . 0 - 1 9 . 0 -1? 0 . 0 
0 . 0 - 7 5 . 0 - 5 6 . 0 
4 . 0 V 4 . 0 11 9 . 0	 °<: 
0 4 . 0 - 4 0 . 0 
8 . 0 2 0 . 0 6 . 0

0 12 3 .0 13 3 . 0

6 . 0 115 .0 8 . 0

0 - 1 3 0 . 0 - 2 4 5 . 0 21

4 . 0 l?8 .0 ?c 8 . 0 
4 .	 0 1 0 . 0 -11 8 . 0

0 - 2 5 6 . 0 -26 6 . 0 1 ' 2

7 . 0 39 .0 2=>5 . 0 
9 . 0 7 2 . 0 3 . 0

6* 0 - 1 2 3 . 0 
-19 5 .0

9 . 0 153 .0 27 6 . 0 
7 . 0 - 3 2 . 3 -18 5 . 0 
R. 0 1 1 . 0 3 . 0 
1. 0 - 8 7 . 0 - Q 8 . 0

• • 0 - 7 . 0 0 . 0

2 II 
0 . 0 9 .0 - 2 4 0 . 0	 2 
0 . 0 - 1 4 0 . 0 - 1 4 8 . 0	 1 
7 . 0 - 3 3 . 0 7 . 0 
7 . 0 SO.O 15 3 . 0

5
-
0 -12.3 2 . 0

BUNDS ON V U D = S A* 0.00 591.00 
BOUNDS riN 5 E : C W O D I F F E R EENC55 ARC -455.00 327.30 
V . C  . Terrorist Incidents 
«ON VALUF 1ST 1 2N3 0 
ou'gns ON V » L U  C S 0.00 224.00 S APE -73.00 
IC = S AHE -128.30 
V . C  . Abductions of Civilians 
>00.0 0. 0 
2 392.0 -108.0 
3 672.0 780.0 388 
4 867.0 135.3 - 8 5 
5 600.0 -267.0 -462 
& I 32.0 1037.0 1299 
7 1 J72.0 -5<iO.O -1592 
70.0 -702.0 -142 
80.0 113.3 812 
76.0 196.0 86 
04.0 -1 77.0 -368 
41.0 - S 3 . D 109 
41.0 -230.0 -137 
14 556.0 315.3 515 
15 408.0 - ' 4 8 . 0 -463 
16 180.0 -278.3 - 8 0 
17 181.0 1.3 229 
18 334.0 1 5 3 . 0 15 2 
1? 41.0 - 2 9 3 . 0 -446 
20 293.0 2 5 2 . 3 545 
-3?6 
23 503.0 1 0 . 3 -27.4 
24 345.0 - 1 5 8 . 3 -188 
25 315.0 - 3 0 . 0 128 
26 358.0 4 3 . 3 73 
27 203.0 - 1 5 5 . 3 -198 
28 218.0 1 5 . 0 170 
29 333.0 1 i 5 . 0 100 
33 479.0 96.0 - 1 9 
31 275.0 -234.3 -300 
32 457.0 • " 7 . 0 4 M 
33 967.0 515.0 2P8 
35 587.0 T-5.0 1 070 
36 973.0 3 3 6 . 3 41 
37 833.0 -1 iO.O -526 
38 1823.0 990.3 1130 
39 1096.0 
-777.0 -1717 
40 828.0 -268.0 459 
41 843.0 15.3 2P3 
179 
44 415.0 -77 .3 
-21 
45 952.0 537.0 674 
46 1384.0 432.0 -105 
47 430.0 -954.0 -1 3P6 
48 685.0 755.0 1 209 
50 659.0 -613!? -1343 
51 1178.0 519.3 12C2 
52 628.0 
-550 . 0 -1069 
53 313.C -11 5.3 235 
54 504.0 191.0 506 
56 415.0 1 -.5!° 479 
57 288.0 - )27 .3 -322 
58 187.0 - 1 3 1 . 3 26 
59 282.0 
->5.0 1°6 
60 149.0 - 1 3 3 . 0 -??H 
61 257.0 138.3 241 
62 5°6.0 319.0 231 
63 889.0 " M 3 . 0 - 4 6 
64 889.0 0 .3 -2°3 
65 103-;.0 146.0 146 
66 740.0 
-755.0 -441 
67 517.C -7->3.0 
iO 117.0 - ' 5 . 0 11 3 
U . S . Casualties 
MON VALUE J S T U 2'IC) CJ 
1717, 
- 1•- 3 5 
10UNDS ON VALUES ,

tOUNDS ON FIP5

IQUNDS DN SFCOND DIFFfREENCES ARE

U . S . Troops Killed in Action 
HON V&LUE 1ST D ?\ID 0 
2.0

.8 .0 6 .0

- • <3 5 .0 3 .3 -fr9 
.1 .0 6 .0 59 
il.O -1 0 .0 -36

ri . 0 0 .0 50

74.0 3 .0 - 3 7 
5 . 0 1.0 
>7.0 1.3 
10 1 i4.0 7 .0 55 
9 . 0 30 5.0 3fl

»6.n -2? 3 .0 - )28

r3.o 7.D 50

6 . 0 1° 3.0 66 
u.o 5.0 - 68 
6 . 0 -17 5.3 - >00

.9.0 I' 3 .0 08

)7.0 8 .0 -75

1 .0 - R 6 .3 - 44

)3.0 - 3 8 .0 48

9 . 0 6 .3 74 
9 . 0 - 3 0 . 3 - 26

r 5 w o 14 6 .0 36

8 .C -5 7 .0 03

)3.0 5 .0 42

)9.0 20 6 .0 21

4 . 0 20 5 .0 -1 
0 .0 -2D 4 . 0 -( .09 
29 llc 3 . 0 4H 3.3 >87 
0 .0 -36 3 .0 - 46 
6 . 0 - 7 4 .0 89 
8 .0 -23 8.3 64 
)9.0 . s 6 .0 23 
1.0 17 2 .0 38 
9 . 0 -13 2 .3 - )04 
37 I K 3 .0 41 4 . 0 46 
38 21< >7 .0 103 4 . 0 >20 
39 14< >3 .0 - 7 0 4 . 0 -1 r38 
40 14 0 . 0 -« 3 .0 >21 
41 20=>9 .0 6ft 9 . 0 f72 
42 11' 6 . 0 -95 3 .0 -1 >4 2 
7 . 0 -35 9 .3 >94 
45 10 3 .0 1.3 . 64 
1 .0 -47 2 . 3 -<.73 
3 .0 12 2 .0 )94 
3 . 0 0 .0 - 02 
9 . 0 6 .3 26 
50 11 ' 0 . 0 39 1.3 35 
51 12" 4 . 0 12 4 . 0 57 
7 . 0 - 4 ? 7 .0 - 51 
53 11 0 . 0 3? 3 .0 T50 
54 11C 0 .0 - 7 0 . 0 - 93 
7 . 0 - 4 8 3 . 0 - .13 
9 . 0 15 2 .0 .35 
5 .0 -11 2 .3 BO 
6 . 0 1.0 93 
0 . 0 -11 6 .0 97 
2 . 0 2 .3 18 
5 . 0 3 .0 81 
4 . 0 9 . 0 • 6 4 
6 . 0 2 .0 73 
9 . 0 20 3.3 11 
8 .0 -31 1.0 14 
1 .0 - 9 7 .0 14 
8 . 0 
-I 3.<T 84 
9 . 0 9 .0 - 7 6 
B3UNDS ON V»LJES 12.00 2197.33 
S.V. Troops Killed in Action 
M O N V A L U F 1ST 
5 . 0 0 . 0 3 .0 !

2 9' »3.0 >8.3 0 .0 I

3 7 7 . 0 - 2 6 .3 -2 «4.0 I

4 5Cn.o -1 !6 .0 
a 0 . 0 I

5 10 5 . 0 (, 4 . 0 5 k 3 . 0 I

6 12 1 .0 1 ?6.0 - 2 28.0 ]

7 11 3 . 0 - 3*3.0 - 2 34.0 1

8 7 2 . 0 -3 . 1 . 0 - 2 ^3.0 I

9 6 )5.C -1 • 7 . 0 2 4 . 0 I

11 10' 4 . 0 1 D 4 . 0 -1 71.0 I

12 11 19.0 1 •  5 . 3 b i .o r

13 7 3 . 0 - 4 76 .0 - 6 • 1.0 I

14 10 9 . 0 3 5 6 . O 8 • 2 .0 I

15 9( )8.0 -I 51 .0 - 5 • 7 .0 I

16 5" 4 . 0 -3 54. 3 - 1 53.0 I

17 6' 0 . 0 )6 .0 4 DO.O I

18 8( 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 *4.0 I

19 8 2 . 0 - ' 8 . 3 - 2 • 8 .0 I

20 6C 9 . 0 -1 )3.3 -1 D5.0 I

21 5( 6 . 0 -1 3 . 0 - 0 . 0 I

2 2 8" 7 . 0 3 1.3 4 • 4 . 0 I

23 8( )4.0 - 73 .0 -3 34.0 1

24 7 9 . 0 5 .3 58.0 I

1.0 I

26 9< 8 . 0 J 3 . 0 33.0 I
_

27 2« 5 . 0 3 57 .0 2 • 4 . 0 I

28 0" 7 . 0 -1 >8. 3 - 5 •>5.0 I

1< 6 . 0 9 .3 2 »7.0 I

9 1 . 0 -I )5. 0 - 2 54.0 I

6 4 . 0 -3 •7 .0 -1 S.2.0 I

o)0.0 16 .3 - 3 24.0 I

0 2 . 0 -
 9 .3 -1 4 .0 I

2< )9.0 2 ) T . 3 3 25.0 I

LI >0.0 -1 9. 3 - 4 36.0 I

28 1 .0 16 1.0 17 30.0 I

51C 8 . 0 23 5 7 . 0 7 56.0 I

7 . 0 - 2 7 1 .0 - 5 0 38.0 I

L9- • 6 .0 I

19 ?8.0 I

L9" 4 . 0 -13 5 1 .  n -28 4 .0 I

3( 4 . 0 -6 0 . 0 7 71.0 I

?3 6 . 0 9 5 2 . 0 15 >2.0 I

21< 4 . 0 -1 )2.3 -11 D4.0 I

p 1 .0 - 1 0 3 . 0 - 8 31.0 I

47 4( )8.0 2 77. 3 13 0 .0 I

4( 0 . 0 2 .0 -2 25.0 I

6 0 . 0 1 0.3 38.0 I

50 IZ'e 0 . 0 «, 0 . 0 4 bO.O I

11 5 . 0 -1 )5 .D - 7 5 .0 r

L7 0 . 0 - 4 )5 .0 - 3 D O . O I

21" 8 . 0 4 > 8 . C 8 73.0 I

54 8' 7 . 0 -3 1.3 - 7 79.0 I

4( 8 . 0 - 4 > 9 . 0 - 1 • 8 .0 I

L5 »0.0 1 2 . 0 5 n.o 1

014.0 -5 6 . 0 - 6 8 .0 1

545.0 51 1. 0 10 >7.0 I

068.0 5' 3 . 0 8 .0 I

017.0 -10 s 1.3 - 1 5 74.0 I

437.0 4 0 . 0 14 71.0 I

se6 . 0 - 5 ' 1 .0 -9" 1 . 0 I

64 602.0 3 . 0 - 6 0 .0 I

67 51 2 . 0 - 4 ; 6 . 0 r3.o 1

68 1 280.0 - 2 2 .3 I 4 .0 I

69 "74.0 -3 6 .0 4 .0 I

83J>)DS nN VaiUIrS »}? 56 i .O3 5 1 9 8 . 0 0 
BOUNDS IN F U S  T DIF CERFNC ES ARE - 2 7 1 1 . 0 0 2337 .30 
B1US0S ON SrCDNO I I F F E ^ E E N ^ S A * E -5O9fl.3O 214S .30 
S.V. Casualties 
JST 0 2ND D

1 1) 7 4 . 0 0 . 0 I

2 ) 1 5 C . C -2 4o 0 . 0 I

7 6 . C - ) 7 4 . ' - 1 5 0 . 0 
4 6 . 0 - 0 .  44 o 01 3 D

5 13 1 9 . 0 4 " 3. 1 fcO3 . 0 I

6 i 5 56o o 23 7 . 1 - 2 3 6 . C I

7 14 CCoO - ' 5 6a : - 3 9 3o0 I

a nC B . O - 29 2 . 3 - 1 3 6 . 0 I

5 5 , 0 - 1 ; 3 ? 3a , o i

0 12 °1. C i3 6<. 4B 9 .0 I

1 13 t4o 0

2 14 = 4,. 0 i 3 I "'"7°n I
n° 
8 0 . 5 ­ 51

4 ) 3 3 0 . 2 J>4 9. 3 .2 I

5 12 3 2 . ) Ru -z>4 7c 8 I

0 2 . 3 - 42 9. S • 33 ' . 7 1

7 9 . 1 ho 3 5C b . 6 I

e n 3 C . 0 2 5

9 11 0 5 . a 4 . ' - 2 7 5 . '

45.(5 - ' 6 lo -1 36j 0 ] 
6o 3 . 7 1

2 12 2 3 , 7 ~ \ \ 4o ?7 i.J I

3 10 ' 2 4 O 4 I

, ^

5 ! 111° 2

6 1 C8 = . 7 - 1 3 2 .1 !

7 15 3 5 * o • • 4 to 54 8 . 7 I

8 13 C 8 r 5 22

9 14 50 o 5 1 42o 36 9 . 4

0 10 P 8 . 7 - 1b L. 3 - 5 0 3 . 8 1

5 6 . 2 • 1 32 . 9 , 3 I

2 1 1? 4 . ' ? *

3 11 0 2 . 4 9 1 # f - 3 2 9 n 6 ] 
4 11 C t . P 3o 5 . 5 I

5 15 5 Q . , 3 4 C T u 44 9 . 3 I

6 17 1 3 . .2 1 53o -pa 3 .2 I

SOUNDS

BOUNDS 0 473o3C 
BOUNDS ,i) 863.20 
] FIRST DIFFf SiCUNO DIFFERENCE 
"Vietnamization" (U.S. KIA/S.V. KIA) 
MON V&LUE 1ST D 2ND 0 
1 1 3 7 . 0 0 .3 0 . 0 I

2 5 C 9 . 0 372 .0 0 . 0 I

3 2 0 6 . 0 - 3 0 3 . 3 - 6 7 5 . 0 I

6 9 4 . 0 4 B 8 . 0 7 9 1 . 0 I

5 3 0 5 . 0 - 3 P 9 . 0 - 8 7 7 . 0 I

6 5 8 6 . 0 2 9 1 . 0 6 7 0 . 0 I

7 6 5 9 . 0 7 3 . 0 - 2 0 8 . 0 I

S 1 0 8 7 . 0 42 8 .0 35 5 . 0 I

9 1481 .0 3 9 4 . 0 - 3 4 . 0 I

10 1 7 6 3 . 0 2 9 2 . 0 - 1 1 2 . 0 I

11

14 4 2 8 3 . 0 5 3 7 . 0 - 1 2 1 7 . 0 I

IS 5 4 0 7 . 0 1124 .0 6 1 7 . 0 I

16 5 5 0 5 . 0 9 8 . 0 - 1 0 2 6 . 0 I

17 T 0 1 6 . 0 1511 .0 1 4 1 3 . 0 I

IB 5 8 9 5 . 0 - 1 1 2 1 . 3 - 2 6 3 2 . 0 !

19 5 0 5 6 . 0 - 8 3 9 . 0 2 « 2 . 0 r

21 7 4 0 3 . 0 1924 .0 1 5 0 1 . 0 !

22 3 7 5 1 . 0 - 1 6 5 2 . 0 - 5 5 7 6 . 0 I

23 5 9 0 8 . 0 2157 .0 5 8 0 9 . 0 I

2* 5 2 9 8 . 0 - 6 1 0 . 0 - 2 7 6 7 . 0 I

25 5 6 8 4 . 0 3 9 6 . 0 9 °6 .0 I

27 7 2 1 3 . 0 - I S 6 . 3 - 1 93 1 . 0 I

28 6 7 1 7 . 0 - 5 S 6 . 0 - 4 0 0 . 0 I

4 2 5 9 . 0 I

32 5 0 1 0 . 0 - 5 5 5 3 . 0 - 9 6 4 9 . 0 I

33 7 1 1 0 . 0 2130 .0 8 6 5 0 . 0 I

3* 6 8 7 0 . 0 - 2 4 0 . 0 - 2 3 4 3 . 0 I

35 6 7 8 2 . 0 - 8 8 . 0 1 5 2 . 0 I

36 6 4 5 7 . 0 - 3 2 5 . 3 - 2 3 7 . 0 I

38 4 2 ? 7 . 0 30 .3 2 4 1 0 . 0 I

39 600 3 . 0 1 7 7 6 . 0 1 6 8 6 . 0 I

40 7 3 3 6 . 0 1 3 3 3 . 0 - 4 4 3 . 0 I

41 6 2 5 6 . 0 - 1 0 8 0 . 0 - 2 4 1 3 . 0 I

42 5 8 0 5 . 0 - 4 5 1 . 0 6 2 9 . 0 I

43 5 7 7 0 . 0 - 3 5 . 0 4 1 6 . 0 I

44 4 5 4 2 . 0 - 1 2 2 8 . 3 - 1 1 9 3 . 0 I

45 4 8 6 6 . 0 3 > 4 . 3 1 5 5 2 . 0 I

46 5 1 3 7 . 0 271 .3 - 5 3 . 0 I

47 49<>3.0 -1'+4.0 - 4 1 5 . 0 I

48 4 9 5 2 . 0 - 4 1 . 0 1 0 3 . 0 I

49 4 7 7 6 . 0 
- 1 7 6 . 0 - 1 3 5 . 0 I

50 5 1 8 0 . 0 4 3 4 . 3 5 8 0 . 0 I

51 6 0 2 4 . 0 9 4 4 . 0 4 4 0 . 0 I

52 4 9 5 3 . 0 - 1 3 7 1 . 0 - 1 9 1 5 . 0 I

53 53^2 .0 4 1 9 . 0 1 4 9 0 . 0 I

54 5 8 9 2 . 0 5 2 0 . 0 1 0 1 . 0 I

56 4 9 " 4 . 0 6 1 2 . 3 2 1 2 2 . 0 I

57 4 7 0 4 . 0 - 2 9 0 . 0 - 9 0 2 . 0 I

58 2 3 6 2 . 0 - 2 3 * 2 . 0 - 2 0 5 2 . 0 !

2 1 3 7 . 0 I

61 2 3 1 0 . 0 - 9 1 5 . C - 2 0 2 3 . 0 ! 
- 4 2 7 4 . 0 I

64 3 2 8 3 . 0 4 3 9 . 0 2 1 O O . 0 I

65 2 9 1 2 . 0 - 3 7 1 . 3 - 8 7 0 . 0 I

64 20°1.0 - 8 2 1 . 0 - 4 5 0 . 0 I

67 2 0 4 2 . 0 - 4 9 . 0 7 7 2 . 0 I

68 2 4 0 6 . 0 3 6 4 . 0 4 1 3 . 0 I

69 2 2 4 9 . 0 - 1 5 7 . 0 - 5 2 1 . 0 I

BOUNDS nN V U J = S M- 137 .00 11560 .33 
BOJNOS IN FIUST ~>I=FFOFNCFS 4RC - 6 5 5 ? . 00 3693 .00 
BOUNDS ON S ? : 3 V D DIFFE»=EN"ES A1F - 9 6 * ° . 0 0 9653 .30 
0 V4L'IC ' FIRST DIFFERENCE 2 SFCO^O IHFFE'F.NCE 
N.V. + V . C . Troops Killed in Action 
M3N VALUE 1ST 3 
1 2 1 3 1 0.3 
• ) 1675 .0 -456.0 1.0

3 1956 .0 28 . 0 7 3 7 . 0

- ' • , 4 1909 .0 7. 3 - 32 1.0 
5 1911 .0 . 0 4 J.O 
A 220S .0 29 f. 3 29 ).O 
7 2 8 8 ! .0 67 5.3 37 l.( 
8 3507 .0 67 ..0 - 5 .0 
13 3749 .0 26 ..0 28 >.o 
U 5516 .0 176 r.o 150 . 0 
1? 3944 .0 - 1 * 7 ' .0 - 3 3 3 9 . 0 
13 2562 .0 -133 . 0 190 .0 
14 5064 .0 250 .3 3 8 R 4 . 0 
11 5501 .0 437.3 - 2 0 6 5 . C 
16 2818 .0 -?6P • 3 - 3 1 2 0 . 0 
17 4102 • 0 12S4 .0 3 96 7 . 0 
1 8 4815 .0 71 3 .0 -57 . 0 
19 5126 .0 31 .0 -407.0 
?  ] 445 9 .0 -171 .0 -1755.0 
?? 5482 . g« 1023.0 2234.0 
?3 544 7 .0 - 3 5 . 0 -105 . 0 
74 3739 .0 -17C( -1673.0 
75 5868 ,P 71  ? r .0 3837.0 
76 786 5.-0 1997.0 - l? ; . 0 
77 9049 • 0 U84.0 -81 ' . 0 
28 6277 . 0 .0 - 4 0 0 6 . 0 
31 7667 . 0 1 1 •• .3 2 45 0 . 0 
32 567 7 . 0 - 2 0 4 ! .0 - 7 3 5 ' . 0 
34 6069 . 0 - 2 « 5 . 0 - 1 0 1 7 . 0 
36 7681 . 0 19 .3 -157< . 0 
38 41241 . 3 265! c .0 947C . 0 
40 12715 . 0 9935 .0 
41 5641 .0 Jill•° 
.0 -1 29">C . 0 - .0 
43 6438 . 0 - 3 B S 1 . 0 910 c .0 
.0 
. 3 - .0 
46 7904 . 0 -4631 . 0 .0 
48 9?Q0 . 0 -342 .0 - 2 0 7 0 . 0 
49 1060! . 0 I3i: .0 1 6 5 ' . 0 
50 1509' . 0 4491 .0 318C . 0 
51 1°1S6 . 0 4374 .3 -411 .0 
•8701 .0 
.0 
54 16825 . 0 .0 7 3°t • 0 
55	 9906 . 0 -691 o .0 6 86 4 .0 
.0 
58 8465 0 -1 304 .n - 3 0 0 . 0 
59 11639 0 31 74 . 3 5078 .0 
60 I M S . 0 - ' 1 7 4 . 3 -5198 • 0 
61 8891 . 0 . 0 1 3PQ . 0 
62 9459 . 0 . 0 lie,? . 0 
63 10001 . 0 542 -76	 .0 
.0 
66 7861 jp -8810 !°- ?474 • p 
67 -11 0 
6fl 67 3 i 0'I 7?a" 
N . V . + V . C . Attrition 
MON VALUE 1ST D 2ND P 
1 8248.0 C, C 0, 
2 6)74.0 -2074.0 o,

3 7276.C 1102.C 3176,

4 8552.0 1276.0 174,

5 7949o0 -603.0 -1879,

6 7S32.0 - 1 7 . 0 586,

7 10516. C 2584.C 2601,

8 12752.0 223fc«0 -348, 
9 12111.0 -641.0 -2877, 
10 13441.0 1330.0 1971. 
12 14078.0 -6838.0-14313, 
13 J0547.C -3531.C 33C7, 
14 15718..0 5171.C 8702. 
15 20876.0 5158oO -13, 
16 10258c0-l 0618, 0-15776. 
17 14555.0 4297.0 14915, 
18 243C3.0 9748.0 5451, 
20 19847.C 2054.0 8564, 
22 22558.0 6119.0 9527, 
23 18592.0 -3966. 0-100e5, 
24 15230.0 -3362.0 604, 
25 23257.0 8027.0 11389, 
26 26259.0 3002.0 -5025, 
27 38687.0 12428.C 9426, 
28 253C2. 0-13385. 0-25813, 
29 37854oO 1 2 5 52, C 25937, 
1SS61 
31 38693. 0 8 2 4 8 . 0 156 57 
32 25482 . 0- '1 3 2 1 1 . 0 - 2 1 4 5 9 
33 259S5. 0 5 1 3 . C '3724 
34 31025. 0 5 0 3 0 . 0 4517 
35 32110. c 1C8 5. 0 -3945 
BOUNDS ON VALUES ARE 6174.00 38693o00 
BOUNDS ON FIPST DIFFERENCES ARE -li385,00 12552,00 
BOUNDS CN SECOND DIFFEREENCES ARE -25813.00 25937.00 
0 VALUE 1 FIRST DIFFERENCE 2 SECOND DIFFERENCE 
Kill Ratio (U.S. + S . V . / N . V . + V . C . ) x 10 
MON VALUE 1ST 0 2ND D 
0 . 0	 0» 0

0o

-5o

) -1 - 1 5 .

°	 " 7,, 
0 . 1 q. 
6 .	 5 . ' - 1 0 . 
4 . - 1 ?. - 1 8 .

6.," 14 .

_

5." - 7 .

7 . - 1 1 . 
9 . - O o L1. - - 1 4 . 
5. -
'^_ 
-Bo 
1 ll 
'
c 
,° 
2o« -•3.

'. . C . 1 . ( - 8 .

1	 23. 1°. l\ 
- ?I - 1 . 
~°'	 ?°l 
13. 
4 t 6 . 
1. - 1 
~
2\° 
0 . 1 ! 
"4" I'' - 0 ] 
BOUNDS TN V4LUES AF S ) do 9' 54-76 
SOUNDS ON FI1-ST OIFFFPFNC^S ARL - 1 2 67 1 6 . 1 4 
BOUNDS CN SFC1MC DIFFFPEENCFS ARE -?.l.,b? 23,7). 
0 VALUb ] FIUST DIFFtBLNCE 2 S?CUNI) DIFFERENCE 
N.V. + v.C. Weapons Captured 
1 700.0 0.0 0.0

2 701.0 1.0 0.0

3 569.0 -112.0 -113.0

4 1088.0 439.0 611.0

5 795.0 -293.3 -792.0

6 725.0 -70.3 223.0 
7 8*5.0 120.3 190.0 
8 995.0 150.0 30.0 
9 855.0 -1*0.0 -290.0 
10 999.0 1*4.0 28*.0 
11 2178.0 1179.0 1035.0 
12 1088.0 -1090.0 -2269.0 
13 1077.0 -11.0 1079.0 
1* 1212.0 1)5.0 1*6.0 
15 1955.0 7*3.0 608.0 
IS 910.0 -1045.0 -1788.0 
17 1066.0 156.0 1201.0 
18 3838.0 2772.0 2616.0 
19 1325.0 -2513.0 -5285.0 
20 1380.0 55.0 2568.0 
21 l*B2.0 132.3 *7.0 
23 1397.0 -525.0 -9fr5.0 
2* 1571.0 17*.0 699.0 
25 228*.0 713.0 539.0 
26 2566.0 2^2.3 - *31 .0 
27 3703.0 1137.0 855.0 
28 2118.0 -1585.0 -2722.0 
29 26"1.0 573.0 2158.0 
30 1979.0 -712.0 -1285.0 
31 3395.0 1*16.0 2128.0 
32 2001.0 - U 9 * . O -2810.0 
3* 3196.0 1319.3 1 4 * 3 . 0 
35 2579.0 -617.0 -1 93 6 . 0 
39 4*85.0 - * *n .o -9415.0 
*1 8395.0 3 O * * . O 2178.0 
•2 5259.0 -3156.0 -6180.0 
*3 26*2.0 - 2 M 7 . 0 519.0 
45 *6*3 .0 -957.0 -3915.0 
47 3906.0 113.3 963.0 
48 3983.0 77.0 -36 .0 
49 5*2 3.0 1**0.3 1363.0 
51 7498.0 997.0 -81.0 
$2 7290.0 -238.0 -1205.0 
53 6826.0 - * 6 * . O -256.0 
56 4217.0 -??8.3 1476.0 
57 3608.0 -519.0 -291.0 
58 392*.0 2 2 6 .0 7*5.0 
59 3835.C - 8 9 . 0 -315.0 
61 3830.0 - J 5 2 . 0 -719.0 
62 57*6.0 1916 .0 2278.0 
63 *189.0 - 1 5 5 7 . 0 -3473.0 
68 3*53.0 - S ' 7 . 3 5916.0 
U . S  . Public Disapproval of the President 
tON V A L U F 1ST 
U . S  . Public Approval of the President 
1.0 0 . 0 o . o r 
1 .0 0 . 0 0 . 0 I

9 . 0 - >.o	 - ?.O I

7 . 0 - >.o	 - 3.0 I

4 . 0 - 5.D	 - . 0 I

0 . 0 S.O ' . 0 I

9 . 0 - . 3	 - r.o I

5 . 0 . 0	 - 1.0 I

5 . 0 ).O • . 0 I

3 . 0 - . 0	 - . 0 I

4 . 0 . 3 1.0 I

2 . 0 - . 0	 - 1.0 I

3 . 0 . 3 S .O I

1 .0 - >.O	 - . 0 I

8 . 0 - . 3	 - . 0 I

7 . 0 - . 3 . 0 I

4 . 0 - . 0	 - ' . 0 I

0 . 0 -i ,.0	 - . 0 I

6 . 0 >.O	 ] ).O I

1 .0 - .3 -1 . 0 I

8 . 0 - ).O > . O I

4 . 0 - >.o	 - . 0 I

4 . 0 ).n . . 0 I

6 . 0 . 0 . 0 I

7 . 0 . 0	 - . 0 I

6 . 0 - . 0	 - . 0 I

5 . 0 - . 0	 - ).O I

6 . 0 . 0 » .O I

5 . 0 - . 0	 - . 0 I

2 . 0 r.3 5.0 I

2 . 0 ).o - r.o i

°.O -1 • 3 -1 .0 I

9 . 0 ).3	 1 S.O I

8 . 0 - • 0 . 0 I

1 .0 . 0 >.O I

6 . C . 0 ' . 0 I

8 . 0 . 3	 - . 0 I

8 . 0 -• 0 . 0 I

6 . 0 -1 . 3 -1 . 0 I

9 . 0 1" . 0	 2 . 0 I

1 .0 - . 0 -2 . 0 I

2 . 0 . 1 » .O I

0 . 0	 - . 0 - . 0 I

5 . 0 -
- . 0 . 0 I

5 . 0 . 0 . 0 I

2 . 0 . 0 r.o I

3 . 0 . 0	 - ).O I

4 . 0 • 0 . 0 I

9 . 0 1 . 0	 1< . . 0 t 
1 .0 . 0 -1 (.0 I

3 . 0	 • a ).O 1

1.0 -
- ; . 0 t.O ! 
5 . 0 • 0 . 0 1

3 . 0 . 0	 - . 0 I

5 . 0 . 0 > .O 1

2 . 0 - . 0	 - • 0 ! 
8 . 0 • 3	 - . 0 I

6 . 0 - ; . 0 . 0 I

8 . 0 I ; . 0	 1« . 0 I

9 . 0 -c . 0 -? . 0 I

6 . C .0	 1 ( • 0 I

6 . 0 -1 C . 0 -1 . 0 I

;.o - - .0 . 0 1

e.o .0 . 0 1

9 . 0 .0 . 0 I

5 . 0 -< • 0	 - . 0 I

1 . 0 . 0	 1C . 0 I

5 . 0 -( . 0 -1 . 0 I

6 . 0 . 0 . 0 I

B O U N D S O N V4Lll=S . 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
S.V. Popular Confidence 
1ST 1 2N3 0 
3

4 ' 3 2 1 9 . 0 - 3 9 2 . o 991 .8

S >33?0.0 131. 3 493 .1

6 >3056.0 - 2 6 4 . 1 - 3 6 5 . 0

n >42?3.4 - 1 4 4 5 . • - 4 0 5 8 . 2 
g >28??.4 - 1 4 3 1 . 3 4 4 . 4 
10 ° 1 ' 7 . 3 - 3 6 9 5 . -2294.1 
11 8701.5 - 4 ? 5 . 1 3269 .4 
1? 7481.R - 1 7 1 9 . » - 7 9 4 . C 
13 92^9 .7 758 . 3 1977 .7 
IS 7006.8 - 5 4 0 . 5 152.2 
16 6869.1 - 1 * 7 . ? 4 0 2 . 6 
17 5608 .? - 1 ' S O . ' - 1 1 2 3 . 2 
IB 6013.1 405 . 3 1665 . ° 
1° 7701.4 16=18. > 12P3 .3 
?n 1630 .4 30->Q. 77/ .0 .8 
21 03"'7.8 - 1 2 ^ 2 . -. - 5 1 8 1 . 7 
22 ° 7 40 .3 - 6 3 7 . 615.1 
2* 1216 .0 723 . 7 - 2 8 . 3 
25 0657.7 -551?. - 1 2 R 2 . 0 
26 083° .0 I 'M. J 739 .6 
27 25*4 .1 1715. 1533 .8 
in 4473. i 07*,. 830 .8 
31 5«*°.l 1535. 561 .0 
1* 4 5 4 0 . 7 - 2 1 5 3 . -I 300 .4 
35 336O.7 - 6 8 0 . ) 147 3 .2 
17 0350.P - 1 1 3 3 . 1 1123.1 
64^0.6 -761 f,. - 1 1 3 5 3 . 7 
40 
41 I R541 .O -3'»9. - 2 7 6 3 . 2 
42 1 705 8 . 4 - ! 4 8 2 . -1 133 .7 
41 
44 1 563-1.?. - 1 3 4 9 . " - \ 3 ? 4 . 2 
45 4 6 4 ' . 7 - 1 0 1 5 . 314.1 
47 1 5133.9 - ^ 2 . - 7 2 1 . 2 
4R 5504.6 3?0 . 41 3 .2 
49 5 7 " ' . 6 - 2 2 2 . - 5 4 2 . 7 
50 1 52°5.9 13 . 235 .3 
51 5263.3 - 3 2 . r - 4 6 . 0 
53 1 6188.8 3 6 8 . - 1 8 8 . 6 
54 6386.3 1 9 7 . ' - 1 7 1 . 1 
56 6116.5 772 . 815 .0 
57 1 5155.8 - 9 S 0 . - 1 « 3 3 . 4 
58 5 3 3 C . Q 730. 1 190 .8 
59 1 3450 . ° - IT34 . C - 2 1 6 5 . 0 
6  1 0731.•= - 1 3 S ? . C - 6 . 4 
6 0A60 .9 - 2 7 0 . ' no?. ' 
6 Q W .  ^  -651. - 3 S 0 . 3 
6 8947.0 - B S 2 . 
- 2 1 1 . 1 
6 9 *50 .6 503 . 1366.1 
> 0576.5 10-fS.c 5^7.<, 
6 06^6.1 139 . -<3*«i .  4 
61 1 0 5 T 6 . 5 - • . -> . - 2 C 9 . 1 
47.01 2"S64.11 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
S.V. Piastre Value in Saigon Black Market 
1 7233.0 ).O 0 . 0 
2 7242 .0 ' . 0 0 . 0 
3 7196 .0 - 4 5 . 0 - 5 5 . 0 
4 7161.0 - 3 . 0 11 .0 
5 7208.0 4 r.o 82.0 
-6 7205.0 ! .  O - 5 0 . 0 
7 7637 .0 43 ?.o 43 5 .0 
8 7545 .0 - 9 . 0 - 5 2 4 . 0 
9 7 132.0 -41 s.o - 3 2 1 . 0 
10 6184.0 - 9 4 . 0 - 5 3 5 . 0 
11 6188 .0 . 0 952.0 
12 5868 .0 -32( ).O - 3 2 4 . 0 
14 6000 .0 7 . 0 1 8 .0 
15 5996 .0 -l . 0 - 7 9 . 0 
16 5899 .0 - 9 . 0 -°3.0 
17 5449 .0 - 4 5 ).O -353.0 
18 5280 .0 -16< ).O 281.0 
19 4966.0 - 3 1 < . 0 -145.0 
21 5 889.0 - 3 6 . 0 -1647.0 
22 5913 .0 2< »• 0 386.0 
23 5 970 .0 r.o -17.0 
24 6022.0 10 ' • 0 95.0 
25 5 890.0 -13 . 0 -234.0 
26 5 966 .0 7 • 0 208.0 
27 6 00 3 .0 1 r.o -39.0 
28 6 540 .0 53 r.o 500.0 
29 6478 .0 - 6 ».o -509.0 
30 6465 .0 -I ).O 49.0 
31 6 764 .0 
32 6 830.0 6 >.o -233.0 
33 6 740.0 - } >.o -156.0 
34 6484 .0 -25 >.o -1(6.0 
35 6415 .0 -•, 5.0 187.0 
36 6004 .0 -41 . 0 -342.0 
37 6 105.0 10 . 0 512.0 
38 5 93 1.0 - 1 7 . . 0 -275.0 
39 5000 .0 -93 . 3 -757.0 
40 6013 .0 101 S.3 1944.0 
41 5 897 .0 -11 b.O -1129.0 
42 5 719.0 - 1 7 ).O -62.0 
43 5 646.0 - 7 s.o 105.0 
45 4989 .0 -33 5.0 -21.0 
47 5115 .0 - 7 ' • . 0 -274.0 
48 5 141.0 ? ).O 100.0 
49 5 147.0 3 . 0 -20.0 
50 5 189.0 C ».O 36.0 
51 5 232 .0 3.0 1 .0 
52 5 287.0 •i 5.0 12.0 
53 53 5 6 . 0 S ).3 14.0 
54 5 228.0 -12 1.0 -l°7.0 
55 5031 .0 -19 r.o -63.0 
56 4864 .0 -16 r.o 30.0 
58 44 7 0 . 0 
" 
3 >.o 326.0 
lH 351.0 6  3 166.0 .0 37.0 
6  3 05 6 .0 -11 . 0 1*3.0 
6  2 808 .0 - 2 4 J.T 
-tm.o 
6  244°.o - 3 5 < • 0 -111.0 
6  2 562.0 11 . 3 472.0 
6 2 750.0 1» 1.0 75.0 
-6  2 724.0 7 b.O -214.0 
6  2692.0 - 3 -6 .0 
6  2457.0 - 2 3 5. 0 -203.0 
BOUNDS PN V4LUP 
BOUNDS 3N F M S T IIFFERENCFS AH -948.00 1285.30 
BOUNDS ON S=C1N 
S.V. Money Supply 
MON VALUE 1ST 0 2ND 0 
B O U N D S ON V O L j r S A"' ?7,'"J

B O U N D S ON h I (• ST ,11 f I- r: h tNCr S /S'.c

B O U N D S ON S' C !ND L i r F T h t t N C r S <'.rtF

r VALU: ] FIRST O I K - H . - M C  : SCCQNI) DIFFERENCE 
S.V. Cost of Living 
MON VALUE .1ST C 2NO 0 
1 10 - C c. 0 I

2 10 7o C „ c . 0

3 10 5,. C - ; . c 
-; . 0 I

4 1C 7 o n , 0 . 0 I

5 il CoC ,c oO I

6 ' I 2of 0 oO I

7 12 1 0 r , 0 I

8 12 2o C ,c -f , n I

9 12 P C c •j C
0 13 3oC >^  -1 O 0 I

°c 
, 0 I

2 14 3°r . 0 1

3 15 7« C o 0 , 0

4 1? 5o ° _2 , r - )> o 0 I

5 15 6. .C , C n O I

6 16 3 o 0 o C . 0

7 16 "oC o 0 - . 0 I

8 ie b<, r 11o 0 If . 0 I

9 11 1 o ° ,c 2< oO

0 Z\ RoO „ C y o 0

1 21 8O r . c ,0 I

2 Zl 7o r - J a r. . 0 I

3 22 5o0 t C )»0 I

4 22 9 , C 0 C • 0 I

5 ?4 2., c 1" j C

6 24 6oO ., 0
 o • • ) 
7
 ' ' l°~ ' ! j C • •' 
•7° ~ 
, c u In : 
0	 27 2oC ' - ' -< \ '
n

4 L1

2 29 •> c o o

3 20 ) „ n ,c - . 0

4 2S 9 C - c -( - 0 I

5 3T o C
;." ( "n 
BOUNDS CN VAl  U c ; 305.00 
BOUNOS ON H ( ST -IC.CO 3 6o'0 
BOUNDS ON S'CCNT DIFFFfLcNCtS 39 n 20 00 
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that shape decisions on whether and h o w a war 
is to be fought. These motives would be very 
different from those one could infer if principal 
policy-makers had simply miscalculated the ef­
fects of their policies and actions. Calculation of 
domestic and international political advantage 
vies with miscalculated but well-intended policy 
as descriptions of U . S  . policy in Vietnam. 
Professor Milstein skillfully extracts from the 
public and private statements of those officials 
charged with conduct of the war the models 
they constructed to decide and explain their 
actions. Utilizing extensive data, he tests these 
models and determines empirically valid rela­
tionships between military actions and their 
political consequences. H  e presents these rela­
tionships as an interrelated set of time-lagged 
statistical equations in linear multiple regres­
sion form, and uses these as a model for a dy­
namic computer simulation of political and 
military relations in the Vietnam W a r . This 
computer simulation makes some remarkably 
accurate predictions of the consequences of 
policy decisions and actions in the war, and also 
predicts what might have happened had either 
more hawkish or more dovish policies been 
followed. 
Ultimately, Mister Milstein is able to analyze, 
on both theoretical and empirical grounds, that 
basic political dilemma posed to leaders on both 
sides of the conflict: the decision whether to 
trade off political support that is the source of 
their power for the extension of that power. 
Jeffrey S. Milstein did this research on the 
Vietnam W a  r while earning his P h . D  . in politi­
cal science from Stanford University and as an 
assistant professor of political science at both 
Michigan State University and Yale University. 
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